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Analysing documents produced by the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, 
the thesis examines the role of intelligence assessment in U.S. Vietnam policy 
during the period between December 1961 and February 1965. It investigates 
intelligence on the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, on the intentions and 
capabilities of North Vietnam, and on the probable consequences of policy options.  
     The first half of the thesis examines the Vietnam intelligence during the 
Kennedy administration, following the rise of optimism in 1962 and the 
intelligence dispute in 1963. The second half of the study explores intelligence 
developments from the fall of the Diem regime in November 1963 to President 
Johnson’s decision to take military action against North Vietnam in February 1965.  
      The study suggests that intelligence deficiencies played a significant role in 
both the failure of counterinsurgency in the first half of the 1960s and in the 
decision for direct military intervention in 1965. The thesis also demonstrates that, 
rather than simply being a result of technical weaknesses, the lack of robust 
intelligence reflected wider problems of Vietnam policy, including political 
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In his oft-quoted essay on Leo Tolstoy (“The Hedgehog and the Fox”), philosopher 
Isaiah Berlin uses a line by the Greek poet Archilochus – “the fox knows many 
things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing" – to illustrate what he sees as “one of 
the deepest differences which divides writers and thinkers, and it may be, human 
beings in general.” On the one side of this “great chasm,” according to Berlin, are 
those “who relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more 
coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel – a single 
universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has 
significance.” The intellectual lives of those on the other side, in contrast, are 
“centrifugal rather than centripetal.” Their minds are “scattered or diffused, moving 
on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects 
for what they are in themselves, without, consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit 
them into, or exclude them from, any one unchanging, all embracing, sometimes 
self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision.”1 
     In studies of international politics, the aversion to a “fanatical, unitary inner 
vision” figures prominently in the writings of Classical Realists, who dominated 
the discipline in the mid-twentieth century. One of the defining features of political 
realism, according to William Wohlforth, is the primacy of the “dispassionate 
analysis” of the security situation based on a “deep familiarity with specific players 
involved in each situation, their history, culture, and collective mindsets.” 2 
Political realism, in this interpretation, is first and foremost against dogma, 
prejudice, wishful thinking and other forms of cognitive psychological hazards that 
can obstruct one’s ability to see the world as it is and in all its complexity.3 
     It is on this basis that Hans Morgenthau – one of the most influential 
Classical Realists of the twentieth century – opposed the Vietnam War. In April 
1965, he criticised the U.S. government for using the simple juxtaposition of 
“Communism” and “free world” as the guiding framework of its Vietnam policy, 
when the growing division within the Communist bloc (symbolized by Tito’s 
                                                                        
1 Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (London: Penguin, 1957), p. 22.   
2 William Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy,” in Steven Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and 
Time Dunne eds., Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), p. 40. 
3 For various traditions and interpretations of realism, see for example: Duncan Bell, 
“Introduction” in Duncan Bell ed., Political Thought and International Relations: 
Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Benjamin Frankel 
ed., Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like 
Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002).  
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Yugoslavia and the Sino-Soviet split) and the rise of neutralism in Asia and Africa 
had diminished the validity of such dualism. He argued that, by sticking to that 
binary framework, Washington had manoeuvred itself into a “position which is 
anti-revolutionary per se and which requires military opposition to revolution 
wherever it is found in Asia, regardless of how it affects the interests – and how 
susceptible it is to the power – of the United States.” He stressed that “For better or 
for worse, we live again in an age of revolution. It is the task of statesmanship not 
to oppose what cannot be opposed without a chance of success, but to bend it to 
one’s own interests.” Politics, Morgenthau added a month later, is “the art of the 
possible. There are certain things that you would like to do but you can’t do 
because you haven’t got the means to do them.”4 
     In Vietnam: the Logic of Withdrawal (1967), historian Howard Zinn also 
criticises the way of thinking and general assumptions underlying the Vietnam 
policy. At the beginning of the book, he emphasises: 
 
What we bring to the common body of evidence in Vietnam – the 
perspective we have – is critical. It determines what we choose to see 
or not to see. It determines how we relate the things we see. This 
perspective varies from one person to another. I think we get closer to 
wisdom, and also to democracy, when we add the perspectives of other 
people to our own. 
 
In the rest of the book, Zinn clarifies factors that in his view had been obscured or 
distorted in the government’s justification for its Vietnam policy. He argues, for 
instance, that, rather than standing up to “communist aggression from the North,” 
the U.S. government was fighting insurgents who were estimated to be more than 
80 percent South Vietnamese. Like Morgenthau, Zinn also questions the domino 
theory, arguing that the United States had to “get accustomed to the idea that there 
will be more Communist countries in the world and that this is not necessarily 
bad.” This is because “Communist nations in their international affairs behave very 
much like other nations,” and they were “as prone to the emotion of nationalism as 
other nations: they crave independence and resist domination by any other nation, 
whether capitalist or Communist.” Paranoia, he points out, “starts from a base of 
facts, but then leaps wildly to a conclusion.”5 
                                                                        
4 Morgenthau quoted in William Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy,” in Steven 
Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Time Dunne eds., Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2008), pp. 40-41. For Morgenthau’s view on Vietnam policy, see also: Hans 
Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965); 
Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960–70 (London: Paul Mall, 
1970), pp. 398–425. 
5 Howard Zinn, Vietnam: the Logic of Withdrawal (Cambridge: South End Press, 1967), pp. 
1, 3-4, 90, 101-102. 
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     In the article “The End of Either/Or” published in the same year (1967), 
McGeorge Bundy levels a similar stricture not against the Johnson administration 
(for which he served as the national security advisor until 1966) but against 
“debaters” of the Vietnam policy outside the U.S. government. Insisting that 
nothing about Vietnam was simple, Bundy argues:  
 
[W]hat has made debate so easy, and action so hard, in Viet Nam is that 
the debater can defend the propositions he likes from a great pile of 
evidence in which there is plenty to support every view. In our actions, 
however, we have to live with the whole. 
 
He acknowledges that the Vietnam conflict involved both aggression from the 
North and civil conflict within the South, both corruption and self-sacrifice in the 
US-backed regime in Saigon, and both anti-communist feeling and a lack of 
affection towards the central government on the part of the South Vietnamese 
people. “The internal complexities are matched internationally.” While Vietnam 
was a test case of communist revolutionary doctrine, a victory for Ho Chi Minh 
would not mean automatic communisation of all Asia, because “The lines of 
influence and concern stretch out in all direction, but almost never in simple and 
straightforward terms.” For the Vietnam policy, Bundy concludes, “the only 
general proposition that seems valid is that sweeping and simple views are useful 
only for those who do not have responsibility.”6 
     How, then, did decision makers responsible for the Vietnam policy actually 
understand the complexity of the Vietnam conflict and its international context? 
How and to what extent did their successes and failures in “dispassionate analysis” 
and the “art of the possible” influence the country’s growing involvement in the 
Vietnam conflict?  
     This study addresses these questions through the examination of intelligence 
assessment, which, in the U.S. system, is expected to be one of the primary sources 
of objective, fact-based analysis of foreign affairs. It starts with President 
Kennedy’s decision to increase the U.S. support for the South Vietnamese 
government (GVN) in December 1961 and ends with President Johnson’s 
authorisation of air strikes against North Vietnam in February 1965. It analyses 
intelligence products on the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, on the intentions 
and capabilities of North Vietnam and on the probable consequences of policy 
options (such as the regime change in 1963 and the military action against North 
Vietnam in 1965). 
                                                                        
6 McGeorge Bundy, “The End of Either/Or,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 45, no. 2 (Jan 1967), pp. 
191, 194-195. 
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     The thesis demonstrates that, although assessments were not entirely 
unsuccessful, intelligence-related weaknesses did play an important role in the 
failure of counterinsurgency during the first half of the 1960s and in the decision 
for direct military intervention in 1965. It also shows that, rather than merely a 
cause of policy failures, the lack of robust intelligence was in part a result of 
broader problems of Vietnam policy, which include the absence of strategic 
consensus, the political pressure to reject criticism, and the ideological context of 
U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s.  
     Through the analysis of diverse challenges in the realms of intelligence and 
intelligence-policy relations, the study also suggests that, in the face of a complex, 
unpredictable policy issue like Vietnam, the realist ideal of adept statesmanship 
based on shrewd, objective assessment can be far more difficult for policymakers 
to achieve than some advocates of political realism seem to assume.  
 
1. Intelligence assessment and the origins of the Vietnam War 
  
Intelligence assessment in the historiography of the Vietnam War 
The literature on the origins of the Vietnam War has extended its scope steadily 
during the last five decades. The subjects that have already been examined 
extensively include, for example, the advisory mechanism in the U.S. government, 
the domestic political considerations of President Johnson, and the decisions made 
on the “other side,” which included the National Liberation Front (NLF), North 
Vietnam, China and the USSR.7 Despite this expansion in the scope of research, 
however, the misperceptions and miscalculations on the part of the U.S. 
government remain a central issue of the Vietnam historiography. 
     In the view of many historians and commentators who support the 
“orthodox” interpretation of the Vietnam War, a series of flawed perceptions was a 
major cause of what they regard as a policy blunder in 1965. They argue that the 
strategic significance of Vietnam was exaggerated in the framework of the domino 
theory, which predicted that a U.S. defeat in South Vietnam would be followed by 
the spread of communist influence in Southeast Asia and/or other parts of the 
                                                                        
7 For the debates over the origins of the Vietnam War, see for example: Jeffrey Kimball, 
ed., To Reason Why: The Debate about the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990); Mark Gilbert ed., Why the North Won the Vietnam War 
(New York: Palgrave, 2002) “Introduction”; Larry Berman and Stephen Routh, “Why the 
United States Fought in Vietnam,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 6 (2003); Kevin 
Ruane, “Putting America in its Place? Recent Writing on the Vietnam Wars,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 37, no. 1 (2002); Garry Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s 
Lost War (Malden: Blackwell, 2009). 
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developing world.8 Similarly, the Cold War rhetoric of dividing the world between 
communist enemies and non-communist friends is often cited as a reason why 
policymakers in Washington could not fully appreciate the nationalist drive behind 
the NLF. The lack of basic knowledge has also been seen as a major source of 
misjudgements. “First,” Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Ambassador to South Vietnam 
1964–1965) later admitted in an interview, “we didn’t know ourselves. We thought 
we were going into another Korean War, but this was a different country. Secondly, 
we didn’t know our South Vietnamese allies. We never understood them…and we 
knew even less about North Vietnam…So, until we know the enemy and know our 
allies and know ourselves, we’d better keep out of this dirty kind of business.”9 
     In contrast, the revisionists, who regard the war as a necessary, winnable and 
generally honourable effort by the United States, appear to reject (except for some 
isolated misjudgements related to military strategy and tactics) that there were 
fundamental flaws and weaknesses in the government’s perceptions.10 They argue 
that the possible domino effect after the fall of South Vietnam was a real threat to 
U.S. national security, rather than an illusion created by an erroneous application of 
the domino theory. Michael Lind, for example, maintains that a communist victory 
in South Vietnam in the mid-1960s was likely to be “followed by a minor regional 
domino effect and a major global revolutionary wave effect…Once the Vietnam 
War is viewed in the context of the Cold War, it looks less like a tragic error than 
like a battle that could have hardly be avoided.”11  The revisionists’ central 
assertion that the war was clearly winnable also implies that the U.S. government 
had at least a basic knowledge and cognitive capacity robust enough to carry out 
counterinsurgency and nation building effectively. 
     In recent decades, some historians who share the orthodox, negative view of 
the Vietnam War have also questioned the importance of the domino theory and 
cognitive problems. In The Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the 
Road to War in Vietnam (1995), Gareth Porter suggests that the central thread in 
                                                                        
8 For the debate over the soundness of the Domino Theory see: Garry Hess, Vietnam: 
Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden: Blackwell, 2009), Chapter 2 “A Necessary War or 
a Mistaken War?” 
9 As quoted in David Elliott, “Official History, Revisionist History, and Wild History,” in 
Mark Bradley and Marilyn Young eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, 
and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 281. 
10 For revisionist works, see: David Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in 
Perspective (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978); Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1984); Richard Nixon, No More Vietnam (London: White 
Allen, 1986); Phillip Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-75 (London: Sidgwick 
1988); Harry Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Navato: Presidio Press, 
1982); Michael Lind, Vietnam: the Necessary War (New York: Freo Press, 1999); Mark 
Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006).  
11 Michael Lind, Vietnam: the Necessary War, pp. 38, 256. 
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Washington’s geopolitical calculations was the relative weaknesses of China and 
the USSR (that is, a perceived “imbalance of power” in America’s favour) rather 
than the vulnerability of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia (the fear of a domino 
effect). 12  Frederic Logevall goes further and dismisses the significance of 
misperception itself. In his highly acclaimed book Choosing War: the Lost Chance 
for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (1999) and in his more recent 
essays (2004, 2008), Logevall criticises what he regards as the “if only we had 
known” excuse of the earlier literature. “Policy makers in Washington,” he insists, 
“generally had a sound grasp of the situation on the ground in South Vietnam, and 
the thinking in Hanoi…the widely repeated assertion – by former officials and 
many scholars – that American decision makers did not know what they were 
getting into in Vietnam, cannot withstand close scrutiny. They had a sound grasp of 
what they were up against.”13 
     In the light of all these arguments, it is remarkable that intelligence 
assessment – a central element of the government’s perceptions and calculations – 
remains almost entirely absent from the mainstream debates on the origins of the 
Vietnam War. With some exceptions (notably the alleged manipulation of 
intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 196414) the quality and 
role of intelligence rarely receive more than a passing reference in the general 
studies of the war’s origins. The question of how intelligence materials (that is, the 
thousands of reports and analyses produced each year to assist Vietnam policy) 
influenced policymakers’ understanding of the conflict during the year leading to 
the military escalation in 1965 largely remains a missing dimension in the general 
debates on the Vietnam War.  
     This omission can partly be explained by the fragmentary and conflicting 
accounts emerging from the existing literature on Vietnam intelligence. In fact, the 
                                                                        
12 Gareth Porter, The Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in 
Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California, 2005). 
13 Fredrik Logevall, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 
34 (2004), pp. 105-106. See also: Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: the Lost Chance for 
Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1999); Fredrik Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (New York: Longman, 2001); 
Fredrik Logevall, “‘There Ain't No Daylight’: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of 
Escalation,” in Mark Bradley and Marilyn Young eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: 
Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 91-108. 
14 For the alleged distortion of intelligence on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, see for 
example: John Prados, “The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later: Flawed Intelligence 
and the Decision for War in Vietnam,” The National Security Archive 
<www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB132/index.htm> accessed 3 Feb 2009; Robert Hanyok, 
“Shunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: the Gulf of Tonkin Mystery 2–4 
August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly (2001); Robert Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness: 
American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975 (Center for Cryptologic History, 
National Security Agency, 2002). 
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possibility of study in this area has improved during the last three decades, thanks 
to declassified internal studies,15 memoirs of former intelligence officers16 and 
research by historians.17 Almost all of those publications, however, concentrate on 
a limited numbers of individuals, organizations, events, subjects or documents. 
From those analyses and narratives, two contrasting images have emerged 
regarding the role of intelligence in Vietnam policy. 
     On the one hand, several studies by former officers of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) gave the impression that those organisations’ assessments were 
generally accurate but had no decisive impact on decision-making, because 
policymakers and the Pentagon did not accept their analysis. CIA and Vietnam 
Policymakers by Harold Ford (a former senior analyst at the CIA’s Office of 
National Estimates), in particular, focuses on three episodes in which the Agency’s 
relatively sound analysis was ignored by policymakers including John McCone 
(the head of the CIA, 1961–1965).18 McCone himself, who supported military 
action against North Vietnam,19 maintained in an interview (1987/1988) that “had 
the people responsible for the operation in Vietnam listened to the intelligence 
                                                                        
15 The works by former CIA officers include: Harold Ford, “Thoughts Engendered by 
Robert McNamara's ‘In Retrospect,’” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 39, no. 5 (1996), pp. 
95-109; Harold Ford, “Why CIA Analysis Were So Doubtful About Vietnam,” Studies in 
Intelligence (1997) , pp. 85-95; Harold Ford, CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three 
Episodes, 1962-1968 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998); Willard 
Matthias, “How Three Estimates went Wrong,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1968); 
Anthony Lewis, “Re-Examining our Perceptions on Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence 
(Winter 1973); Ellsworth Bunker, "Vietnam in Retrospect,” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 
1974). For the INR’s study declassified in 2004 and the responses by former head of the 
INR Thomas Hughes and historian John Prados, see: W. Dean Howells, Dorothy Avery, and 
Fred Green, Vietnam 1961-1968 as Interpreted in INR's Production (U.S. Department of 
State, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1969); Thomas Hughes, “INR's Vietnam 
Study in Context: A Retrospective Preface Thirty-Five Years Later,” The National Security 
Archive; John Prados, “The Mouse That Roared: State Department Intelligence in the 
Vietnam War,” The National Security Archive. All three documents are available at:  
<htpp://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/index.htm> accessed 3 April 
2010.  
16 George W. Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in 
Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001); William Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account 
of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989); 
Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton: Steerforth Press, 
1994); Peer De Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times 
Books, 1978).  
17 John Prados, “Impatience, Illusion, and Asymmetry: Intelligence in Vietnam,” in Marc 
Gilbert ed., Why the North Won the Vietnam War (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 137-152; 
Mark Moyar, “Hanoi's Strategic Surprise,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 18, no. 1 
(Spring 2003), pp. 155-170. 
18 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers.  
19 Memo, “Summary Record of the Meeting on Southeast Asia on 24 May 1964, 11:00 
AM,” LBJL, NSF, NSC History, Box 38, Folder 1, #10; Ford, CIA and Vietnam 
Policymakers, pp. 58-61, 76-78. 
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analysts, they’d have avoided a great many mistakes.”20 His Deputy Director Ray 
Cline, another supporter of air strikes,21 also argues: 
 
[The] CIA’s estimates and other analytical papers in the entire 
Kennedy-Johnson era were soberer and less optimistic than those of the 
Defense Department…Desmond Fitzgerald and I both tried to warn 
that an Asian guerrilla war was not to be easily won by conventional 
military forces and weapons, but the message did not get across very 
well…The intelligence was sound, but the policy was not firmly based 
on the evidence. The result was a tragedy for the United States and the 
peoples of Southeast Asia.22  
  
On the other hand, some of the former senior policymakers have suggested that 
they did not receive proper analytical support from the intelligence community 
including the CIA and the INR. General Taylor’s comment quoted earlier implies 
that the government did not have solid intelligence on friends, enemies and the 
conflict itself. Likewise, Robert McNamara (the Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968) 
argues in his book In Retrospect (1995) that the CIA’s memo of June 1964 on the 
possibility of a domino effect (titled “Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos 
Precipitate a ‘Domino Effect’ in the Far East?”) appeared to “confirm my and 
others’ fear – misplaced in retrospect, but no less real at the time – that the West’s 
containment policy lay at serious risk in Vietnam. And thus we continued our slide 
down the slippery slope.”23 Some studies also suggest that Vietnam intelligence 
had weaknesses serious enough to undermine the quality of Vietnam policy. 
Referring to the optimistic assessments of the counterinsurgency in late 1962, the 
editors of the Pentagon Papers judge that reports and intelligence during that 
period were “not only wrong, but more importantly, they were influential.”24 In his 
essay “Impatience, Illusion and Asymmetry: Intelligence in Vietnam” (2002), 
historian John Prados provides an overview of intelligence-related problems before 
and during the Vietnam War. While acknowledging that “[U.S.] intelligence in 
Vietnam ultimately functioned with considerable effectiveness,” Prados concludes 
that “American and South Vietnamese problems in terms of intelligence were 
                                                                        
20 John McCone, interviewed by Harry Kreisler, “Reflection on a Life in Government 
Service: Conversation with John A. McCone” (Autumn 1987 and Spring 1988), 
<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con0.html> accessed 19 
June 2007. 
21 Memo, Cline to M. Bundy (n.d.), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 10, Folder 5, #93; Memo, Cline 
to McCone “Vietnam” (27 Nov 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 10, Folder 5, #93a. 
22 Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC: 
Acropolis, 1976), p. 199.  
23 Robert McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of 
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 125. 
24 Mike Gravel, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of the United 
States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Book 3, IV-3-4, 
“Phrased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam 1962–1964,” p. vii.  
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deeper and of more consequence…the United States could not resolve its 
fundamental problems on intelligence in the war…In contrast, Hanoi’s good 
intelligence helped pave its way to victory in 1975.”25 
 
Vietnam intelligence: qualities, roles and explanations 
This study demonstrates that each of those interpretations represents parts of a 
complex picture of Vietnam intelligence. It shows that, across diverse subjects and 
organisations, the quality of intelligence varied significantly. On the positive side, 
the intelligence community produced relatively sound assessment of some issues, 
such as the coup plot in 1963 and the general trend in North Vietnam in 1964. 
Furthermore, compared to many senior personnel in Washington, the CIA and the 
INR had a more pessimistic view of the state of the counterinsurgency and of the 
benefits of direct U.S. military intervention. However, shortcomings were equally 
prevalent. To various degrees, assessments were, for example, missing or 
rudimentary (peasant attitude and the background of insurgents), inaccurate (the 
number of Strategic Hamlets), overly optimistic or pessimistic (the probable 
consequences of air strikes), oversimplified or one-sided (the geopolitics in 
Southeast Asia), and/or unintelligible to policymakers (intelligence inputs to the 
NSC Working Group in November 1964). In general, there were serious gaps and 
weaknesses in the knowledge of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the analysis 
of socio-political factors, the assessment of broad pictures of the conflict, and the 
prediction of policy outcomes. On top of these weaknesses, Vietnam intelligence 
had overall bias in favour of the government’s justification for its Vietnam policy: 
the intelligence community challenged neither the description of the NLF as a 
Communist movement nor the domino theory. 
     The roles of intelligence in policy making also defy a general description. 
There were some occasions (such as the political instability in 1964) in which good 
intelligence helped policymakers to handle the situation. Also, as Ford, McCone 
and Cline emphasise, there were cases in which relatively sound judgments of 
analysts were ignored by policymakers. In many areas, however, the absence of 
robust intelligence did undermine the quality of Vietnam policy. The weak analysis 
of socio-political factors, for example, was a part of the unsuccessful efforts to win 
the hearts and minds of the rural community. During the political crisis in 1963, 
policymakers did not receive proper analysis regarding the probable consequences 
of a regime change, making it easier for the State Department to go ahead with a 
military coup. Likewise, analysts’ failure to emphasize Hanoi’s determination to 
                                                                        
25 Prados, “Impatience, Illusion, and Asymmetry: Intelligence in Vietnam,” p. 150. 
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support southern insurgents facilitated the advocates of escalation to prevail in 
1965. The CIA’s focus on the geopolitical threats (rather than opportunities) in 
Southeast Asia can be seen as one of the reasons why policymakers did not make a 
serious effort to explore other policy options in the region that might have allowed 
the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam without a major geopolitical 
setback. The general failure to analyse the complex problems in South Vietnam can 
help explain the misguided efforts to improve the situation with a relatively simple 
solution (such as the aggressive use of air power against insurgents in 1962, the 
overthrow of President Diem in 1963, and the military action against North 
Vietnam in 1965). The overall bias in favour of Washington’s justification for its 
Vietnam policy also reinforced the belief that the United States should and could 
win the conflict.  
     The possible causes of those intelligence-related problems are wide-ranging, 
and many of them related to the broad contexts of Vietnam policy. They include the 
competence, character and personal background of key individuals (such as Robert 
McNamara, John McCone, Gen. Paul Harkins and Ambassador Frederick Nolting); 
problems in technical aspects of intelligence analysis (notably, analytical 
challenges and limitations inherent to each subject, the lack of information and 
knowledge, and the absence of a proper strategic framework for 
counterinsurgency); organizational and procedural weaknesses (including the 
shortage of resources and expertise, the lack of an effective cross-departmental 
coordination mechanism, and the absence of a clear separation between 
intelligence and policymaking); political pressures and considerations 
(bureaucratic rivalry and disputes, and the need to maintain the morale of friendly 
forces and to justify the U.S. involvement in the conflict); and the wider “national 
security culture” of the 1960s (such as the Cold War ideology and the relatively 
low status of intelligence in Kennedy and Johnson’s foreign policy). 
 
2. Complexity, uncertainty and international security 
 
Complexity, uncertainty and foreign policy decision-making 
As already suggested, one theme that this study attempts to explore in particular is 
the difficulty of making a reality-based foreign policy in the face of a highly 
complex and unpredictable security issue. This is not only a central challenge for 
Vietnam policymakers (as Hans Morgenthau, Howard Zinn and McGeorge Bundy 
recognise in their works cited earlier) but also a widely discussed subject in the 
literature on foreign policy and national security.  
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     The notions of complexity and uncertainty (as well as other related concepts, 
such as diversity and ambiguity) have been a part of policy studies since its 
emergence as a field of academic inquiry in the 1950s. As Wayne Parsons points 
out, Harold Lasswell, a founding father of the discipline, envisaged an ideal policy 
process not as a technocratic search for a solution based on undisputable facts or 
statistics but rather as a democratic mechanism to accommodate the diverse 
perspectives of society, which seem almost inevitable on most of the major 
socio-political issues.26 It was also in the mid-twentieth century that, in his article 
“The Science of Muddling Through” (1959), Charles Lindblom set forward an 
incremental approach to decision-making on the assumption that, when handling a 
complex issue which is not yet fully understood, a method that incorporates 
adaptation and small-scale problem solving is more effective than one resting 
simply upon a grand design.27 Those lines of inquiry have been followed up and 
further expanded by various branches of policy studies, including works on a 
“complex adaptive system.”28 At the same time, however, the limits and pitfalls of 
those approaches (especially when a holistic vision and/or a drastic change of 
policy direction are required) have also been recognised. Christopher Hill, for 
example, points out that “Accepting the virtue of muddling through…can 
legitimatize the unwillingness to ask fundamental questions and to criticize the 
general direction of policy.”29   
     In parallel to those discussions on the ideal approach, scholars have also 
examined how policymakers actually respond to a complex, unpredictable situation. 
From a cognitive-psychological point of view, Judgement under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases (1982) by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky examines the way 
in which people process information in an environment of risk and uncertainty.30 
In 2008, Janice Stein reviewed similar studies in the field of foreign policy and 
concluded that “likely states of the world are very difficult to estimate because we 
do not have repeated trials with large numbers in world politics…This world of 
uncertainty is one they [foreign policy specialists] particularly dislike and it is 
                                                                        
26 Wayne Parsons, “From Muddling Though to Mudding Up: Evidence Based Policy 
Making and the Modernization of British Government,” Public Policy and Administration, 
vol. 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 43, 53-56.  
27 Charles Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review, 
vol. 19, no. 2 (Spring 1959).  
28 See for example: Donald Schön, Beyond the Stable State: Public and Private Learning 
in a Changing Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973); Ralph Tracy, Complex 
Responsive Processes in Organizations: Learning and Knowledge Creation (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
29 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palggrave, 
2003), p. 104. 
30 Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgement under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
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under these conditions that experts, just like other people, seek the certainty, the 
false certainty, of order and control.”31 Political hurdles set up against an effective 
response to a complex, uncertain reality have also been discussed in terms of both 
bureaucratic and domestic political pressures to make one’s claim simpler and 
more assertive.32  
     In studies of national security, chaos and unpredictability have been familiar 
subjects for military strategists since the publication of Clausewitz’s On War in 
1832.33  However, his caution against a simple, mechanical view of military 
operations has repeatedly been ignored by commanders and strategists, including 
those who promoted the notion of “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) in the 
1990s. After the victory in the first Gulf War in 1991, some parts of the U.S. 
defence establishment began to hope that new technologies (such as the global 
positioning system and long-range precision strikes) could diminish uncertainty 
and ensure a near-perfect view of the battlefield in the wars that the United States 
would fight in the twenty-first century.34 “The digitalization of the army represents 
the end of Clausewitz,” a senior army general declared in the mid-1990s. “[We are] 
entering the non-Clausewitzian world,” echoed Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan (former 
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA).35 Alarmed by this trend and 
aware of the reality of the Chechen War in the 1990s, leading military thinkers 
such as Williamson Murray, Stephen Cimbala and Colin Gray, made a case for the 
continuing relevance of the Clausewitzian approach.36  The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan seem to vindicate their arguments that technology cannot be an answer 
to political and strategic questions, and that many of the sources of uncertainty 
identified by Clausewitz (such as chance, insufficient knowledge and the 
                                                                        
31  Janice Stein, “Foreign Policy Decision-making: Rational, Psychological, and 
Neurological Model,” in Steven Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Time Dunne eds., Foreign 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 107.  
32 Thomas Christiansen, for example, demonstrates that President Truman accepted what 
some of his advisors feared was an unrealistically simplistic form of the containment policy 
in the late 1940s in order to mobilise his country in the face of the growing threat from the 
USSR. Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, 
and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 32. 
See also: Thomas Hughes, “On the Causes of Our Discontents,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 
4 (July 1969). 
33 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976 [1832]).  
34 See in particular: William Owen, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 2000). 
35 Both quotations are from: Stephen Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and 
Military Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2001), p. 5.  
36 Williamson Murray, “Thinking about Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Forth 
Quarterly, 16 (Summer 1997), pp. 69-76; Williamson Murray, “Military Culture Does 
Matter,” Strategic Review, 27 (Spring 1999), pp. 32-40; Stephen Cimbala, Clausewitz and 
Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Colin Gray, Strategy 
for Chaos: Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 
2002).  
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adversarial nature of warfare) will remain integral parts of military operations. 
     In contrast, those working on the broader question of national security 
strategy (which includes geopolitics and diplomacy) already showed a growing 
interest in the potentially chaotic nature of international politics in the early 1990s. 
“Complexity, Global Politics and National Security Conference” in 1996 suggested 
that this trend stemmed from two main factors: development in other disciplines 
(such as the chaos theory and non-linear dynamics in science) and the perceived 
fluidity in international politics since the fall of the USSR. 37  Many works 
published around that time discuss relatively passive ways of coping with an 
unpredictable situation (maintaining strategic flexibility and organisational 
adaptability, for example). Some scholars and practitioners, however, supported 
more active solutions, such as “environmental shaping,” which was, according to 
Paul Davis, emphasised by Dick Cheney in his document The Regional Defense 
Strategy in 1993.38 This may not be unrelated to the “you are either with us or the 
terrorists” approach of the U.S. government after 11 September 2001.39 Even in 
this atmosphere of simplicity and control in the early 2000s, however, many in 
Washington continued to recognise the world as turbulent and unpredictable. As 
DIA Director Thomas Wilson reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
March 2002:  
 
[T]he general turmoil and uncertainty prevalent since the end of the 
Cold War would continue through the next decade…Accounting for 
and dealing with uncertainty has always been our biggest analytical 
challenge. But in today’s environment, we need to be as adept at 
dealing with ‘complex mysteries’ as well as at uncovering ‘hidden 
secret.’40 
 
     As this DIA report accentuates, uncertainty – and the limits of intelligence in 
general – has been a key issue in intelligence studies. This is not to deny that much 
of the discussion in this field has been devoted to what intelligence can, rather than 
                                                                        
37 The conference was organized jointly by the National Defense University and RAND 
corporation. Davis Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and 
National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997). 
38 Paul Davis, “Uncertainty-Sensitive Planning,” in Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, and 
Gregory Treverton eds., New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 138, footnote 11.  
39 Dennis Sandole regards the U.S. foreign policy in the first half of the 2000s as a classic 
example of “extreme” Realpolitik, which tries to enhance predictability and stability 
through the creation of a bi-polar system of “them” and “us” and through the threatened or 
actual use of military forces against “them.” Dennis Sandole, “Complexity and Conflict 
Resolution,” in Neil Harrison ed., Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a 
New Paradigm (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 57. 
40 Thomas Wilson (the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency), Statement for the Record, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, “Global Threats and Challenges” (19 March 2002), pp. 
1-2, 26. 
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cannot, do for national security. A central point of Sherman Kent’s classic Strategic 
Intelligence for American World Policy (1949) is that intelligence estimates based 
on “the indexes of strategic stature, specific vulnerability, and probable courses of 
action” are not only more reliable than “the only alternative, i.e. the crystal ball” 
but also had been “astonishingly close to what actually came to pass.” 41 
Well-known cases of intelligence success (such as the Allies’ signal intelligence 
during the Second World War42) have kept true to Sun Tzu’s dictum that “if you 
known your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred 
battles.”43  
     At the same time, however, it has also been recognised that a reasonably 
accurate understanding of enemies and other factors in international politics is not 
always possible. Kent contributed to this field of inquiry as well by making a 
distinction between the known, the knowable and the unknowable. A growing 
volume of case studies on intelligence failures (including a series of strategic 
surprises and the failure to predict the fall of the Soviet Union) has helped 
determine many of the practical hurdles to accurate and timely assessment.44 
Those constraints include, among many others, the lack of reliable information, the 
problems of noise, and the limits of objective interpretation of socio-political facts. 
The problem of uncertainty is particularly imminent in intelligence estimates, 
which analyse broad pictures, long-term prospects and probable consequences of 
policy options. This is partly because, as Donald Steury points out, the assessment 
of these issues “could not be proved, however well-founded they might be in 
experience or factual or theoretical knowledge.”45  
                                                                        
41 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1949), p. 60.  
42 For the signal intelligence in the Second World War, see for example: F. Harry Hinsley, 
et. al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, vols. 1–4 (London: HMSO, 1979-90); 
David Alvarez, ed., Allied and Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II (London: Frank 
Cass, 1999); Ralph Bennett, Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1996); W.J.R. Gardner, Decoding history : the battle of the Atlantic 
and Ultra (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999). See also: Gregory Elder, “Intelligence 
in War: It Can Be Decisive,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 50, no. 2 (2006).  
43 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. John Minford (London: Penguin, 2009), III. 18.  
44 For intelligence failure, see for example: Richard Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: 
Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,” World Politics, vol. 31, no. 1 (1978); Mark 
Lowenthal, “The Burdensome Concept of Failure,” in Alfred Maurer, Marion Tunstall and 
James Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder: Westview, 1985); Robert 
Jervis, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: the Case of Iraq,” the Journal of 
Strategic Studies, vol. 29, no. 1 (February 2006); Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: 
Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2010). 
45 Donald Steury, “Introduction” in Sherman Kent, Sherman Kent and the Board of 
National Estimate: Collected Essays (Washington DC: Center for the Studies of 
Intelligence, 1996). See also: Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the 
Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), “Too Much 
Certainty,” pp. 126-127.  
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     This limited reliability of intelligence – and policymakers’ perception of it – 
complicates the intelligence-policy relation. It requires careful communication of 
complex pictures and various probabilities to policymakers often unfamiliar with 
the subject in hand. At the same time, the risk of intelligence being “politicized” (in 
the form of, for example, distortion, dismissal or “cherry-picking”) can also 
increase when assessments are ambiguous, complex or inconclusive.46 Recent 
history has also indicated that the discussion of uncertainty itself – or the 
“unknown unknown” – can be abused by policymakers for political purposes.47  
     Those practical problems at the national level have no small implications for 
international efforts to maintain order and stability. The key approaches to 
international peace and security (notably the Just War paradigm and the 
Democratic Peace theory) depend on the government’s and/or the public’s ability 
to make sound judgments on relevant factors (such as the imminence of threats and 
the probable consequences of military action): so too does the application of any 
other normative concepts. It is a sobering reminder that some of the most 
prominent advocates of “ethical foreign policy” and humanitarian causes 
(including Michael Ignatieff and the Guardian newspaper) supported what they 
believed to be the “liberation of the Iraqi people” in the run-up to the Iraq War in 
2003, only to realise years later that the invasion actually caused a humanitarian 
crisis. In his article “Getting Iraq Wrong” (2007), Ignatieff, a former Harvard 
professor, reflects:  
 
I’ve learned that good judgment in politics looks different from good 
judgment in intellectual life. Among intellectuals, judgment is about 
generalizing and interpreting particular facts as instances of some big 
idea. In politics, everything is what it is and not another thing. 
Specifics matter more than generalities…The attribute that underpins 
good judgment in politicians is a sense of reality…They must not 
confuse the world as it is with the world as they wish it to be.48  
      
It is no coincidence that, in international relations theory, Classical Realism has 
enjoyed a minor resurgence in recent years. “Realism was partly rehabilitated, 
albeit in a more pluralistic form. Meanwhile, the consistent realist hostility to the 
Iraq War rekindled interest in the normative dimensions of realism,” wrote Duncan 
Bell in 2009. One of the images of realism that has emerged from this process of 
                                                                        
46 Thomas Hughes, “On the Causes of Our Discontents,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 4 
(July 1969), pp. 653-67. 
47 DOD News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (12 February 2002), News 
Transcript, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,  
<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636> accessed 25 Sept 
2010.   
48 Michael Ignatieff, “Getting Iraq Wrong,” New York Times Magazine (5 August 2007). 
 19 
rehabilitation is an “‘attitude towards the world’ of a truth-seeking kind” with 
critical edges and ethical undertones, as opposed to the old stamp of state-centric 
Realpolitik irreconcilable with morality.49  
     Whatever directions this new interest in Classical Realism takes in the future, 
though, the term “realism” itself always presupposes, as Alastair Murray puts it, 
“an intimate involvement with ‘the facts as they really are.’”50  The diverse 
literature outlined above indicates that, in the environment of complexity and 
uncertainty, fulfilling that very basic principle can be a rather difficult task for 
policymakers. This suggests that realism has to be examined first and foremost as a 
realm of challenges and problems rather than simply presented as a solution.  
 
Vietnam intelligence and the failure of realism 
In an attempt to highlight some of the key obstacles to realism in foreign policy, 
this study explores three broad issues: the difficulties of producing a solid, 
fact-based assessment of foreign affairs (in terms of both the current reality and 
future possibilities); the ease with which one’s factual judgement can be distorted 
or marginalized by other, non-factual elements in foreign policy (such as ideas, 
theories, prejudices, political pressures and normative reasoning); and the tension 
between the complexity and uncertainty of reality and the simplicity and 
assertiveness often central to the world of politics.  
     It suggests that, in the case of Vietnam policy, a result of those problems was 
a mixture of cognitive/intellectual flaws (such as exaggeration, wishful thinking, 
logical leaps, and insufficient attention to details) in the general understanding of 
the conflict rather than a simple case of inaccuracy regarding enemy intentions and 
capabilities.51 This generic form of perceptive failure helps explain why neither 
                                                                        
49 Duncan Bell, “Introduction,” in Duncan Bell ed., Political Thought and International 
Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 2, 
10. For the recent, positive reappraisal of Classical Realism, see for example: Michael 
Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Seán Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: A 
Genealogy of Power Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). For critical 
overview of Classical Realism, see for example: Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, 
Understanding International Relations, 4th edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), pp. 23-30. 
50 Alastair Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan 
Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), p. 2. 
51 In the studies of international security, the difficulty of knowing the enemy’s intentions 
and capabilities has been seen as a major cause of war and a source of general insecurity in 
international politics (known as the “security dilemma”). In his classic Why Nations Go to 
War (8th edition, 2001), for example, John Stoessinger concludes: “perhaps the most 
important single precipitating factor in the outbreak of war is misperception. Such 
distortion may manifest itself in four different ways: in a leader’s image of himself; a 
leader’s view of his adversary’s character; a leader’s view of his adversary’s intentions 
toward himself; and finally, a leader’s view of his adversary’s capabilities and power.” 
Similarly, in The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (2008) – 
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democratic scrutiny nor the Just War paradigm could prevent the outbreak of the 
Vietnam War in 1965.   
 
3. Scope and source 
 
This study focuses on the intelligence assessments of the U.S. government relevant 
to its strategic decisions in the Vietnam conflict from December 1961 to February 
1965.52 The term “intelligence assessment” is used here to describe information 
and knowledge produced and processed by government organisations with the aim 
of assisting policymaking. Based on this definition, the thesis examines documents 
that have at least one of the following functions: to offer background information 
(biographies of South Vietnamese ruling elites, for example), to report and/or 
analyse latest developments (situation reports and current intelligence), to provide 
an in-depth study of a specific issue (special reports), to assess the broader and 
long-term outlook of the conflict (intelligence estimates) and to predict the 
probable consequences of a particular policy option. 
     Most of those documents were produced by the Pentagon, the State 
Department and the CIA in the United States, as well as by the U.S. mission in 
South Vietnam, which included the Military Assistant Command Vietnam (MACV), 
the U.S. Embassy, the US Operation Mission (USOM), the US Information Agency 
(USIA) and the CIA Saigon Station (CAS).   
     Not all of their intelligence products are available to researchers. 
Declassified materials from the CIA’s operational wing (the Directorate of Plans) 
and the National Security Agency (NSA) remain particularly sparse due to these 
agencies’ exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.53 The information on 
those two organisations, therefore, comes primarily from declassified studies 
completed by researchers with access to classified materials.54 Internal documents 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
arguably the most important recent contribution to the subject – Ken Booth and Nicholas 
Wheeler emphasise the “significance of accurate threat assessment” and argue: “It is more 
difficult to gauge intentions…than extrapolate capabilities...All the uncertainties 
surrounding a state’s present and future motives and intentions feed…the predisposition of 
so many theorists and practitioners to assert, fatalistically, that pessimistic calculations must 
always prevail when interpreting and responding to the weaponry of potential rivals.” John 
Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 8th edition (Boston: Bedford / St Martin’s, 2001), p. 
255; Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and 
Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 58-60.  
52 This means that the thesis does not investigate other tasks of the U.S. intelligence 
community, such as intelligence collection, counterintelligence, intelligence liaison, covert 
operations and intelligence activities at the tactical and operational levels. 
53 The Director of Plans was renamed Directorate of Operations in 1973. 
54 For the Directorate of Plans, see: Thomas Ahern, CIA and the Generals: Covert Support 
to Military Government in South Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1999); Thomas Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo (Washington, DC: Center 
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of other organizations – including the CIA’s analytical branch (the Directorate of 
Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates), the State Department’s Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) – 
are more widely available. However, it is difficult to assess the volume of materials 
still classified and the possible bias in the pattern of declassification.  
     It appears, in contrast, that a significant portion of the intelligence materials 
that were circulated across departmental boundaries can now be found in the files 
of senior policymakers such as McGeorge Bundy, John McNaughton, James 
Thompson and Roger Hilsman. Although the government remains reluctant to 
release some cables, memos and studies, the declassified documents offer a fairly 





Nearly three decades of conflict and disunity followed Vietnam’s declaration of 
independence from France in 1945. The First Indochinese War between France and 
Vietnamese nationalists (the Viet Minh) broke out in late 1946 when French forces 
bombarded the city of Haiphong, killing around six thousand Vietnamese and 
triggering Vietnamese attacks on French strongholds throughout the Red River 
Delta. The fighting continued until mid-1954, when France accepted its defeat and 
signed the Geneva Accord. The agreement officially ended the war, guaranteed the 
departure of French forces, and divided Vietnam into two sections, South Vietnam 
(the RVN) and North Vietnam (the DRV).  
     This left the United States as the primary sponsor of the South Vietnamese 
government (the GVN) led by President Ngo Dinh Diem. During his first three 
years in office, Diem and his supporters successfully contained the major threats to 
the central government, an achievement widely praised in the United States as the 
“Diem miracle.” However, the situation deteriorated rapidly after the ill-judged 
land reform in 1957. This reactionary policy allowed the opponents of the regime 
to re-establish their popular bases, leading to the creation of the National 
Liberation Front (NLF) and the start of an armed campaign against the Saigon 
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regime. 55   
     In response, President Kennedy decided to step up U.S. support for the GVN 
in December 1961. The decision was followed by the creation of a new U.S. 
command (the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACV) and the 
introduction of new projects designed to contain the insurgency. By late 1964, 
those efforts had proven largely unsuccessful, with the NLF estimated to be in 
control of nearly half of the South Vietnamese territory. In the hope of turning the 
tide, President Johnson authorized air strikes against North Vietnam in February 
1965, which led to the introduction of U.S. combat forces during the following 
months. The U.S. troops continued to fight on the frontline until Washington 
signed the Paris Peace Accord and withdrew its forces in 1973. Saigon fell two 
years later just after the evacuation of the U.S. embassy on 29–30 April 1975. 
     This study focuses on the period from December 1961 to February 1965, 
during which the U.S. advisory mission failed to help the GVN to contain the 
insurgency and the U.S. government ended up in a direct military intervention in 
the Vietnam conflict. Those three-odd years can be divided into three stages, which 
roughly correspond to 1962, 1963 and 1964.  
     December 1961 - November 1962: During the year following Kennedy’s 
decision in December 1961 to expand U.S. support for the GVN, the assessment of 
the counterinsurgency fluctuated significantly, and ended up with widespread 
optimism in the Vietnam policy community. Reports during the earlier part of the 
year (January–May 1962) were dominated by the progress in new programmes 
such as the administrative reform of the GVN. During the early summer 
(June–July), however, the flaws and limitations of those initiatives became more 
obvious and were duly reported to senior policymakers. The atmosphere once 
again turned more sanguine around August when the GVN began to use aerial 
strikes more aggressively, went ahead with a rapid expansion of Strategic Hamlets 
and intensified its efforts to manipulate information flows to the U.S. government. 
By late 1962, these developments had drawn attention away from the underlying 
problems of the GVN, leading to the spread of optimism in the U.S. mission and of 
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the generally positive view in some parts of Washington. 
     December 1962 - November 1963: The misguided confidence in late 1962 
was followed by a year-long dispute over the state of the counterinsurgency, which 
was later intertwined with disagreement over the U.S. response to the political 
crisis (May–November 1963). The dispute originated in late 1962 when analysts in 
the INR and the CIA began to question the optimism of the U.S. mission and the 
JCS. Their low-key attempts from February to April 1963 to highlight negative 
aspects of GVN/U.S. operations, however, failed to change the prevailing view of 
the administration. By coincidence, this was followed by the outbreak of Buddhist 
protests in May 1963, which spiralled into general political instability in the RVN. 
Convinced that the counterinsurgency was not going well and that much of the U.S. 
government did not understand the reality, the State Department began to plot a 
regime change without proper consultation with other departments. Its contingency 
plan and fence-sitting during June and July led to the unsuccessful push for a coup 
d’état in late August. This resulted in an open dispute in the National Security 
Council (NSC) in September 1963 between the Pentagon (which insisted that the 
counterinsurgency was going well and therefore a regime change was unnecessary) 
and the State Department (which argued that the United States needed a new 
regime in Saigon to reverse the deteriorating situation in the countryside). 
Although the President managed to restore a degree of unity in his administration 
by sending a cross-departmental mission to Saigon in late September to early 
October, Washington remained divided over its basic policy direction right up until 
the assassinations of President Diem and his brother Nhu during the military coup 
in early November 1963. Three weeks later, Kennedy was also assassinated.  
     November 1963 - February 1965: Developments during the following 
months made it clear that the counterinsurgency in the countryside had not been 
successful and was rapidly deteriorating further, and that the South Vietnamese 
junta was far less capable of running the country than the supporters of the regime 
change had predicted. From this context of shock and confusion during the winter 
emerged the idea of military action against North Vietnam, which dominated the 
policy debate for the rest of 1964. The first round of inquiries into this policy 
option in the spring of 1964 did not lead to its immediate implementation, partly 
because the result of those discussions proved indecisive and the President 
remained reluctant to expand the U.S. role before the end of the 1964 presidential 
campaign. The pressure for escalation increased during the summer, nonetheless, 
as the counterinsurgency continued to stumble, the GVN stepped up its “March 
North” campaign, the Gulf of Tonkin incident raised expectations among the South 
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Vietnamese of further U.S. commitment, and the GVN plunged into another round 
of political crisis. After the presidential election on 2 November, an 
interdepartmental working group in the NSC carried out a month-long review of 
Vietnam policy. Despite some disagreement and opposition, its final report set the 
stage for air strikes against the DRV, which were implemented in early February 
1965. 
 
5. Thesis structure 
 
The thesis has two main parts. Part One (Chapters 2 - 4) examines the failure of the 
counterinsurgency from December 1961 to November 1963 under the leadership of 
President Kennedy in Washington and President Diem in Saigon. Chapter 2 
investigates the changing atmosphere and the rise of optimism in 1962. Chapters 3 
and 4 both analyse events in 1963: intelligence disputes over the state of the 
counterinsurgency (Chapter 3) and the intelligence community’s responses to the 
political crisis mainly in urban areas (Chapter 4). 
     Part Two (Chapters 5 - 8) examines the period between the regime changes in 
November 1963 and the decision for air strikes in February 1965. Chapter 5 analyses 
the five months following the fall of the Diem regime (from November 1963 to 
March 1964) when intelligence showed the negative trend and structural problems in 
the GVN/U.S. war efforts but policymakers decided not to consider a diplomatic 
solution or a radically new approach to counterinsurgency. The following three 
chapters examine the development from April 1964 to February 1965, investigating 
the intelligence on South Vietnam (Chapter 6), the assessment of the intentions and 
capabilities of North Vietnam (Chapter 7) and intelligence’s role in policymaking 
(Chapter 8).  
     The concluding chapter (Chapter 9) briefly sums up the key findings and 
considers their implications for understanding the origins of the Vietnam War and 




Counterinsurgency: Rise of Optimism, 1962 
 
When the United States became the primary ally of South Vietnam in 1954, CIA 
analysts had relatively low expectations. “Even assuming that the US and the UK 
were willing to give full support to a South Vietnamese state and to guarantee its 
integrity and that France was willing to relinquish its political and economic 
dominance,” a CIA memo warned in July 1954, “it would be extremely difficult to 
organize an effective Vietnamese government in the chaotic situation which would 
undoubtedly exist following the signing of a cease-fire agreement between the 
French and the Communists.” This conclusion was based on the judgement that the 
viability of South Vietnam as a nation-state depended upon whether its government 
could meet the following conditions: 
 
a. That the government of South Vietnam receive international 
recognition and support. 
b. That the line between North and South Vietnam and the border of 
Laos and Cambodia be secured. 
c. That South Vietnam be independent of France and that this be 
manifested in terms visible to the average Vietnamese. 
d. That the government be capable of providing physical security to 
the Vietnamese. 
e. That the government achieve short-term economic viability. 
f. That the new South Vietnam government quickly establish a 
reputation for honesty and efficiency. 
g. That the Vietnamese provide a few leaders and a large number of 
honest and competent administrators.1 
 
Although the initial success of the Diem regime from 1954 to 1956 appeared to 
disprove the memo’s negative prediction, most of those seven points remained 
valid indicators of the long-term viability of the GVN. In fact, the growing 
difficulty for the GVN after the creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 
1959 can partly be explained in the light of these “critical factors” the CIA had 
identified in 1954. Although Saigon’s independence from France had become clear 
to the average Vietnamese by the late 1950s, the growing support from the United 
States left the GVN vulnerable to accusations of being a puppet of Western 
imperialism. The steady expansion of the Ho Chi Minh trail had made South 
Vietnam’s borders less secure against enemy infiltration. Providing physical 
security to the rural community became increasingly difficult as dissidents 
                                                                        
1 Memo, CIA to DCI, “Critical Factors Underlying the Viability of a South Vietnam State 
(for Board Consideration)” (12 July 1954), NA, CREST 79R00904A000200010023-3. 
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switched from a “peaceful struggle” to armed campaigns. The image of the South 
Vietnamese administration was hardly one of honesty and efficiency, and one of 
the main objectives of the USOM-endorsed training of local administrators in 1962 
was to change the attitude of government employees in order to “encourage private 
individuals to consider government officials as friends and helpers rather than as 
tyrants never to be approached.”2 
     It was the process of marginalising those and other basic problems for the 
GVN that gave rise to optimism in the U.S. government in 1962. This was despite, 
and partly because of, the fact that by mid-1962, some of the problems – notably 
the flaws in the Strategic Hamlet programme, the weaknesses of the South 
Vietnamese forces, and peasant apathy toward the GVN – had become obvious, 
creating widespread concern within the U.S. government about the future of the 
GVN. Around August 1962, however, policymakers’ attention was diverted from 
basic socio-political problems and became dominated by two outwardly positive 
developments: the greater use of air power against insurgents and the rapid 
expansion of the Strategic Hamlet programme. This resulted in a sharp rise of 
optimism in the U.S. mission and a growing confidence in the policy community in 
Washington in late 1962. As a result of this focus on what the U.S. mission 
considered as progress, the U.S. government missed an opportunity to mitigate the 
negative effects of air strikes and strategic hamlets and to tackle the problems that 
had been reported in mid-1962. 
     The immediate cause of this reporting failure lay in the GVN’s – and to 
lesser but significant extent the U.S. mission’s – attempts to counter both the war 
weariness among the friendly forces and the criticism by the U.S. media (through 
the hasty expansion of air strikes and strategic hamlets as well as the manipulation 
of information flow to Washington). At the same time, the overconfidence in late 
1962 also reflected the underlying weaknesses in Vietnam intelligence. The poor 
intelligence on many of the key issues (such as the strength of the NLF and the 
attitude of the rural community), the absence of National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) and the lack of methodological consensus as to how the conflict should be 
analysed all facilitated the rise of optimism in late 1962.  
 
1. Sources of intelligence failures  
 
In 1962 Vietnam intelligence made progress in some areas, including in particular 
                                                                        
2 Memo, Knox to Hilsman, “The Joint American-Vietnamese Program for the Training of 
Local Government Officials” (1 Feb 1962), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 
1/62–2/62,” #2. 
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tactical intelligence, regular reports and military statistics. By mid-1962, army and 
naval intelligence schools had introduced new courses on unconventional conflict.3 
In Saigon, the CIA was working with the GVN to improve the latter’s intelligence 
apparatus,4 while, according to CINCPAC, a grass-roots intelligence system on the 
front line was being “refined and perfected” by the MACV.5  As to regular 
reporting, the Embassy, the MACV and the CIA Saigon Station had their formats 
for weekly and/or monthly report to Washington, where the State Department, the 
Pentagon and the CIA were to send weekly summary of progress (Status Report) to 
the White House.6 At the same time, the Order of Battle statistics, which listed 
comparative strength and casualties of the friendly and enemy forces, came to 
dominate the reports from the MACV and the briefing in the Pentagon.  
     In contrast, the U.S. government made comparatively little effort to 
systematically analyse the qualitative aspects of military operations (including the 
quality and morale of the South Vietnamese forces7) and socio-political issues 
                                                                        
3 The U.S. army intelligence schools at Fort Holabird (Maryland) and Washington, D.C., 
for example, provided “a broad basis for service-wide capabilities in the field of 
counterinsurgency.” The US Army Pacific Intelligence School in Okinawa offered similar 
courses on counterinsurgency with more emphasis on the specific region. Likewise, in 
February 1962, “The Naval Intelligence School includes 42 hour [sic] on unconventional 
warfare in the Post Graduate Course (40 weeks – 50 students), and 20 hour [sic] in the Air 
Intelligence Course (32 weeks – 100 students).” Memo, Army, “Intelligence Aspect of 
Counterinsurgency Operations” (n.d.), JFKL, NSF, Departments and Agencies, Box 279, 
“Department of Defense (B) Subjects, Special Warfare, Miscellaneous Reports”; Memo, 
Department of Defense, “Guerrilla Warfare and Related Matters: Department of Defense 
Status Report” (19 Feb 1962), JFKL, NSF, Department and Agencies, Box 279, 
“Department of Defense (B) Subjects, Special Warfare, 8/61–2/62,” #16c. 
4 Memo for the Special Group (CI), “Intelligence Collection and Evaluation in South 
Vietnam” (25 June 1962), JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Box 319, “Special Group 
(CI) Subjects, Meetings, 6/8/61–11/2/62,” #44b. 
5 “The carious uncoordinated military and civilian intelligence activities are being welded 
into a coordinated collecting and reporting system…The reporting procedures are being 
refined and perfected. The opportunity to test, developed and evaluate the use of special 
equipment and techniques, such as aerial photography, surveillance radar and radio research 
equipment, is being seized.” Cable, CINCPAC to JCS, “Report on Value and Means for 
Taking Maximum Advantage of Preset Conflict in South Vietnam Toward Increasing U.S. 
Capabilities for this Type Warfare” (20 March 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 7, 
“March 1962: 5–20.” See also: Cable, MAAG to CINCPAC (10 Jan 1962), JFKL, Newman 
Papers, Box 7, “January 1962: 9–15.” 
6 “The requirement for bi-weekly reports on Presidential approved action for South 
Viet-Nam is reduced to a single weekly report. It is requested that this report reach the 
White House by noon each Thursday.” Memo, M. Bundy to Johnson, W. Bundy and 
Fitzgerald, “Frequency of reporting on South Viet-Nam actions” (8 Dec 1961), JFKL, 
Newman Papers, Box 6, “Dec.1961: 7–8.”  
7 For example, Ben Ward (the chief of the Eastern Division, the Office of Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Intelligence) cabled Col. John P. Jones (an army attaché at Saigon Embassy) on 
3 December 1962: “We still present a Vietnam highlight every week at the ACSI briefing 
for the Secretary of the Army together with a running comparison of incidents and 
casualties. Your weekly cable containing these statistics forms the basis for this 
presentation, and we are constantly being called on to provide similar data to other 
intelligence agencies and staff officers. Along this same line, it would be appreciated if you 
could also include statistics comparing weapons lost and captured. Comparisons of losses 
are becoming an item of increasing interest here…We cannot stress too strongly, however, 
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(such as the administrative problems of the GVN and the attitude of the rural 
community8),  even though those issues were analysed in some documents on an 
ad-hoc basis. Intelligence on the NLF remained equally rudimentary. Due to the 
effective counterintelligence measures of the NLF,  the main source of information 
on insurgents remained a limited number of captured documents and interrogations 
of POWs.9  In addition, as the intelligence community produced no National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on South Vietnam in 1962, there was a general gap in 
intelligence that could provide a broad picture of the conflict and convey the view 
of the U.S. intelligence community as a whole. 
     Those weaknesses can partly be explained by the absence of methodological 
consensus on how this type of conflict should be analysed. In April 1962, the 
Special Group for Counter-Insurgency within the National Security Council (NSC) 
did initiate a cross-departmental inquiry into “Intelligence Requirements for 
Counterinsurgency.” This exercise resulted in the memo “Essential Elements of 
Information for Counterinsurgency” in August 1962. This document, however, was 
designed to identify the potential threat of insurgency in a relatively stable country 
and therefore largely irrelevant to South Vietnam, where a guerrilla war was 
already taking place.10 At the same time, the lack of a strategic consensus for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the importance of your evaluations of information which you submit. For instance, your 
CX-637 on the reorganization of the RVNAF…noted that the plan was in accordance with 
recommendations from MACV, but we still have no idea what impact this reorganization 
may have on the counter-insurgency effort as a whole, on morale, or on the RVNAF 
relations with the civil side of government…As a matter of routine, we receive only the 
daily OPSUMS and DISUMS from MACV. As a rule, these present only the bare facts and 
do not provide sufficient data on which to base estimates of the situation nor do they 
indicate GVN intentions in either political or military fields. Anything you can do to 
expand our source material in these areas would be appreciated.” Cable, Ward to Jones (3 
Dec 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 10, “Dec. 1962: 7–31.” 
8 In September 1962, Robert Johnson discussed the need for a system to evaluate peasant 
attitude. Memo, Johnson to Cottrell, “Measuring the Extent of Progress in the Countryside 
in Viet Nam” (11 Sept 1962), NA, RG330, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA), Secret and Below General Files, 1962, Box 
108, “Vietnam, 1962, 092, July–Dec.” 
9 For the security measures of the VC, see for example: Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong 
Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath (New York: Vintage 
Book, 1986), pp. 75–79. For captured documents and interrogations of POWs, see for 
example: Memo, MACV, “Captured Viet Cong Document” (8 June 1962), JFKL, Newman 
Papers, Box 8, “July 1962: 1–5”; Memo, MACV, “Captured Viet Cong Documents” (1 Dec 
1962), JFKL, John Newman Papers, Box 10, “Dec. 1962: 1–4”; Memo (translation of 
captured VC documents), MACV J-2, “Viet-Cong squads, platoons and Companies” (12 
Sept 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 14, “12 Sept. 1963”; Memo (translation of 
captured VC documents), MACV J-2, “Organizations of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam” (19 Sept 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 15, “19 Sept. 1963.” 
10 Memo for DCI, “DD/I Comments on General Krukal’s Memorandum for the Special 
Group (CI), ‘Intelligence Requirements for Counterinsurgency’” (11 April 1962), NA, 
CREST 80B01083A000100120018-3; Memo for USIB “Intelligence Required for 
Counterinsurgency” (15 Aug 1962), CREST 80B01083A000100100017-6; Memo, DOD, 
“Status of Military Counterinsurgency Program” (18 Sept 1963), Section VI 
“Counterinsurgency Intelligence,” JFKL, NSF, Departments and Agencies, Box 280, 
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Vietnam policy itself further increased the difficulty for the intelligence community 
to develop an analytical framework.11 President Kennedy appeared to consider 
Roger Hilsman’s memo “Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” (February 1962) as 
the U.S. strategy in the RVN, but it had at least two fundamental problems.12 
Firstly, Hilsman’s idea drew upon Britain’s experience in Malaya in the 1950s13 
(rather than the more relevant experience of the French forces during the first 
Indochina War14) and centred upon the efforts to cut off the insurgents’ access to 
the rural population. As a result it failed to consider some of the key challenges in 
South Vietnam that were not significant in Malaya (such as the tension between the 
rural community and the central government, and the nationalist appeal of the 
NLF). 15  Secondly, while the memo’s core principle – the primacy of the 
socio-political dimension – might be sound, it was not shared by the GVN and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
“Department of Defense (B) Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, 9/18/63, Part 
VI and Part VII.” For the discussion on this issue within the CIA, see CREST, job number 
80B01083A, Box 1, Folder 10. 
11 The other major documents on strategy in 1962 include the Viet-Nam Task Force’s 
“Outline Plan of Counterinsurgency Operations.” John Newman, JFK and Vietnam: 
Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp. 
179–180. 
12 Memo, Hilsman, “Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” (2 Feb 1962), JFKL, Hilsman 
Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam, 2/2/62,” #4. 
13 Malaya continued to be the model of U.S. operations. From Malaya, the US imported 
tactics such as the “food denial project” and the use of dogs to detect guerrilla forces, while 
both U.S. and South Vietnamese officers were trained at the British Jungle Warfare Course 
in Malaya in the early 1960s. Memo, “Note on Food Denial Programs during 1948–1960 
Malayan Emergency” (21 Sept 1962), NA, RG330, OASD/ISA, Secret and Below General 
Files, 1962, Box 109 “Vietnam, 1962, 384–400.12”; Memo, DOD, “Guerrilla Warfare and 
Related Matters: Department of Defense Status Report” (19 Feb 1962), JFKL, NSF, 
Department and Agencies, Box 279, “Department of Defense (B) Subjects, Special Warfare, 
8/61–2/62, #16c,” p. 15. 
14 Studies of the first Indochina War were available in early 1962. When France withdrew 
from Vietnam after the Geneva agreement in July 1954, the French high command 
compiled a three-volume study of its defeat. Copies of that study were passed to the United 
States. In the public domain, at least several major studies had been completed by 1962, 
and many more works were to be published during the 1960s. Prados, “Impatience, Illusion, 
and Asymmetry: Intelligence in Vietnam,” p. 143; RAND, RM-2395, G. Tanham, “Doctrine 
and Tactics of Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina” (20 Sept 1959), JFKL, 
NSF, Regional Security, Box 215, “Far East, General, Doctrine and Tactics of 
Revolutionary Warfare, 3/61”; RAND, “Limited War Patterns: 1. Southeast Asia,” JFKL, 
NSF, Box 231A, “Southeast Asia, General, RAND Report ‘Limited War Patterns: 1. 
Southeast Asia’ 7/63”, #1; INR, RFE-14, “Summary of Principal Events in the History of 
Vietnam” (10 Jan 1962), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 23, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1966, 
Vietnam: General, 1/61–3/63.” 
15 George McGhee, chairman of State’s Policy Planning Council, did emphasise the 
discrepancy between Malaya and Vietnam in November 1961, when he argued that “it is 
very important to bear in mind that no one of these campaigns [in Greek, Malaya and the 
Philippines] is directly compatible to the situation in Vietnam. In Malaya and the 
Philippines, there was no active contiguous sanctuary from which manpower and supplies 
could be furnished…Malaya was unique in that a colonial power (the UK) was involved; 
the campaign was against an ethnic minority (the Chinese); and the tactics of the Chinese 
guerrillas were more terrorist than guerrilla.” Memo, McGhe to M. Bundy, 
“Counter-Guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines” (21 Nov 1961), 
JFKL, NSF, Robert Komer, Box 414, “Counterinsurgency, Special Group, 2/61–4/61 and 
undated”, #12. 
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Pentagon. Already in March 1962, Hilsman himself noted that the forced 
resettlement of the rural population indicated the GVN’s “total misunderstanding” 
of what the joint socio-political-military project (Operation Sunrise) was designed 
to achieve.16 The MACV’s growing reliance on air campaigns in mid-1962 also 
suggested that the “hearts and minds” aspect of counterinsurgency was not the 
priority of the Pentagon. This military-centric approach was confirmed in a speech 
given by Gen. Earle Wheeler (Army Chief of Staff) in November 1962, in which 
he said:  
 
It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast 
Asia are primarily political and economic, rather than military. I do not 
agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military…At the 
present moment in Vietnam, the United State is assisting President 
Diem to develop military strength sufficient to permit that country’s 
political, economic, and social potential to grow unmolested…The 
struggle in Southeast Asia, then, is a military struggle in a military 
context, with political and economic factors significant but not as 
significant at this moment, I think, as are the military factors.17  
 
     By early 1962, political pressures had also emerged as a threat to the 
objectivity of intelligence assessment. At the heart of the problem was that most of 
the information on South Vietnam available in Washington came through the U.S. 
mission, which was responsible for implementing policy. There the incentive to 
report positively and refute criticism was particular strong for senior policymakers 
(such as Ambassador Nolting and Gen. Harkins) who were responsible for 
maintaining both the morale of the friendly forces and the GVN’s confidence in the 
U.S. commitment. In this context, the critical reports from U.S. media (including 
the New York Times, Newsweek and NBC) became a growing concern for the U.S. 
government. Accordingly, in February 1962, the State Department instructed 
Nolting to persuade U.S. correspondents not to dispatch reports on “sensitive 
matters” (such as the MACV’s involvement in combat operations which violated 
the Geneva agreement), “sensational press stories” about civilian casualties, and 
“frivolous, thoughtless criticism” of the GVN.18 The Embassy failed to extract 
“maximum feasible cooperation” from journalists, however, and resorted instead to 
what John Meklin (the Public Affairs Officers in the Saigon Embassy in 1962) later 
described as “excessive classification…that denied newsmen access to whole 
                                                                        
16 Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 198. 
17 Wheeler as quoted in Memo, Hilsman to Harriman and Forrestal (2 Feb 1963), JFKL, 
Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam 2/1/63–3/21/63,” #1. 
18  William Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986–1989), p. 111. 
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segments of US operations.”19 This pressure of public relations remained a key 
source of distortion in reporting and intelligence throughout 1962. 
     The general political rhetoric of Vietnam policy also had a distorting effect 
on Vietnam intelligence. The basic justification of the U.S. support for the GVN, as 
clarified in the White Paper of December 1961, was to defend the freedom of 
South Vietnam against communist aggression. At the same time, it was widely 
believed in 1962 that negotiated settlement for South Vietnam was not a viable 
option. Although John Galbraith, the U.S. Ambassador to India, advised the 
President to start negotiation with North Vietnam in April 1962, his idea was 
strongly opposed by the JCS, which argued “Any reversal of US policy could have 
disastrous effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vietnam, but with the 
rest of our Asian and other allies as well.”20 After Galbraith’s proposal was 
secretly tested and failed,21 negotiation with the communists was kept out of 
policy option, leaving victory as the only way out of the RVN. Those policy 
frameworks increased the pressure on U.S. officials, including intelligence analysts, 
not to emphasise elements (such as the limited significance of communism in the 
NLF, the mistreatment of the people by the GVN, and the difficulty of wining the 
conflict against a highly experienced nationalist movement) that might put into 
question the basic assumptions behind Vietnam policy.    
 
2. Too early to judge (December 1961 - May 1962) 
 
Kennedy’s decision in December 1961 to step up the U.S. support for the GVN 
was followed by a large flow of U.S. money, materials and personnel into the RVN 
and the introduction of new projects aimed at containing the insurgency. During the 
course of 1962, the number of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam rose from around 
3,000 to 11,500.22 In February 1962, the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) was absorbed into the new commando structure, the Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV). Under the expanded and reorganised U.S. mission, 
the Strategic Hamlet project became a focal point of the GVN/U.S. operations. 
According to the plan, the programme was to serve as a coordinated civil-military 
effort to “gain or maintain security and population control, and establish effective 
                                                                        
19 Ibid,, p. 112. See also: Memo, Mecklin to Nolting, “Press Relations” (27 Nov 1962), 
FRUS, Vietnam 1961-1963, vol. II, 322. 
20 Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, pp. 120.  
21  President Kennedy authorised Averell Harriman and William Sullivan, who were 
attending the Geneva conference on Laos, to meet North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Ung 
Van Khiem at the hotel suite of the Burmese delegation, but the meeting achieved virtually 
nothing. Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, pp. 120–121. 
22 Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, pp. 137. 
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presence of government among people.”23 Peasants were to be grouped into 
fortified villages (or “hamlets”). Within each hamlet, a Civic Action team was to 
offer basic socioeconomic support to the inhabitants. Paramilitary units, including 
Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, were expected to provide defensive measures, 
while the police force was to maintain law and order. These civilian projects were 
to be supported by the military’s “clear and hold” operations (or “pacification”) 
designed to eliminate insurgents by force. Initially, the joint projects began as 
Operation Sunrise in the Binh Duong province in March 1962, and Operation Seas 
Swallow in the Phu Yen province in May 1962.24   
     Alongside those interdepartmental efforts, each section of the U.S. mission 
had its own programmes. The Embassy, for example, was encouraging the 
Presidential Palace to introduce political reform that the U.S. government thought 
was necessary, such as the delegation of power to officers on the font line. The US 
Operation Mission (USOM) was assisting with socioeconomic projects and 
working with the South Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior to improve the quality 
of local administration.25 The MACV was helping the reform and operations of the 
South Vietnamese army (ARVN), while the CIA’s Saigon Station (CAS) was 
conducting covert operations mainly in the Central Highlands.26  
      Already in early 1962, some observers – including the British Embassy in 
Saigon and the unnamed author of a provocative article in New Republic in March 
1962 – expressed their pessimism about the GVN’s ability to contain the 
insurgency.27 Yet, negative comments on the prospects of the new programmes 
were limited during the first quarter of 1962. At this early stage, many officers in 
the U.S. mission apparently assumed that, as Lionel McGarr (the commander of 
                                                                        
23 Memo, MACV, “Special Report on Provincial Rehabilitation, 19–30 Aug. 1962” (8 Sept 
1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 9, Folder 6. 
24 For the counterinsurgency in early 1962, see for example: Memo MACV, “Clearing and 
Holding Operations” (11 May 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 8, “May 1962: 10–29”; 
INR, RFE-27 “Progress Report on South Vietnam” (18 June 1962), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, 
Box 3, “Vietnam, 3/1/62–7/27/62”, #8; MACV, “Special Report on Provincial 
Rehabilitation, 19–30 Aug. 1962” (8 Sept 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 9, Folder 6. 
25 Memo, Knox to Hilsman, “The Joint American-Vietnamese Program for the Training of 
Local Government Officials” (1 Feb 1962), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 
1/62–2/62”, #2; Harvey Neese and John O’Donnell eds., Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam 
1960–1965 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001). 
26 Thomas Ahern, CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center 
for the Study of Intelligence, 2001). 
27 Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK?: Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 118-121; Gibbons, The US Government and the 
Vietnam War, Part 2, pp. 120–121; Z, “The War in Vietnam: We Have Not Been Told the 
Whole Truth,” New Republic (12 March 1962); Memo, Jorden to Cotrell “New Republic 
article and editorial on Viet-Nam” (16 March 1962); INR, Hughes to Rice “Comments on 
“The War in Vietnam” by “Z”, New Republic, 3.12.62” (n.d.), all three documents in JFKL, 
President’s Office Files, Country Files, Box 128A, “Vietnam, Security, 1962,” #7, 7a, and 
7d. 
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MAAG) suggested, “our country’s strong stand announced to the world” was 
having a positive psychological effect on the friendly forces.28 At the February 
1962 Honolulu conference, Gen. Harkins emphasised “a spirit of optimism and 
growing confidence within Vietnamese and U.S. military and civilian circles,” 
promoting Ambassador Nolting to add that a “spirits of movement is 
discernable.”29 At the same time, reports and intelligence had not yet provided a 
clear picture of the scale of the problems facing the GVN. The MACV’s Order of 
Battle statistics, according to George Allen (a MACV analyst in 1962), continued 
to underestimate the number of the insurgents and the extent of enemy-controlled 
territory, due partly to the deliberate distortion of intelligence by Col. James 
Winterbottom (the head of the MACV intelligence section, J-2) and Gen. Paul 
Harkins (the MACV commander). 30  Another source of feedback to senior 
policymakers – the weekly “Status Reports” to the NSC – listed the progress in the 
GVN/US projects rather than the weaknesses of the GVN or the strength of the 
NLF.31 Although the GVN’s problems (including the lack of popular support for 
President Diem) were mentioned in cables and reports, they were mostly seen as 
factors that could be mitigated by new projects or that would not jeopardise the 
prospect of victory.32  Moreover, the future of those new programmes, which were 




                                                                        
28 Letter, McGarr to Lyndon Johnson (22 Feb 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 7, 
“February 1962: 19-23.” 
29 Minutes of the 3rd Honolulu conference on Vietnam (19 Feb 1962), JFKL, Newman 
Papers, Box 7, “February 1962: 19-23.” 
30 According to George Allen (MACV intelligence analyst in 1962) and John Newman, the 
number of VC guerrillas in the first MACV Order of Battle estimates in April was reduced 
from over 40,000 to 16,305 under pressure from Winterbottom. The first graphic battlefield 
assessment presented at the Honolulu conference in May was also edited by Winterbottm 
and Harkins, who converted about one-third of “enemy controlled” areas into either 
“neutral” or “government controlled” and replaced around half of the “neutral” areas with 
“government controlled.” Newman, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 242–244, 249; Allen, None So 
Blind, p. 142. 
31 For the Status Reports in late 1961 to early 1962, see: documents in JFKL, NSF, Country, 
Box 202, “Vietnam, Subjects, Status Reports, 6/12/61–11/10/61,”; Memo, State Department 
Task Force Viet-Nam, “Status Report on the Instructions to Ambassador Nolting” (21 Feb 
1962); Memo, JCS J-3, “Status Report of the Military Actions in South Vietnam” (21 Feb 
1963); Memo, CIA, “Status Report on Covert Actions in Vietnam” (23 Feb 1963) all in 
JFKL, President’s Office Files, Country Files, Box 128A, “Vietnam, Security, 1962,” #3, 
#10 and #11; Stat Dept. Task Force Viet-Nam, “Status Report on the Instruction to 
Ambassador Nolting” (18 April 1962), JFKL, John Newman Papers, Box 8, “April 1962: 
10–28.” 
32 See for example: Memo, Knox (USOM) to Hilsman, “The Joint American-Vietnamese 
Program for the Training of Local Government Officials” (1 Feb 1962), JFKL, Hilsman 
Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 1/62–2/62,” #2; Minutes of the 3rd Honolulu conference on 
Vietnam (19 Feb 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 7, “February 1962: 19-23.” 
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3. Warning and pessimism (June - July 1962) 
 
In June to early August 1962, some of the key problems for the GVN became much 
clearer. While many documents continued to stress achievements,33 problems were 
also mentioned and/or analysed in cables from Saigon, reports by returned officers, 
briefings to senior policymakers, and in-depth analysis in Washington. 
Policymakers tended to be sceptical about negative reports coming from those 
outside the administration, such as U.S. journalists and the French government. Yet 
some documents – notably William Pfaff’s five-page letter to John Cogley dated 1 
July34 – and some issues mentioned in the media were taken seriously.  
     In July, problems in the Strategic Hamlet programme became a major 
concern for the CIA Saigon Station and the INR, even though Ambassador Nolting 
and the CIA’ Office of Current Intelligence remained more optimistic about its 
future.35 The CAS cable on 3 July in particular warned that the entire programme 
was being “sabotaged by military field commanders and, most dangerously, by the 
province chiefs.” Field commanders did not want to use their force in static 
defence, while province chiefs ignored the requests that the trainees at the Strategic 
Hamlet Training Center be selected from individuals who were “in good standing 
in their communities and having enough prestige to influence the people.” As it 
turned out, according to the cable, many of the trainees at the Thi Nghe Strategic 
Hamlet Training Center came from “the lowest elements possible,” including 
“illiterate peasants…juvenile delinquents, and others who constituted a control 
problem.” The cable also pointed out that “the harsh, dictatorial approach by the 
Provincial Chiefs” was “turning the peasant more and more against the 
government” and that there was “extensive corruption in the use of funds and 
supplies” given to the Provincial Chiefs for setting up the hamlets.36 This was 
followed by another CAS cable on 16 July, which analysed the potential risk of 
                                                                        
33 See for example: INR, RFE-27, “Progress Report on South Vietnam” (18 June 1962), 
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“Final Report” (1 July 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 8, “July 1962: 1–5.” 
34 This five-page letter was written after Pfaff’s intensive survey of South Vietnam during 
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FOIA Electronic Reading Room, <www.foia.cia.gov> accessed 2 Sept 2007.  
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expanding the project. The expansion was planned by the Presidential Palace, 
which came to regard the Strategic Hamlet programme as a “generalized national 
rallying symbol” and as a “militant democracy in underdeveloped countries.” The 
cable argued that the ambitious plan of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President’s younger 
brother, to stretch the programme into enemy-controlled territories (including the 
use of “kibbutz-type posts to which young, highly motivated families would be 
sent to live…in areas adjacent to VC strongholds”) was “perhaps the most 
debatable feature of current GVN plans.” The cable warned that the insufficient 
integration of the project into a wider security plan would make hamlets vulnerable 
to enemy attacks, which were likely to intensify after the end of the rainy season.37 
When forwarding this cable to Roger Hilsman (the chairman of the INR), Charles 
Spinks (an INR analyst) generally agreed with the CAS’s assessment, but added 
future warnings. He argued, for example, that the disagreement between Nhu and 
his brother Can, who controlled the central part of the RVN, would not be solved as 
easily as the CAS predicted.38    
     On the military side of operations, reports drew attention to at least two key 
problems in the South Vietnamese military (the ARVN). The first was the Palace’s 
political interference in military affairs, much of which stemmed from its desire to 
reduce the risk of a military coup. (After the large-scale coup attempt in November 
1960 and the bombing of the Presidential Palace by two Air Force aircrafts in 
November 1961, a coup d’état was hardly a distant possibility in 1962.) In an 
attempt to avoid the concentration of power and thereby prevent the rise of a leader 
who could oppose his power, the President kept the command structure “so split 
and confused that military operations against the communist Viet Cong guerrillas 
border on chaotic,” according to Ben Price (AP).39 Some aspects of operations, 
such as the number of bombs that each airplane could carry, were subject to 
restrictions so as not to enable officers to use their forces against the Presidential 
Palace.40 On top of this, Diem’s insistence on making all tactical decisions was 
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38 Memo, INR, “CAS Evaluation of Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam” (17 July 
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making operations slow and inflexible,41 while his intolerance to casualties on his 
side made commanders reluctant to engage in a risky but important operation.42 
The second problem lay in the morale, competence and loyalty of solders. The CIA 
Saigon Station, for example, reported in June that the South Vietnamese people, 
including soldiers, were “getting tired of the present situation,” and suggested the 
possibility of a coup attempt.43 One of the junior officers who participated in 
counterinsurgency orientation visit to South Vietnam during June and July 1962 
also observed:  
 
Fire discipline is extremely poor. A large percentage of the troops 
won’t shoot back and the ones that will couldn’t hit an elephant...The 
attitude of the Army is pervaded by apathy. They just don’t seem to 
possess the will to win…The provincial Army…had the additional 
problems of being highly infiltrated by VC. In the briefing given by 
MACV, it was stated that from 10% to 30 % of the Provincial Army 
was in sympathy with the Viet Cong…I was told by pilots from 
HMM-362 of the instance, when carrying Provincial troops, upon their 
disembarking from the helicopters they turned and fired on the 
aircraft.44 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
small bombs only (typically around 20 pounds). When one aircraft was permitted to carry a 
1000-pound bomb, Diem made sure that it did not have enough fuel to reach Saigon. In 
June 1963, the MACV also recognised the restriction on the amount of bombs as a major 
problem. A set of reports by officers who participated orientation visit to South Vietnam (c. 
Aug 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 10, “Dec. 1962: 7–31.” Memo, Timmes to 
Harkins, “VNAF Bomb Moratorium” (15 June 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 12, 
“June. 1963: 10–16.” 
41 Discussing an assault on a small village on 22 June, a officer argued that the major 
reason for its failure was that “the intelligence had to go up the chain of command all the 
way to the president. Then with the president picking the units and the tactics to be used, 
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military operations must be approved by Diem, no matter how small the operations, and 
once the plan is approved it can only be changed by Diem,” and provided a pre-planned 
assault against insurgents on 26 July as a typical example: “The landing zone and the 
direction of attack for the troops was already set. When we arrived at the landing zone, the 
Viet Cong (a regular VC Company, numbering approximately 100 to 150) was plainly 
visible about one half a mile past the landing zone, away from the direction of attack. 
Neither the landing zone nor the direction of attack could be changed. They all escaped.” A 
set of reports by officers who participated orientation visit to South Vietnam (c. Aug 1962), 
JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 10, “Dec. 1962: 7–31.” 
42  “[Local] military commanders do not take chances,” Pfaff observed, “Why fight 
aggressively and risk defeat when it is possible to hide in forts and be congratulated by the 
government for low casualty rates. Letter, Pfaff to Cogley (1 July 1962), JFKL, White 
House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 75, “CO312 Viet-Nam, 4/16/62–12/31/62.” Ben 
Price also reported on 8 July that Major General William Rosson (Chief of the US Special 
Forces (Guerrillas)) was offended by the ARVN’s commander’s “refusal to take the 
offensive in any meaningful way,” even though that story was categorically denied by the 
US Army and Rosson himself. Cable, CINCPAC to MACV (9 July 1962), JFKL, NSF, 
Country, Box 196A “Vietnam General, 7/7/62–7/10/62,” #11. 
43 Cable, CAS to CIA, “Possibility of a Coup D’etat” (15 June 1962), the CIA, FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room <www.foia.cia.gov> accessed 2 Sept 2006. 
44 A set of reports by officers who participated orientation visit to South Vietnam (c. Aug 
1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 10, “Dec. 1962: 7–31.” 
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     Knowledge about other aspects of enemy activities remained quite limited in 
mid-1962. Just how little the U.S. intelligence community knew about the NLF in 
1962 was revealed in the National Intelligence Estimates 53-63 (April 1963), 
which identified the NLF as the political wing of the Viet Cong (the term used by 
the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments to describe their enemy) and argued 
that “this organization [the NLF] currently has little following in Vietnam, is 
clearly a front for the Communists, and its ostensible leaders are political 
nonentities.” 45  A notable exception was enemy infiltration from Laos and 
Cambodia, which become a major issue when Robert Trumbull (New York Times) 
and Neil Sheeham (UPI) reported on 4 and 13 July that thousands of North 
Vietnamese cadres had been “streaming like water through a sieve across the 
border from Laos into South Vietnam.”46 Although the U.S. government dismissed 
those reports as mere speculation,47 it accepted that there had been an increase in 
infiltration since May 1962. (MACV figures for infiltration were 500–1000 per 
month from June 1961 to November 1961, 100–200 per month from December 
1961 to April 1962, 800–1000 in May 1962, and 800 in the first week of June 
1962.48) It was also widely recognized that the DRV could step up infiltration “with 
no great difficulty and relatively little danger of detection,” as insurgents 
dominated the inhabitants in much of the border area and South Vietnamese 
patrolling along the Laotian frontier was limited.49  
     Arguably the most serious problem for the GVN recognised in mid-1962 was 
the lack of active support by the rural community. On 12 June, the CIA reported 
that limited public opinion sampling in Phong Dinh Province southwest of Saigon 
confirmed previous reporting that “the peasant, for the most part, is hostile or has 
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adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude toward the regime. Reasons were: injustice of 
GVN officials, shelling of village by GVN forces, inadequacy of GVN aid to 
villages.”50 This was followed by the INR’s research paper of 18 June, which 
concluded that “Despite favorable developments, there has been no major 
break-through in improving the popular image of the government particularly in 
the countryside,” pointing out that the ultimate challenge of political reform was to 
“walk the thin line of meaningful and sustained assistance to the villagers without 
obvious efforts to direct, regiment, or control them.”51 Likewise, the Vietnam Task 
Force’s Final Report on 1 July warned that “Our attempt continues, but Diem’s 
popular support has decreased.”52 On the same day, journalist William Pfaff wrote 
down his observation:  
 
The villagers have…no special reason to love this government…The 
government insists on collecting land rent on even the smallest 
properties…the peasant tips off the VC, there is an ambush, and the 
former saves his rent, the VC adds to its collection of weapons…the 
peasant’s relationship to the army is that of any peasant to any army – 
he hates and fears it because it disrupts his life and livelihood.53  
 
A week later, Ben Price (AP) reported that, according to returned officers he 
interviewed, forced resettlements without proper explanation to peasants were 
“creating a vast reservoir of resentment.”54 Toward the end of July, those warnings 
culminated in a 78-page study of peasant-government relations by the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Council (“South Vietnam: The Political Relationship 
between the Central Government and the Countryside”). After outlining the 
historical background, the study examined the following factors as major sources 
of peasant apathy and hostility toward the government: 
 
a. the ineffectiveness of the GVN in providing security and in 
administering the welfare programs;  
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b. excessive demands upon the rural population;  
c. lack of empathy on the part of local officials and their frequent 
failure to explain government programs adequately;  
d. lack of justice in the treatment of accused individuals;  
e. lack of trust by the people in the GVN leadership because of 
differences in style of living, regional origins and religion, 
allegations of venality, exploitative activities of the Can Lao Party, 
etc.; and 
f. such possible economic grievances as failure to implement land 
reform fully.  
 
The report suggested that, in order to rally the support of the rural population, a 
“general demarche” in political reform was necessary.55   
     Facing those reports, many, including senior policymakers, recognised the 
possibility of rapid deterioration of the situation in the RVN and/or the need to 
consider a negotiated settlement. William Pfaff’s letter on 1 July concluded, 
“There simply is no military solution possible here…There has got to be a political 
solution. But as things stand now the parallels with [the last years of the first 
Indochina War] are painful.”56 In late July, R. A. Burrows (the counsellor of the 
British Embassy in Saigon) argued that there could be no hope of progress under 
President Diem, while Colonel Henry Lee (a military attaché to the British 
Embassy) mentioned the possibility of replacing the President by a military junta. 
On 2 August, H. A. F. Hohler (British Ambassador to South Vietnam) reportedly 
told a Vietnamese journalist that the only solution for South Vietnam was a 
neutralist coalition, pointing out that the U.S. government had little experience in 
counterinsurgency.57 The next day (3 August), Ambassador Nolting reported that 
the “next 6–12 months will be period of crisis in [the] sense that either great 
improvement in situation or considerable deterioration could ensue,” adding that 
the GVN’s programmes, which had raised hope, could “boomerang disasterously 
[sic] if not followed through.” 58 Three days later Forrestal suggested that the U.S. 
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might have to withdraw from the RVN, writing to Keisen: “I want to get out there, 
armed with some of Averell’s bite, to see what can be done. I don’t think we have 
much time to decide whether to stay with SVN on our terms or get out.”59  
 
4. Diverting attention (August 1962) 
 
At least three developments around August 1962 helped marginalise those 
weaknesses of the GVN reported during the early summer of 1962, paving the way 
for the spread of a positive assessment in late 1962. The first is the authorisations 
to expand air campaigns and the Strategic Hamlet programme. At this point, the 
Pentagon was not fully aware of negative aspects of this policy, including the 
greater risk of civilian casualties caused by large-scale, poorly targeted 
offensives.60 Nor did it take seriously the possibility that one of the main reasons 
why the GVN wanted the regular troops to rely on long-range artillery and air 
strikes (while ordering paramilitary units to defend the most vulnerable posts) was 
to avoid close contact between insurgents and the regular troops and thereby to 
reduce the casualties to the latter, which President Diem might see as protection for 
his own power.61 Likewise, when on 6 August the GVN informed the U.S. mission 
of its plan to expand the Strategic Hamlet programmes into less secure territories, 
rather than adhering to the “oil bolt” principle of extending the project carefully 
from secure areas,62 the U.S. government largely accepted it without serious 
scrutiny of its implications. In his cable to Washington on 9 August, William 
Trueheart (U.S. Embassy) judged that “the development of this plan constitutes a 
most welcome step forward in the GVN’s effort to organize the Strategic Hamlet 
Program in a more effective manner.”63 In a similar tone, General Lemnitzer (the 
Chairman of the JCS) told McNamara on 28 August that “the plan reflects sincere 
interest and a desire to pursue the task with both organization and coordination.”64 
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It appeared that the CIA station, which warned against such expansion in the cable 
on 16 July mentioned earlier, did not oppose the plan either, possibly because its 
chief since 1959, William Colby, was replaced by John Richardson in mid-1962.65  
     The second factor that mitigated the pessimism of the early summer of 1962 
was the GVN’s emphasis on the VC hardships in some areas particularly in the 
central part of the RVN. In August, Nguyen Dinh Thuan (the Secretary of State) 
provided the MACV with evidence (including captured VC letters) that indicated a 
severe shortage of food and medical supplies for insurgents in the Central 
Highlands.66 Exploiting this information to underline the benefit of using herbicide, 
which the White House remained reluctant to authorise,67 Thuan argued, “VC 
crops destruction by all means will cut down infiltration rate and force communists 
for showdown in the plain, in which our forces could use…their superior means.”68 
Nolting relayed this news to the State Department on 25 August, arguing:  
 
Both Embassy and MACV consider as encouraging those indications 
of VC hardships in highland areas…MACV report…records first real 
indication [that] health conditions of VC may be sufficiently serious to 
affect operational effectiveness…All these indications reinforce our 
conviction that carefully conceived crop destruction programs in 
clearly VC areas…can be important weapon against VC. These 
operations must be mounted quickly if to be effective.69  
 
On the same day, Hilsman told Harriman that, according to reports from Saigon, 
“the Viet Cong in at least certain areas are extremely short of medical supplies and 
suffering unusually high sickness rate.”70 Those reports, though not unfounded, 
drew attention to the problems, rather than strengths, of the enemy forces.   
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     The third, and related, source of optimism was the GVN’s efforts to 
exaggerate its achievements and conceal negative information. While such 
attempts did exist before,71 they became bolder and more effective during the 
second half of 1962. A possible trigger for this development was the meeting 
between Ambassador Nolting and Secretary Thuan on 15 August. In this meeting, 
they discussed the possibility of war-weariness among the friendly forces,72 and 
the GVN’s suspicion about declining U.S. confidence in the counterinsurgency, 
which the GVN feared could lead Washington to consider a reduction of its support 
or even a neutralist solution. Sharing the GVN’s anxiety, Nolting told Thuan that 
“we may be approaching time when a definite shift in GVN psychological line 
should be made,” and continued: 
 
Perhaps GVN should begin to point to light at end of tunnel, which 
may be not far away. This line can be made credible and I suggested 
that he and President Diem should think seriously about fixing eyes of 
South Vietnamese people on achievement of peace and fruits thereof 
within relatively near future. Thuan agreed that President Diem should 
move in this direction and that we should work together to inject this 
note of hope into his public speeches.73  
 
Just two days later (17 August), at the end of an address to province and military 
officers, the President’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, declared that “in another year 
current unconventional war in SVN would be won and then a conventional war 
would be launched northward with the ultimate objective of the unification of 
Vietnam.”74 Shortly afterward (late August), the Palace expelled François Sully 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
1963–1966, Box 3, “POL 29 Amnesty 1962.”  
71 There had been a suspicion that the GVN were distorting information in an attempt to 
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Vietnamese citizens and their every statement emphasized.” INR, RFE-27 “Progress Report 
on South Vietnam” (18 June 1962), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 
3/1/62–7/27/62,” #8; Memo, MACV, “Discussions and Statements by US Personnel” (27 
June 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 8, “June 1962: 20–30”; Letter, Pfaff to Cogley (1 
July 1962), Letter Forrestal to Dungan (3 Aug 1962), both documents in JFKL, White 
House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 75, “CO312 Viet-Nam, 4/16/62–12/31/62.” 
72 For long, Nolting was concerned about the possibility that the lack of spectacular 
success made it difficult for Diem to sustain public morale and support for his regime. See 
for example: Cable, Saigon to State, “Status Report on Political Items as of Nov. 23” (24 
Nov 1961), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 6, “Nov 1961: 22–24.” 
73 Cable, Saigon to State (16 Aug 1962), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 196A, “Vietnam 
General, 8/15/62–8/22/62,” #4. 
74 Cable, Saigon to State (18 Aug 1962), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 196A, “Vietnam, 
General, 8/15/62–8/22/62,” #7. 
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(Newsweek) from the country after his critical article of 20 August, followed by the 
same action against James Robinson (NBC) in October.75 Meanwhile, the GVN 
imposed restrictions on U.S. reporters who remained in the RVN, including a 
prohibition on journalists covering operations in Zone D and a ban on field unit 
commanders talking with correspondents other than through written 
communications.76  Pointing out that the actions against Sully and Robinson 
signalled a major shift in GVN press policy, John Mecklin (the Public Affairs 
Officer at the Saigon Embassy) warned Nolting on 27 November that “this policy 
is being formulated and administered by Counselor Nhu, uncomfortably often at 
the whim of his wife…the GVN is deliberately harassing all foreign newsmen, and, 
even more seriously, deliberately attempting to establish a blackout on news from 
Vietnam other than official communiques, which are notoriously unreliable.”77  
 
5. Spread of optimism (September - December 1962) 
 
Bad news continued to reach Washington throughout the summer and autumn of 
1962. In September, for example, the U.S. mission reported the opposition in 
Khanh Hoa province,78 and some documents continued to mention problems in the 
government-peasant relations.79 The sudden deterioration of South Vietnamese 
diplomatic relations with Laos and Cambodia was one of the key subjects at the 
meeting between President Kennedy and State Secretary Thuan on 25 September.80 
The biggest concern around September 1962, though, was the expansion of enemy 
activities and infiltration. On 23 August, the CIA Saigon Station reported that 
insurgents were extending their operations into the Saigon area, which remained 
relatively safe at that time.81 At the Tuesday luncheon on 11 September, according 
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to Roger Hilsman (the head of the INR), Forrestal discovered that the Bundy 
brothers and Walt Rostow were “all talking as if there had been a marked increase 
of infiltration into South Vietnam through Laos,” and requested the INR to produce 
another paper on the subject.82 
     Despite all this, optimism gradually spread in the U.S. mission and among 
senior policymakers in Washington. On 21 August, the CIA station reported that 
“With acceleration and augmentation of the CIDG [Citizens’ Irregular Defense 
Groups] programs and continued steady progress on the Strategic Hamlets 
programs, the nature of war in South Vietnam could change significantly in our 
favor within eighteen months. Ambassador Nolting and the rest of us believe that 
the beginning of a change for the better is already evident.”83 In a similarly 
positive tone, Dean Rusk (the Secretary of State) told Nolting on 23 August, 
commenting on Nhu’s speech on 17 August mentioned earlier, that “Diem’s calls 
for struggle and sacrifice could now be balanced with some description of purpose 
[of] this struggle in terms of what peace will eventually bring to Viet-Nam. If VC 
can be given bloody nose during coming dry season, light at end of tunnel would 
truly seem brighter.”84 When Forrestal briefed the President on 18 September on 
Nolting’s latest “somewhat bullish” review of the situation, he emphasised “a 
2-to-1 ratio in over-all casualties and almost a 4-to-1 ratio in the number of troops 
killed in action in favor of the GVN,” which, if sustained, “will inevitably have an 
important adverse psychological effect on the enemy.”85 These statistics prompted 
Forrestal to argue that “While we cannot yet sit back in the confidence that the job 
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is well in hand, nevertheless it does appear that we have finally developed a series 
of techniques which, if properly applied, do seem to produce results.” The positive 
trend in military statistics also led Robert McNamara (the Secretary of Defense) to 
declare at the Honolulu conference in October that “Every quantitative measure we 
have show that we are winning this war.”86  
     Those positive assessments in late 1962 were not groundless. The expansion 
of the Strategic Hamlets and the aggressive use of air power did cause some 
difficulties to insurgents in some areas during the second half of 1962. 87 
Nonetheless, the general optimism in late 1962 was misguided and detrimental in 
the long run, as it was to become clearer in 1963. It was based largely on the 
statistics of two projects: the Strategic Hamlet and large-scale military operations. 
Those statistics could be easily exaggerated either by reporting inaccurate figures 
or by counting elements that did not represent any substantial progress (such as a 
fake military sortie without serious contact with enemies, and strategic hamlets 
which had only a token wire around them).88 Nor did the statistics show the 
negative effects of those operations (such as civilian casualties caused by poorly 
targeted air campaigns and the diversion of resources from other projects89) or the 
remaining problems in other dimensions of counterinsurgency (such as the limited 
progress in civic action, the strength of insurgents, the oppressive practices of local 
officers and the lack of peasant support for the GVN). 
     Already in late 1962, some in the U.S. government noticed those problems. 
On 12 October, for example, Averell Harriman (the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs) cabled Noting that “I remain concerned about the dangers of 
over-optimism…Although the tide may be turning in Viet-Nam, there is a danger 
that certain very serious problems may not be receiving the attention and action 
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which they deserve here in Washington.”90 Five days later, Robert Johnson (State 
Department) judged that the Strategic Hamlet programme in the central part of the 
RVN was “mostly pure façade,” explaining that “Often creation of a so-called 
strategic hamlet involves nothing but a very inadequate fence around one-quarter 
of the hamlet.”91  Echoing this view, Gen. Taylor reported to McNamara in 
November that, of 3,353 hamlets that the GVN claimed as completed, “not more 
than 600 can be viewed as fulfilling the desired characteristics in terms of 
equipment, defensive works, security forces and, possibly most important, 
government.”92 President Kennedy also received a warning from Senator Mike 
Mansfield, who visited Saigon toward the end of 1962. In his memo to the 
President on 26 December, the Senator argued that the insurgency could not be 
contained in a few years as Gen. Harkins had claimed, and that the United States 
had to think about a diplomatic solution. The Strategic Hamlets, Mansfield insisted, 
required an “immense job of social engineering, dependent on great outlays of aid 
on our part for many years and a most responsive, alert and enlightened leadership” 
from the GVN.93 In late 1962, the INR and the CIA’s Office of National Estimates 
also began to produce documents that emphasised some of the key problems in the 
counterinsurgency.94 This led to the year-long dispute over Vietnam intelligence 
during 1963, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Counterinsurgency: Intelligence Dispute, 1963 
 
Disagreement over the state of the counterinsurgency remained a defining feature 
of Vietnam policy in 1963. Tension emerged in early 1963 when the CIA’s Office 
of National Estimates (ONE) and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) attempted to highlight the negative effects of air strikes and 
strategic hamlets as well as a range of socio-political and administrative problems 
for the GVN through NIE 53-63 and the post-trip reports by Roger Hilsman (INR) 
and Michael Forrestal (NSC). However, those parallel efforts failed to change the 
view of senior policymakers, as the critical edge of the NIE was watered down in 
its final draft and the Hilsman-Forrestal report had little effect on the attitude of the 
Pentagon and the U.S. mission. After a lulu in disputes during the first four months 
of the political crisis (May–August), further disagreements over the 
counterinsurgency became an open dispute between the State Department and the 
JCS in the NSC meetings in September. While the McNamara-Taylor mission to 
Saigon from late September to early October restored some sense of unity within 
the Vietnam policy community, it was only after the fall of the Diem regime in 
November 1963 that the entire administration, including the Pentagon, recognised 
the negative trend in the countryside and some of the key problems in the 
counterinsurgency. 
     The range of weaknesses that lay behind the rising optimism in 1962 
discussed in the previous chapter – such as the political pressure to refute media 
criticism, the poor intelligence on non-military factors, and the lack of a clear 
strategic consensus – continued to be a major source of intelligence-related 
problems in 1963. At the same time, the rivalry between the State Department and 
the Pentagon became more prominent during 1963. This adverse bureaucratic 
context brought pressure on both parties to make their assessments simpler and 
one-sided, reducing the room for a constructive discussion on the mixed 
developments in South Vietnam in 1963. 
 
1. Doubts of the ONE and the INR (December 1962 - August 1963) 
 
The CIA and NIE 53-63 
According to Harold Ford (the chief of the ONE’s Far East Staff and one of the 
analysts who wrote the original draft), the production of NIE 53-63 began in 
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September 1962 when the ONE analysts were convinced that “behind the signs of 
some outward improvement lay profound adverse trends.”1 Their early draft NIE 
in November 1962 was not entirely pessimistic about the prospect for victory. It 
argued, for example, that “If the US presence and assistance program are 
maintained at present levels, GVN military forces will be able to contain the VC 
military threat and may be able to mount offensives,” and that “If [the GVN] 
adheres to its present strategic counterinsurgency plan and continues to implement 
certain promising programs, the GVN may be able to prevent the VC from 
increasing their present level of domination over South Vietnam’s rural population 
and establish firmer GVN control over presently contested rural areas.” At the 
same time, the draft also examined some hurdles to the GVN/U.S. efforts in the 
countryside, and judged that the “present GVN is not likely to take the political 
steps necessary to reduce the VC threat to a point where the US could significantly 
diminish its present involvement in the South Vietnamese struggle.”2  
     Having re-examined reports from the U.S. mission, the ONE staffs noted in 
early February that those documents inclined to highlighted progress and 
depreciated difficulties, that critical information was “frequently prefaced by 
comments denigrating its source,” and that some of the in-depth studies had a 
summary introduction which demonstrated optimism “not supported by the details 
in the accompanying text.”3 This increasingly critical attitude toward positive 
reports from Saigon partly explains the pessimism in a new draft NIE produced in 
February 1963, which warned:  
 
The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be protracted and costly 
[because] very great weaknesses remain and will be difficult to 
surmount. Among these are lack of aggressive and firm leadership at 
all levels of command, poor morale among the troops, lack of trust 
between peasant and soldier, poor tactical use of available forces, a 
very inadequate intelligence system, and obvious Communist 
penetration of the South Vietnamese military organization.4  
 
When this February draft was submitted to the US Intelligence Board (USIB), John 
McCone (the Director of Central Intelligence) rejected its negative conclusion, and 
ordered ONE analysts to seek the view of those who he thought were the “people 
who know Vietnam best” (including Wheeler, Felt, Harkins, Nolting, Krulak, 
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Sept 2006. 
3 Memo, CIA/ONE, “Postmortem on NIE 43-61, ‘Prospects in South Vietnam’” (14 Feb 
1963), quoted in Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 10. 
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Hilsman and Forrestal).5 Those consultations were hardly constructive, according 
to Willard Mathias (the Board of National Estimates chairman for NIE 53-63). 
“They show a general tendency to take issue with a particular sentence purporting 
to state a fact, rather than an estimative judgment. This or that was ‘too 
pessimistic,’ but there was no clear line of argument why.” One of the issues they 
disputed was the alleged mistreatment of the rural community by the ARVN. Gen. 
Wheeler insisted that he “had received no such reports,” whereas Gen. Felt argued 
that “Charges of [ARVN] rape, pillage and outright brutality are made by Radio 
Hanoi.” Gen. Krulak did accept that some of those crimes had been committed, but 
explained that in Asia it was to be expected that “the soldier will kick the peasant 
as he goes by.” 6 At around the same time, Chester Cooper, an ONE officer whom 
McCone sent to the RVN to investigate the situation, told the DCI that the draft 
NIE was too pessimistic, and that, except for some part of Delta region, the GVN 
would defeat the VC “within about three years.”7  
     In the State Department, members of the Vietnam Working Group in the Far 
Eastern division also complained to the INR that the tone of the draft NIE was too 
gloomy. (It is not clear whether their criticism was forwarded to the ONE). In 
February 1963, Chalmers Wood (a member of the Working Group) told Hilsman 
that although “very substantially improved over the previous versions,” the new 
draft NIE was “still essentially an unbalanced presentation” and remained 
“unsatisfactory.” In particular, Wood disagreed with the ONE’s view on the 
Strategic Hamlet program. In his view, the draft said that the programme was “so 
badly implemented that it has had little effect on the security situation.” On the 
contrary, he argued, the Working Group had received no evidence that, as the draft 
suggested, the GVN was becoming impatient with the time and effort necessary for 
a carefully integrated development of the project. “I think,” Wood summed up his 
complaint, “my basic objection to the paper is that it states, quite correctly, that a 
lasting reduction of the VC threat and the curtailment of US involvement depend 
upon political and economic measure and increased support from the Vietnamese 
people, but the paper gives no indication that such steps are contemplated, much 
less underway. We think they are.”8  
     For a while ONE analysts refused to modify their judgement. As the DCI’s 
new deadline approached, however, they decided to “shade the estimate in a more 
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optimistic direction.” Matthias recalled that their attitude changed on the 
assumption that, if they stuck to the original conclusion, McCone and other parts of 
the CIA might not go along with it, and that, even if they did, it might evoke even 
greater dissent by other departments. “[I]f we were so rigid that we invited debate 
and amendment at the USIB,” Mathias explained, “we might find ourselves with a 
paper more offensive to our judgment than one which moved slightly toward a less 
pessimistic view.”9 The result was the final NIE 53-63 (17 April 1963), which 
concluded:  
 
We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the 
situation is improving…Improvements which have occurred during the 
past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily 
and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of 
government control and in creating greater security in the 
countryside.10 
 
The publication of the final draft on 17 April did not initiate much discussion 
among policymakers.11 A couple of weeks earlier, the situation in Laos had 
become unstable, and that was the main subject at the NSC meetings on Southeast 
Asia on 10 and 20 April.12 From May onward South Vietnam itself faced a 
political instability, and the possibility of a regime change became the focus of the 
Vietnam policy until late August (see Chapter 4).  
 
The INR and the Forrestal-Hilsman reports   
In the State Department, the INR was making a similar effort to emphasise the 
problems in the counterinsurgency. In his memo to Rusk and Kennedy on 3 
December, Roger Hilsman (the head of the INR) argued, “Elimination, and even 
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significant reduction, of the Communist insurgency will almost certainly require 
several years,” as insurgents “probably continue to look primarily to the long run in 
South Vietnam and to remain confident of eventual victory.” He was particularly 
critical of bombing campaigns and crop destruction, which “may well contribute to 
the development of militant opposition among the peasants and positive 
identification with the Viet Cong.”13 
     This was followed by the INR Research Memorandum RFE-66 (“Capsule 
Assessment of the Effort in South Vietnam,” 19 December 1962). The document 
clarified at least three broad problems: the flaws in military operations (including 
the over reliance upon large-scale operations and conventional tactics, and the 
excessive use of air strikes in the absence of ground contact with the enemy which 
“continues to kill a lot of innocent peasants”); the weaknesses in the Strategic 
Hamlet programme (such as the confusion among local officers as to the objectives 
of the programmes, the lack of a coordinated pacification programme, the 
insufficient attention to defensive, socioeconomic and administrative efforts, and 
the fact that few hamlets provided benefits to peasants); and the general disregard 
for the socio-political dimension of counterinsurgency (notably the insufficient 
effort to improve the lot of the rural population through socio-economic and 
administrative reform).14 
     Shortly afterwards (in late December to early January), Hilsman and 
Forrestal visited the RVN. After arriving in Saigon, Hilsman observed:  
 
One of the reasons for their optimism is apparently the vigor with 
which the South Vietnamese government and especially Brother Nhu 
have pushed the strategic hamlet program…Beyond the above it is 
hard to see exactly what specific basis there is for the Embassy’s 
optimism. Partly it is a question of mood. The sense of activity is 
much stronger…On a factual basis, they cite as reasons for optimism 
the increased activities of the ARVIN – they are going out more often, 
attacking more often, and even occasionally engaging in night 
attacks15  
 
During the rest of the trip, they met senior U.S. and GVN officers (including 
Ambassador Nolting, Rufus Phillips, President Diem and his brother Nhu), 
received a joint J-2 and J-3 briefing at the MACV and attended a Country Team 
Meeting and Strategic Hamlet Coordination Committee. Carrying more weight in 
                                                                        
13 Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, pp. 130–131. This sentence 
was also repeated in INR RFE-66, “Capsule Assessment of the Effort in South Vietnam” 
(19 Dec 1962), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 7/28/62–1/31/63,” #5.   
14 INR, RFE-66, “Capsule Assessment of the Effort in South Vietnam” (19 Dec 1962), 
JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam, 7/28/62–1/31/63,” #5.  
15  Memo, Hilsman (n.d.), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam Hilsman Trip, 
12/62–1/63, Memoranda for the Record,” #1. 
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Hilsman and Forrestal’s judgement, though, were their first-hand observation on 
the front line (Phien Province, Plei Ku, Plei Mrong, Dak To, and Dak Pek) and the 
opinion of Major General Edward Rowny, whom Hilsman had known since they 
both attended postgraduate courses in international politics at Yale University. 
Rowny, who had been on some 20 major operations, argued that the interference 
by Admiral Felt (the commander of CINCPAC) in the details of tactical planning 
had adverse effects on the MACV. He also showed that the GVN’s operations 
tended to be preceded by warnings to insurgents and “proceeding so slowly as to 
give the VC ample time to escape.” Rowny argued that the ARVN’s reluctance to 
engage in serious fighting with insurgents was due in part to President Diem’s 
demand for a total victory, pointing out that when an operation killed three VC 
officers and 60 regular VC troops and captured their weapons while the ARVN lost 
one officer and several men, Diem was furious at this “defeat.”16 
     After the trip, Hilsman and Forrestal submitted two reports, one for general 
circulation and the other for the President’s eyes only. The 19-page open report 
focused on the performance of the GVN. While accepting that the 
counterinsurgency was “clearly going better than it was a year ago,” the reports 
stressed the significance of problems including the lack of an overall strategic plan 
(which was necessary for setting priority and coordinating different part of 
counterinsurgency); the neglect of police forces; the “confusing multiplicity” of 
paramilitary forces;17 and the excessive use of large-scale offensives (the “search 
and destroy” operations, as opposed to the more defensive “clear and hold” 
operations).18 The “eyes only” annex, in contrast, discussed some of the key 
problems in the U.S. mission, which included the lack of coordination and 
leadership, the misuse of air power, and the dangers of transferring covert 
operations in the Central Highland from the CIA to the Pentagon.19 
     Forrestal encouraged Kennedy to draw attention to some of those problems 
                                                                        
16  Memos, Hilsman (n.d.), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam Hilsman Trip, 
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Forrestal to Kennedy, “A Report on South Vietnam” (n.d., around 25 Jan 1963), JFKL, 
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18 Memo, Hilsman and Forrestal to Kennedy, “A Report on South Vietnam” (n.d., around 
25 Jan 1963), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam Hilsman Trip, 12/62–1/63, Basic 
Report & “Eyes Only” Annex,” #1. 
19 Memo, Hilsman and Forrestal to Kennedy, “Eyes Only Annex: Performance of U.S. 
Mission” (n.d., around 25 Jan 1963), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 3, “Vietnam Hilsman 
Trip, 12/62–1/63, Basic Report & “Eyes Only” Annex,” #1a. 
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at the NSC meeting on 1 February, the announced purpose of which was to hear 
General Wheeler’s survey of the military situation in the RVN in January.20 Before 
the meeting, Forrestal advised the President to raise, “as a matter of stimulating 
action,” a series of questions in line with the problems identified in the eye-only 
annex.21 Forrestal’s scheme failed, however, and on 4 August he apologised to 
Kennedy, saying that the meeting was a “complete waste of your time.” He argued 
that the “rosy euphoria generated by General Wheeler’s report” made it difficult to 
initiate reform though a formal meeting. As “another technique” he recommended 
“a quiet campaign in the appropriate departments” by Averell Harriman and 
Forrestal himself.22  
    Those episodes in early 1963 were likely to made Hilsman and Forrestal even 
more hostile toward the view of the Pentagon and the U.S. Embassy. This partly 
explains why, after Hilsman became the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs in April 1963 and the political crisis in the RVN started in May, they 
pushed the U.S. policy toward a regime change without due consultation with other 
parts of the administration (see the next chapter). 
 
2. Open dispute (September - October 1963) 
 
Disagreement at the NSC (September 1963) 
The dispute over the counterinsurgency was muted from May to August as the 
political crisis remained the primary concern of policymakers. The disagreement 
returned to the forefront of policymaking in early September after the State 
Department’s effort for a coup d’état in late August failed. At the NSC meeting on 
6 September, policymakers agreed that, in order to re-examine the U.S. response to 
the political crisis, they needed an up-to-date assessment of the impacts of the 
political instability on the counterinsurgency. Dean Rusk (the Secretary of State) 
opened the meeting with the suggestion that “over the weekend there should be an 
interdepartmental effort to pull together and assess all the information available in 
Washington.” When the discussion moved to the U.S. response to the political 
crisis and Rusk mentioned the possibility of delivering an ultimatum to President 
Diem, Robert Kennedy (the Attorney General) returned to the point that “we do not 
yet have sufficient information [on counterinsurgency] on which to base such a 
                                                                        
20 Pentagon Press Briefing by Wheeler on Vietnam on 4 Feb 1962, JFKL, Hilsman Papers, 
Box 3, “Vietnam 2/1/63–3/21/63,” #1b, 1c, 1d. 
21 Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, “South Vietnam” (1 Feb 1963), JFKL, President’s Office 
Files, Country Files, Box 128A, “Vietnam, Security, 1963,” #2. 
22 Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, “South Vietnam” (4 Feb 1962), JFKL, Newman Papers, 
Box 11, “Feb. 1963: 1–8.” 
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decision.” Rusk agreed, saying that “before issuing an ultimatum we must reassess 
that question and we need information to do so.” Then, rather abruptly, the NSC 
decided that Victor Krulak (JCS) and Joseph Mendenhall (State Department) 
should be dispatched to Saigon to “sample opinion” among American military and 
civilian advisers respectively. It was also proposed that John Mecklin (Saigon 
Embassy) and Rufus Philips (USOM) would do the same with USIA and USOM 
staff working on the frontline. When the meeting ended, therefore, the possibility 
of an interdepartmental reassessment of intelligence available in Washington, 
which Rusk had proposed at the beginning of the meeting, was no longer a priority, 
reducing the role of the intelligence community in the Vietnam policymaking 
during the next two months.23  
     Krulak and Mendenhall left for Saigon that evening, and after four days of 
research in the RVN, returned to Washington on 10 September. Their written 
reports and oral briefings at the NSC meetings on 10 September made clear the 
basic disagreement between the State Department and the JCS. Krulak insisted that 
“the shooting war is still going ahead at an impressive pace. It has been affected 
adversely by the political crisis, but the impact is not great.”24 Mendenhall, in 
contras, reported “a virtual breakdown of the civil government in Saigon as well as 
a pervasive atmosphere of fear and hate arising from the policy reign of terror and 
the arrests of students,” concluding that “the war against the Viet Cong could not 
be won if Nhu remains in Vietnam.”25 Mecklin supported Mendenhall’s conclusion, 
arguing that “There is mounting evidence that the war cannot be won with the 
present regime, especially in view of the damage done to popular support during 
the Buddhist crisis.”26 So did Phillips, who also added that “with all due respect to 
                                                                        
23 Memo, State, the NSC meeting on 6 September, JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 4, 
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vol. 4, 78.  
26 Memo, Mecklin to Murrow, “A Policy for Viet-Nam” (10 Sept 1963), JFKL, Newman 
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General Krulak's report, the US military advisers were not able to give credible 
evidence on political attitudes.” This prompted Krulak to argue that “the advisers 
were not good on politics or palace intrigue but they were good on saying whether 
or not the war was being won and they do say that the war is going well,” to which 
Phillips replied that “this was not a military war but a political war. It was a war for 
men's minds more than battles against the Viet Cong.”27 John McCone (the 
Director of Central Intelligence) appeared to support the view of Krulak and the 
JCS. Summarizing NIE 53-63 (May 1963) and SNIE 53-2-63 (July 1963), he 
argued that “The later forecast trouble but not so great that it would not be possible 
to correct the situation. The current view of the intelligence community is not as 
ominous as that expressed by the civilian reporters today.”28 (It is worth noting 
that the minutes of the meeting taken by Hilsman gives an impression that McCone 
supported the State’s view, recording simply that “Mr. McCone read from the June 
SNIE that indicated the intelligence community was even then not very 
hopeful.”29) 
     The disagreement within the administration continued throughout the second 
half of September, and, as discussed in Chapter 4, the media attack against the CIA 
Saigon Station, which was allegedly orchestrated by some part of the State 
Department, added a new dimension to the bureaucratic tension in the Vietnam 
policy community. Meanwhile, the media and Congress became increasingly 
sceptical about the U.S. support for the GVN. David Halberstam’s New York Times 
article on 16 September (“Rift with Saigon on War Tactics Underlined by 2 Red 
Attacks”)30 in particular prompted the CIA and Krulak to investigate and criticise 
what the Agency called “Halberstam’s lugubrious and pessimistic approach to the 
situation in Vietnam.”31 Gen. Harkins also cabled Taylor, Felt and Krulak on 19 
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September, arguing, “From most of the reports and articles I read, one would say 
Vietnam and our programs here are falling apart at the seams. Well, I just 
thoroughly disagree…Thanks goodness I do not get to read the newspapers until 
they are at least three days old. If I got them as soon as you do, I would be afraid to 
go to work or I wouldn’t know what to do. All is not black. No, far from it.”32 
     Facing the divisions among his advisors and the criticism from the U.S. 
public, Kennedy sent another mission to Saigon chaired by McNamara and Gen. 
Taylor in late September. The composition of the mission – about two dozen 
officers from the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA and the White House – 
reflected the need to restore unity in the policy circle. (For the same reason, 
Kennedy also instructed McNamara to tell the Presidential Palace that Washington 
was “not open to oriental divisive tactics.”) At the same time, the choice of two 
chairmen from the Pentagon indicated Kennedy’s intention to make sure that the 
mission return with a clear-cut report on good progress, thus refuting the doubt in 
the media and Congress. It was in this context that, in his cable to Harkins before 
his departure to the RVN, Gen. Taylor said:   
 
[W]e need ability on return to give an eye-ball account of situation in 
South Vietnam to an increasingly critical Congress. Aid program is 
endangered by recent events...Our primary objective is to learn not 
only whether the war is progressing favorably but at what rate it is 
progressing. On return we can expect to be pressed to assure Congress 
that the war can be won in a finite period. Hope you will show us all 
data and indications bearing on this point of rate of progress.33 
 
“In your short visit,” Harkins replied the following day, “we hope to give you a 
blow to blow bird-eye view of that been done. To me it’s remarkable, but of course 
I’m prejudiced and try to keep out of the politics – yet – I know how they are 
involved.”34 The aim of the mission, therefore, was primarily political, and making 
an accurate assessment was of secondary importance. This was not fully 
understood by the civilian part of the mission, some of whom opposed 
McNamara’s positive judgment on the war effort. 35  As Kennedy wanted, 
nonetheless, the McNamara-Taylor report not only confirmed that the war was 
going successfully but also recommended that the President withdraw 1,000 troops 
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by the end of 1963.36  
 
The Sullivan report and RFE-90 (October 1963) 
In October, two documents addressed the causes of the intelligence dispute. One is 
the report “Divergent Attitudes in U.S. Official Community” (5 October) written 
by William Sullivan (State Department), who, as a member of the 
McNamara-Taylor mission, was allocated the task of investigating the “nature and 
the cause of differing opinions and attitudes” in the U.S. team in Saigon. Sullivan 
saw the problem as the classic case of “the two men who look at the same glass of 
water – one sees it half full, the other sees it half empty.” He argued that the 
disagreement stemmed partly from the different natures of the military and civilian 
operations. The MACV, on the one hand, was directed toward active and physical 
tasks (such as conducting military operations and building Strategic Hamlets). 
Those activities were relatively specific, and their progress could be measured 
easily. As a consequence, according to Sullivan, they felt a “justifiable sense of 
accomplishment” and a “can-do” or “gung-ho” sense of confidence in their ability 
to complete their mission. On the other hand, progress was hard to measure for the 
civilians who were responsible for the politico-psychological aspect of 
counterinsurgency (such as to “dissuade an oriental regime from its method of 
governing and to persuade it to use other methods which involve more empathy 
towards the popular mind”). Consequently, the civilians were inclined to question 
the developments in the light of the GVN’s reluctance to reform its politics. In 
Sullivan’s view, the different perspectives were further magnified by the 
imprecision of the data examined, which gave an “opportunity for a great deal of 
subjective interpretation.” There were “considerable emotional elements” as well, 
he added. In the military, this took the form of professional pride: “Any suggestion 
that success is not being attained is considered a personal affront, a reflection 
impugning the achievements of the US armed forces.”37 
     While Sullivan’s report investigated the intelligence problem in Saigon, the 
INR’s Research Memorandum RFE-90 (“Statistics on the War Effort in South 
Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends,” 22 October) tried to highlight the flaws in the 
Pentagon’s interpretation of its military statistics.38 It shows that, in terms of four 
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indicators (enemy attacks, casualties, weapon losses and defections/desertions) that 
the Pentagon had been using to measure the general trend, “there appear to have 
been a number of significant and unfavourable changes in the military situation in 
South Vietnam since July of this year.” The INR also suggested that the negative 
turn was due largely to weaknesses in the counterinsurgency itself, rather than a 
result of the political instability since May 1963 (which the State Department had 
been refusing to help the GVN to solve). “Even without the Buddhist crisis and the 
more serious political difficulties following its wake,” the document concludes, “it 
is possible that the Diem government would have been unable to maintain the 
favourable trends of preceding periods in the face of the accelerated Viet Cong 
effort since July 1963.”39 
     Towards the end of October, the State Department not only circulated about 
40 copies of RFE-90 within the executive branch without consulting the Pentagon 
but also requested the JCS to concur in its release to the Senate Foreign Policy 
Committee.40 More provocatively perhaps, Forrestal sent a copy to Krulak on 28 
October and asked: “I wonder if your people feel the need to comment on the 
referenced memorandum?”41 The JCS held meetings to discuss its response, and 
produced a memo to rebut the INR’s claim. 42  On 7 November, McNamara 
forwarded the memo to Rusk and wrote: “Dean, attached is the State memo re. the 
war in Vietnam. Below it are the comments of the Chiefs. If you were to tell me 
that it is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without 
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seeking the views of the Defense Department the matter will die,”43 which Rusk 
assured almost immediately.44 
     Just after the release of RFE-90, South Vietnamese generals went ahead with 
a military coup on 1 November and assassinated President Diem and his brother 
Nhu on the following day. Although fundamental problems persisted, the regime 
change in Saigon punctured the yearlong dispute over Vietnam estimates. By early 
1964, the negative trend and the near-collapse of the war effort became undeniable. 
So too was the detrimental effect of spending much of 1963 disputing whether the 
counterinsurgency was going well rather than how to tackle the key problems, 
many of which the ONE and the INR had already recognised in late 1962. 
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Political Crisis, 1963 
 
The political instability in South Vietnam dominated Vietnam policy in mid- to late 
1963. It began with a Buddhist demonstration in the city of Hué on 8 May and 
ended with a military coup on 1 and 2 November, during which President Diem 
and his brother Nhu were assassinated. The six-month tragedy had many turns, but 
the State Department’s willingness to remove the Diem regime remained a central 
element in U.S. policy throughout the crisis. During May and June 1963 when the 
Buddhist protests began and continued to escalate, State policymakers started 
drawing up a contingency plan in favour of a regime change and rumours of a coup 
emerged even before the CIA circulated an in-depth analysis of the Buddhist 
demonstrations on 28 June 1963. The next phase of the crisis (from July to 
mid-August) was marked by the disagreement between Ambassador Nolting (who 
opposed a regime change and tried to help President Diem to reconcile with the 
protestors) and the State Department in Washington (which assumed that a coup 
was almost inevitable and advocated a policy of “fence-sitting”). The latter’s view 
was published as SNIE 53-2-63 and contributed to the end of the conciliatory 
approach that Nolting had been urging Diem to explore. At around the same time, 
information on coup plots became increasingly complex, and the CIA’s Office of 
Current Intelligence (OCI) questioned the plotters’ ability to take action against the 
Presidential Palace. Despite this uncertainty, the State Department, along with the 
new Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, pushed general officers to overthrow the 
Ngo brothers during the closing week of August 1963. The collapse of that effort 
exposed the problems in the State Department’s approach and the unreliability of 
information coming through the Saigon Embassy. The following month 
(September 1963) was dominated by the dispute over the need and merits of a 
regime change and the “question of Nhu,” which was also intertwined with the 
media attack against the CIA’s Saigon Station. During October, Washington’s 
“pressure plan” designed to push the GVN to change its policy proved ineffective, 
while a coup became increasingly likely, reviving the disagreement between the 
State Department and the opponents of a regime change (including DCI John 
McCone). While the November coup itself went relatively smoothly, the 
developments in the following year showed that rebuilding the nation under a new 
regime in the middle of a war against an insurgency was much more difficult than 
the proponents of the regime change had assumed during the crisis. 
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     There were some notable achievements by the intelligence community. The 
CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) in particular did produce relatively 
sound assessment of key topics – including the Current Intelligence Memorandum 
on the Buddhist protests (dated 28 June), the rumours of a coup (14 and 21 August), 
the developments after the pagoda raids (26 August) and the GVN’s response to aid 
suspensions (18 October) – although there was problem in timing in some cases. At 
the same time, however, the intelligence community, notably the CIA’s Office of 
National Estimates (ONE), failed to provide a sound estimate of the probable 
consequences of a coup d’état. On this issue, the optimism expressed by the INR in 
RFE-55 (21 June) was accepted as the judgement of the intelligence community in 
SNIE 53-2-63 (10 July). Although CIA analysts had doubts about a coup and DCI 
John McCone gave warnings at NSC meetings in September and October, senior 
policymakers were not fully informed of the potential problems of removing the 
existing regime. This absence of critical intelligence facilitated the State 
Department to go ahead with a military coup even in the face of opposition by 
other parts of the Vietnam policy community.  
     While this intelligence failure can partly be explained by the technical limits 
of predicting policy results, it also reflected the way and context in which Vietnam 
policymaking evolved in 1963. Explaining why Washington moved towards a 
regime change without careful consideration of its consequences, McGeorge 
Bundy later recalled:     
 
In part because the process was so confused, so laden with personality 
clashes, and so distorted and inflamed by publicity that it never got far 
from the immediate issues of tactical judgment. The process of 
policy-making was almost at its worst from mid-August through the 
beginning of October, and thereafter events came so rapidly that time 
was not taken for reflection. Yet, this is only a part of the reason. The 
greater part is that all of the participants assumed that the stakes in 
South Vietnam were so serious as to warrant the deepened 
commitment…no one in the policy circle suggested seriously that the 
U.S. start to think in terms of withdrawing with the task unfinished...1 
 
These problems also help explain the absence of intelligence analysis on the 
probable consequences of a coup d’état. Especially from late August onward, 
bureaucratic politics and a range of immediate issues (such as the impact of the 
crisis on the war effort, the possible effects of pressure plans, and the media attack 
on the CIA) diverted the attention of the intelligence community away from 
analysing the consequences of a regime change. The unwillingness to discuss the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement could also be seen as a source of intelligence 
                                                                        
1 Bundy as quoted in Gibbons, The US Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, p. 205. 
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failure: for senior policymakers in the State Department – including analysts in the 
INR – who thought that the war could not be won with Diem and that withdrawal 
was not an option, a regime change had become the only solution by mid-1963. 
 
1. The Diem regime and the US government before May 1963 
 
President Diem and his family, who were all Catholic, had faced many political 
problems. The greatest concern for Presidential Diem – and a major subject for the 
CIA and the INR – was the possibility of a coup d’état. A large-scale coup attempt 
almost toppled his regime in November 1960.2 A year later, both the CIA and the 
INR recognised a growing discontent within the military and the increasing 
possibility of another coup attempt.3 This was followed by the bombing of the 
Presidential Palace by two Air Force aircrafts in February 1962, which destroyed 
part of the building. In June and August 1962, the CIA’s Saigon station again 
warned the increasing risk of another action against the President.4  
     The authoritarian tendency of the GVN also worried Washington.5 Although 
it had some democratic elements (such as general elections, the parliament and the 
high court), those institutions were beset with corruption and were too weak to 
check the conduct of the Presidential Palace. At the same time, the organizations 
under the control of the President’s younger brother Nhu, such as the Special 
Forces, the Can Lao party and the Republican Youth, played a vital role in 
suppressing political opposition, while Diem’s another sibling, Ngo Dinh Can, 
reigned over the central part of the country “like an autonomous police state.”6  
     By early 1963, some of the senior officers in the State Department, 
especially Michael Forrestal (a Far East staff of the NSC) and Roger Hilsman (the 
head of the INR), had come to regard Diem’s authoritarian tendency as a primary 
                                                                        
2 During this abortive coup, one of the CIA agents, George Carver, was at the coup’s 
command centre, reporting the developments to the CAS headquarters. Colby, Lost Victory, 
pp. 76-79. On 8 July, Time of Viet-Nam carried an article on Carver’s involvement in the 
1960 coup attempt. Cable, Saigon to State (8 July 1963), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 198, 
“Vietnam, General, 7/1/63–7/20/63,” #32. 
3 INR, IN, “Coup Plotting in South Vietnam” (28 Nov 1961), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 
6, Folder “Nov 1961: 28–30”; Memo, CIA to McCone, “The Diem Regime and Its 
Prospects” (5 Dec 1961), NA, CREST 79R00904A000800010008-7.  
4 Cable, CAS to CIA, “Possibility of a Coup D’etat” (15 June 1962), the CIA, FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room <www.foia.cia.gov> accessed 2 Sept 2006; Cable, CAS to CIA, 
“Warning to President Diem of a Possible Coup D’etat on Night 1–2 August 1962” (1 Aug 
1962), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 196A, “Vietnam General, 8/1/62–8/14/62,” #2. 
5 For the Dime regime, see foe example: Memo, Kreimer to McCone, “The Authoritarian 
Tendencies of the Diem Regime” (8 Oct 1963), NA, JFK Collection, CIA Miscellaneous 
Files, Box 5, Folder “JFK-M-06 (F20)”; Philip Catton, Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to 
America's War in Vietnam (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
6 Cable, CAS to CIA, “Apprehension [deleted] Regarding Recent Events in Vietnam” (18 
May 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 11, “Apr. 1963: 17–18.”  
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obstacle to the counterinsurgency and consider regime change as a viable option. 
“[W]e have been pussy-footing with Diem for too long,” Forrestal wrote in August 
1962, expressing his frustration with the Palace’s refusal to carry out political 
reforms. 7  Unlike Ambassador Nolting who reminded Washington that the 
Embassy could not “program or control” Diem’s projects,8 Forrestal thought that 
Nolting must use tougher measures to get action from “our bulky satrap.”9 It was 
also in mid-1962 that the INR began to argue that a regime change could be a 
possible solution to political problems, arguing that a coup “would have a better 
than even chance of succeeding.” The Bureau identified Vice-President Nguyen 
Ngoc Tho as a viable replacement for Diem and predicted that General “Big” Minh 
could be a leading figure of a coup d’état.10 (Tho and Minh headed the new regime 
after the overthrow of Diem in November 1963.) After his trip to Saigon with 
Hilsman in late 1962 and early 1963, which confirmed their pessimism about the 
war effort, Forrestal moved on to argue that “the risks in remaining too closely tied 
to Diem’s government will increase rather than decrease as time goes on,”11 and 
explored the possibility of contacting Diem’s opponents. Apparently in support of 
this suggestion, the INR in February 1963 provided a list of Diem’s critics in South 
Vietnam and proposed ways to establish contact with them.12  
     The Pentagon and the CIA had different opinions. In early 1963, the U.S. 
military continued to believe that the GVN was winning the war and did not feel 
the need to change the regime. While some analysts in the CIA, especially those in 
the ONE, shared Forrestal and Hilsman’s pessimism about the counterinsurgency, 
the Agency had been more cautious about the result of a coup d’état. “The 
re-establishment of effective government authority and of smooth operation of 
government service in the aftermath of a military coup would be very difficult,” a 
CIA memo warned in December 1961, adding that “Dislocations and uncertainties 
in the chain of command and in the structure of loyalties would provide 
opportunities for Communist exploitation.”13  
                                                                        
7 Memo, Forrestal to “Karl” (6 Aug 1962), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 196A, “Vietnam, 
General, 8/1/62–8/14/62,” #8. 
8 Cable, Saigon to State, “Outline FY 63 Aid Program, Interim Fund Request” (3 Aug 
1962), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 196A, “Vietnam General, 8/1/62–8/14/62,” #5. 
9 Letter, Forrestal to Dungan (3 Aug 1962), JFKL, White House Central Files, Subject 
Files, Box 75, “CO312 Viet-Nam, 4/16/62–12/31/62.”  
10 Howells, Avery, and Green, Vietnam 1961–1968 as Interpreted in INR's Production, A-II, 
pp. 2, 11–12. 
11 Memo, Forrestal to Harriman, “Contact with Vietnamese Opposition” (8 Feb 1963), 
JFKL, Schlesinger Papers, WH-19, Folder “South Vietnam,” #4. 
12 Memo, Whiting to Hilsman, “Contacts with Vietnamese Oppositionists” (12 Feb 1963); 
Memo, Whiting to Hilsman, “Some Opposition Leaders in South Vietnam” (27 Feb 1963) 
both documents in NA, RG 59, Entry 5305, Box 2, “POL 1 General Policy, Background 
(Briefing Papers).”  
13 Memo for the DCI, “The Diem Regime and Its Prospects” (5 Dec 1961), NA, CREST 
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     Those preconceptions played a critical role in the U.S. response to the 
political crisis from May 1963 onwards. The State Department’s impatience with 
the GVN largely explains the department’s uncompromising attitude toward the 
Presidential Palace and its readiness to accept the risk of a coup d’état. The CIA 
and the Pentagon’s opposition to a regime change was not obvious during the first 
three months of the crisis when contingency planning was carried out within the 
State Department. After State’s abortive push for an overthrow of the Ngo family 
in late August, however, the disagreement over the need and consequences of a 
coup d’état became a major source of bureaucratic tension during September and 
October 1963. 
 
2. Protest, contingency plan, and coup plots (May - June 1963) 
 
The political crisis started with a local incident on 7 May 1963. Disobeying the 
decree banning the display of religious symbols, Buddhists in Hué cerebrated 
Buddha’s birthday with religious flags flying outside their buildings. The 
authorities ordered them to follow the decree, even though they had recently turned 
a blind eye to a similar violation by the Catholic community. The next day, 
Buddhists staged a protest and clashed with government forces, during which 
several civilians, including children, were killed and more than ten people were 
injured. Although the government’s promise on 19 May to compensate the families 
of the casualties temporarily eased the tension, Buddhist leaders went on to present 
a set of five demands to the government on 15 May. The Palace’s reluctance to 
meet these demands provoked a 48-hour hunger strike on 29 and 30 May, which 
developed into large-scale demonstrations. The unrest continued until the GVN 
reached an agreement with Buddhist leaders on 5 June. Soon afterward, however, 
Madame Nhu (Diem’s sister-in-law) further antagonised the Buddhist community 
by criticising their leaders, and the first self-immolation of a Buddhist monk, Thich 
Quang Duc, took place on a street in Saigon on 11 June. Five days later, another 
tentative agreement between the GVN and Buddhist leaders once again prevented 
the crisis from further escalating. Without a clear breakthrough toward a solution, 
though, the situation continued to be unpredictable.14  
     Among the diverse initial responses within the U.S. government, one of the 
most pessimistic was the assessment of John Richardson, the head of the CIA 
Saigon Station (CAS). In his cable of 18 May 1963, he analysed the Hué incident 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
79R00904A000800010008-7. 
14 For the development from 8 May to 5 June, see: Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, pp. 
12–24. 
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as one of Diem’s three “unwise political acts” in recent months. The other two 
were the dismissals of Tran Kim Tuyen (the Director of the Palace’s intelligence 
and security service called Service d’Etudes Politiques et Sociales, SEPS) and 
Huynh Van Lang (the head of the southern branch of the Can Lao party), who had 
been known as two of the most loyal supporters of the Ngo family. Despite having 
been Nhu’s devout “henchman and troubleshooter,” Tuyen was removed from his 
post reportedly because of a “silly women’s tiff” between Madame Nhu and 
Madame Tuyen. This act of “frivolity, ingratitude and lack of perspective” could 
increase doubt and insecurity within the GVN, while the parallel removal of Lang 
from his post could cause similar problems among the party’s rank and file. 
Richardson observed that those decisions, together with the Hué incident, were 
destroying confidence among different segments of Vietnamese society, including 
public servants, intellectuals, party supporters, and the mass of non-Catholic 
peasantry. “If this continues,” he predicted, “only sycophants and xenophobes will 
predominate in the GVN and its relations with its people, bureaucracy, army and 
friendly allies will deteriorate in a welter of petty jealousies, feuds, and 
prejudices.”15  
     Ambassador Nolting appeared to see the situation as less urgent and 
emphasized the uncertainty surrounding the Buddhist demonstrations and the 
Palace’s response. While “individual without genuine religious convictions may 
attempt [to] exploit issues as means [to] unify anti-regime elements,” Nolting 
argued on 18 May, Buddhist leaders had not yet decided what further action they 
should take. For its part, the GVN might be willing to accommodate Buddhist 
sentiment, but remained “unsure how to proceed.”16 Later that month, as the 
situation became relatively stable, the Ambassador left for a month-long holiday on 
the Greek islands, leaving William Trueheart (Deputy Chief of the Mission) as the 
chargé d’affaires in the Embassy.  
     As protests resumed after Nolting’s departure, Trueheart struggled to 
understand the intentions of both sides. As to the Buddhist demonstration, he 
suspected that it had already developed into something more political, which might 
not be settled by the government’s concession on religious issues. The Buddhist 
leaders, Trueheart noted on 31 May, might be using the charge of religious 
persecution as a “label and façade behind which other groups seek to express 
opposition to Diem government and exploit situation for various aims.”17 On 11 
June, he stressed that the Buddhist movement had radicalised, and that some 
                                                                        
15 Cable, CAS to CIA, “Apprehension [deleted] Regarding Recent Events in Vietnam” (18 
May 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 11, Folder “Apr. 1963: 17–18.”  
16 Cable, Saigon to State (18 May 1963), FRUS, Vietnam, 1961-1963, vol. 3, 129. 
17 Cable, Saigon to State (31 May 1963), FRUS, Vietnam, 1961-1963, vol. 3, 140. 
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activists were reportedly talking about the overthrow of the GVN. In this context, 
the Buddhists might have responded to the government’s further concession by 
increasing their demands. Even if its leaders made peace with the government, the 
Buddhist movement might not have been “sufficiently organized and cohesive to 
back any agreement.”18 Meanwhile, the Palace’s attitude remained equally elusive 
partly because Diem was “predisposed not to take U.S. advice” and reluctant to 
discuss political issues with the Embassy and as a result Trueheart had to obtain 
information on the Palace’s policy primarily through Diem’s Secretary of State 
Nguyen Dinh Thuan (a Confucian who was playing an important role in the deal 
between the Ngos and the Buddhist leaders).19 Because of all this, the situation 
remained, as Trueheat put it on 6 July, “more than usually puzzling.”20 
     Without solid intelligence on the ongoing crisis, the State Department began 
to draw a contingency plan for a regime change in June 1963. In this context, the 
department produced at least two important documents: Joseph Mendenhall’s 
memorandum “Contingency Planning for Viet-Nam: Likely Developments in 
Current Crisis and Suggested Courses of Action” (14 June 1963) and the INR’s 
Research Memorandum RFE-55, “Implication of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam” 
(21 June). 21  Both documents predicted that the Buddhists would resume 
demonstrations, that the dissatisfaction within the military would increase the 
chance of a coup d’état, and that the U.S. government would have to support coup 
attempts. Their arguments regarding the probable outcomes of a regime change, 
however, appeared to be based largely upon wishful thinking. Mendenhall, for 
instance, argued that the “odds are probably against a Diem victory” because the 
loyalty of division commanders was “always somewhat questionable” and the 
Buddhist issue had raised a “serious question” as to whether the troops would obey 
the order to defend the Ngo family. The risk of insurgents trying to seize some 
provincial towns during a prolonged coup attempt could be reduced by “having the 
US prepared to introduce further combat military forces.” As to the prospect after a 
fall of the Ngo family, the INR believed that there was “a reasonably large pool” of 
unused manpower, which could provide “reasonably effective leadership for the 
                                                                        
18 Cable, Saigon to State, (11 June 1963), JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 12, “June. 1963: 
10–16”. 
19 Cable, Saigon to State (1 June 1963), FRUS, Vietnam, 1961-1963, vol. 3, 141. 
20 On 6 July, Trueheart confessed to Thuan that he was “finding situation more than usually 
puzzling.” Cable, Saigon to State (6 July 1963) JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 198, “Vietnam, 
General, 7/1/63–7/20/63,” #28. 
21 Memo, Mendenhall, “Contingency Planning for Viet-Nam: Likely Developments in 
Current Crisis and Suggested Courses of Action” (14 June 1963), NA, RG 59, Bureau of 
Far Eastern Affairs, the Vietnam Working Group, Subject Files, 1963–1966, Box 2, Folder 
“POL 1 General Policy, Background (Briefing Papers)”; Howells, Avery, and Green, 
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government and the war effort.” Based on those arguments, Mendenhall 
recommended that the U.S. government take the initiative to establish secret 
contact with prospective leaders (such as Vice-President Tho, General Le Van Kim 
and General “Big” Minh) in order to make sure that the new regime was acceptable 
to Washington. On 14 June, the State Department instructed Trueheart to inform 
Tho that if Diem proved “definitely unable to act as President and only in this 
situation we would want to back Tho as constitutional successor.”22  
     This was followed by the growing rumours of coup plotting. On 26 and 27 
June, for example, reliable sources told the U.S. government about separate plots 
by Tran Kim Tuyen and Huynh Van Lang (two officers discussed in Richardson’s 
aforementioned cable of 18 May). It was also reported in late June that three 
groups each planning a regime change (“one headed by former Dien Hoa Province 
Chief, Lit. Col. Pham Ngoc Thao…; a second called the ‘Tuyen group’; and an 
otherwise unidentified ‘military group’”) had united.23 
     It was after most of these escalatory moves in the first two months of the 
crisis had taken place that the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) published 
a study of the Buddhist movement (“The Buddhist in South Vietnam”) on 28 June. 
The report analysed several key questions. One of them was the nature of 
Buddhism in South Vietnam, which was, according to the report, not only diverse 
but also merged with Confucianism, Taoism, animism and ancestor cults. As to the 
source of religious grievance (that is, the reason behind the Buddhists’ belief that 
the Ngos were perpetuating the privileged status of Catholics), the report pointed 
out that Diem’s bias in favour of Catholics in the civil service and the military had 
been forcing many officers to undergo a “rice bowl” conversion24 and that Ngo 
Dinh Thuc (Diem’s younger brother and the Archbishop of Hué) was leading a 
highly visible programme of Church renovation.25 At the same time, the report 
recognised the uncertainty over the ongoing Buddhist demonstrations. As to the 
aim of the protest, the OCI stressed that most Buddhist leaders hoped to keep the 
religious issues isolated from the broader political objective, but that the extremist 
elements might be determined to keep up the momentum in the hope of an ultimate 
                                                                        
22 Cable, State to Saigon (14 June 1963), FRUS, Vietnam, 1961-1963, vol. 3, 175. 
23 CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, “Coup Rumors in South Vietnam” (14 Aug 
1963), NA, JFK Collection, CIA Miscellaneous Files, Box 5, “JFK-M-06 (F20).” 
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downfall of the Ngo family. “In the prevailing atmosphere,” the OCI warned, “the 
Buddhist movement may increasingly solidify around extremist elements.” The 
report was equally indecisive on the role of the NLF in the Buddhist demonstration. 
While arguing that “there has been no evidence that the Communists instigated or 
influenced the Buddhist demonstrations or demands,” the report also provided 
information that indicated a certain level of Communist penetration of Buddhist 
organisations.26   
 
3. The rejection of reconciliation, the doubt over coup plots (July - 20 Aug 1963) 
 
Fence sitting, SNIE, and the fall of the conciliatory approach 
Ambassador Nolting returned to Washington in early July and was briefed about 
the developments in the RVN. Almost immediately, he judged that a coup had to be 
avoided and that the U.S. government had to help the Palace to overcome the 
present difficulties. “[I]f a revolution occurred in Vietnam which grew out of the 
Buddhist situation,” Nolting told Undersecretary of State George Ball on 5 July, 
“the country would be split between feuding factions and the Americans would 
have to withdraw, and the country might be lost to the Communists.”27 By that 
time, however, some of his colleagues in the State Department had concluded that 
a coup might already be inevitable. “We all believe one more burning Bonze will 
cause domestic US reaction which will require strong public statement despite 
danger that this might precipitate coup in Saigon,” the State Department told 
McGeorge Bundy (the National Security Advisor) on 1 July.28 At a NSC meeting 
three days later, Hilsman insisted that “Our estimate was that no matter what Diem 
did there will be coup attempts over the next four months,” adding that “the chance 
of chaos in the wake of a coup are considerably less than they were a year ago.”29 
On 8 July, Forrestal informed Bundy of those disagreements within the State 
Department and recommended the policy of fence sitting:  
 
If our estimate is that Diem will take appropriate measures to pacify 
the situation and will thus survive, then in our own best interests we 
could be active in our support of him personally. If, on the other hand, 
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Government and the Vietnam War, Part 2, p. 146. 
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our estimate is that his political ineptitude in recent weeks has so 
weakened his support within Vietnam that he cannot be expected to 
hold out much longer, then we should be careful to maintain a 
reasonably friendly touch with potential leaders of non-Communist 
coup attempts. Our dilemma at the moment is that we cannot yet agree 
on the estimate. In general, people in Washington are somewhat more 
pessimistic about Diem’s chances of riding this one out than people in 
the field. You can argue both ways on whose judgment is better at this 
particular moment. In light of this, my own judgment is that we are 
entering a period in which our policy must be one of fence sitting, 
realizing of course that such a policy constitute something less than full 
identification between our own interests and those of President Diem.30 
 
     It was against this background that the intelligence community published 
SNIE 53-2-63, “The Situation in South Vietnam” (10 July 1963).31 Unlike NIE 
53-63 in April 1963, this document focused exclusively on the political crisis, and 
its production was presumably dominated by the INR. As the Bureau’s internal 
study in 1969 points out, the SNIE “not only followed the line taken by INR but 
quoted large portions directly from the INR paper [RFE-55].”32 As a result, its 
conclusion largely endorsed the view of the State headquarters:  
 
If – as is likely – Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the 
commitments he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably 
flare again and the chances of a coup or assassination attempts against 
him will became better than even…A non-Communist successor 
regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but given 
continued support from the US, could provide reasonably effective 
leadership for the government and the war effort. 
 
It is not clear why the CIA agreed to publish this view in the national estimate 
despite the fact that its conclusion contradicted the Agency’s more cautious 
judgement on a regime change, which was expressed in its memo in December 
1961 mentioned earlier as well as through DCI John McCone later in the crisis in 
September and October.33 Whatever the reason, the Agency allowed the INR to 
present its assessment as the consensus of the intelligence community, missing the 
opportunity to critically analyse the probable result of a coup d’état.    
     Meanwhile in Saigon, Nolting was doing his best to resolve the crisis 
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peacefully. After spending a day “urging, encouraging, warning, [and] trying to get 
President Diem to move in constructive manner,” he finally convinced Diem to 
issue a Public Proclamation on 18 July.34 On the next day, Nolting requested that 
the State Department issue a public statement in support of the Palace’s decision, 
arguing that it would help Diem “to move GVN and to prevent any undercutting of 
Diem’s broadcast. It may well also cause Buddhists to hesitate before making 
further demands.”35 Encouraged by Diem’s further concessions on 19 July, Nolting 
repeated his request for a statement, insisting that “this crisis can be surmounted if 
Diem will not allow his policy to be undercut from any quarter, and we are 
working hard at this.”36 The State Department refused to issue a statement, 
however, arguing that Buddhist agitation was now controlled by radicals who were 
aiming at a regime change, and that further demonstrations and violence were 
likely. “In these circumstances and in light [of] coup rumors, it [is] clear we have 
to deal with [a] most uncertain and volatile situation…We [are] therefore inclined 
[to] continue for present public posture of noninterference [in] this internal affair, 
neither favoring Buddhists or Diem in public statements.”37 Nolting sent another 
cable on 20 July, saying that “Diem’s statement, and the response to it, may offer 
the last opportunity to surmount this difficulty…It would be [a] pity if the 
skepticism [in the State Department] were to increase Buddhist skepticism and/or 
intransigence, and thus lose the opportunity to move this problem towards solution. 
I again recommend [a] statement along [the] lines previously suggested, which 
certainly does not go overboard but would [be] effective, and possibly decisive, 
here.”38 In response, the State Department reiterated its pessimism about the future 
of the GVN and sent a copy of SNIE 53-2-63 to the Embassy to clarify “our 
estimate [of the] situation as it looks from here.”39 At this point, the disagreement 
became clear to Nolting, who confirmed, “I find myself more sanguine about 
prospects of GVN’s settling Buddhist problem and avoiding coup d’etat than 
general tenor [of State cable 104 on 20 July] and SNIE.”40 
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40 Cable, Saigon to State (25 July 1936), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 198, “Vietnam, General, 
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     As Diem’s 18 July statement achieved very little, the prospect for a violent 
clash between the GVN and protesters rose sharply. In early August, Madame Nhu 
once again offended the Buddhist community by saying that all protesters had done 
so far was to “barbecue a bonze”41 and criticising Buddhist leaders for “attempting, 
with much publicity, to revoke even more such macabre insanities.”42 Two days 
later (5 August), a young monk, Huynh Van Le, immolated himself, followed by 
another such suicide on 16 August.43 The GVN, in its part, drew a three-phase 
control plan in early August to contain violent Buddhist demonstration.44 As for 
the U.S. government, on 8 August the NSC Special Group (Counterinsurgency) 
had already ordered the Pentagon to develop a contingency plan to evacuate U.S. 
citizens from the RVN in the event of extreme political violence.45  
 
Question over coup plots 
In early July 1963, further information on coup plots reached Washington. On 3 
July, David Halberstam (New York Times) reported, “Some Vietnamese military 
officers are reported ready to act but they give the impression that they would like 
the Americans to make a public statement calling for a change.”46 Soon afterward, 
the CIA received the details of coup planning by a group of general officers, which 
included Gen. Don, Gen. Kim, Gen. Khiem, and Gen. Minh. According to a CAS 
cable on 8 July, Gen. Don argued that all generals “except for one or two” were in 
agreement with their plan to eliminate the entire Ngo family. The only obstacle 
identified in the cable was the dissatisfaction among the junior officers. Therefore 
one of the several stages of the plan was designed to satisfy their interests. After 
the coup, the new regime would be led by a military ruler advised by a committee 
of three, while elections would be announced immediately and held within three to 
six months.47  
     After the meeting between Nhu and generals on 11 July, however, the coup 
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plots began to look less certain for at least three reasons. Firstly, reports in 
mid-July indicated that Nhu at the 11 July meeting suggested that he would support 
the general’s coup against President Diem and that he himself, together with his 
wife, might draw the required plan for it.48 While the possibility of Nhu’s coup 
against his brother remained a subject of speculation,49 the episode indicated that 
Nhu was “seeking to divide or entrapping generals,” or trying to protect his own 
position in the assumption that a coup was almost inevitable.50 The second source 
of uncertainty lay in the growing doubt over the ability of Don’s group to take 
action against the Ngo family. The 11 July meeting with Nhu revealed that, 
contrary to Don’s claim, several generals remained loyal to the Ngos “because they 
owed their advancement personally to Nhu.”51 After the 11 July meeting, no major 
development was reported on this group’s planning.52 Furthermore, it had become 
evident that the actual forces were under the control of local commanders rather 
than the generals at the centre of Don’s circle. Tra Tu Oai (the Chief of the 
Department of Psychological Warfare) told a CAS officer that “the generals would 
not be the leaders of [a coup] because they do not exercise effective power in the 
army. The battalion commanders are the officers to watch because they control the 
troops.”53 Thirdly, outside the military, Tuyen and his close allies were stepping up 
their preparations for a coup and repeatedly claimed that they were about to take 
action against the Presidential Palace.54 To complicate the matter, the rumour also 
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emerged that Tuyen’s circle had been directing a part of the Buddhist 
demonstration “for some time” in order to divert the Palace’s attention away from 
the possibility of a coup d’état.55 
     These developments prompted Forrestal to ask Chester Cooper (an analyst at 
the CIA) to produce a weekly analysis of the coup plotting. (It is worth noting that 
Forrestal also requested that reports be disseminated only to himself and 
Hilsman.)56 In response, the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) produced 
two documents, both titled “Coup Rumors in South Vietnam,” on 14 and 21 August. 
The first report (14 August) examined the information since late June and analysed 
the intentions and capability of three main players (Tuyen’s group, the generals 
around Gen. Don,and Nhu). The report argued that Tuyen and his former SEPS 
colleagues were not supported by the generals, one of whom (Gen. Don) reportedly 
dismissed those civilians as “young punks.” The OCI judged that Don’s 
army-based group had a better chance of launching a coup, but questioned their 
ability and determination: 
 
They may represent the surfacing of what are really only contingency 
plans…or even merely discussion on the need for some kind of action. 
A number of general officers, such as Don and General Duong Van 
Minh, have long been critical of certain aspects of the Diem regime, 
but many of them seem to have little taste for political action. 
Furthermore, their criticisms are well known to Diem and Nhu, and the 
most dangerous officers have long been deprived of direct troop 
command, making any plotting dependent the support of their juniors. 
Some of the generals have demonstrated firm loyalty to the regime in 
the past, some appear to be pure opportunists, and the majority appear 
reluctant to risk their positions in any action not certain of success.  
 
The report also argued that Nhu’s countermove might jeopardise any plot against 
his brother and/or himself, pointing out that since the 11 July meeting “we have 
almost no further reports alleging plotting by high-ranking officers.” The report 
concluded: “While the number and variety of reports do reflect some serious coup 
plotting as well as a general climate of dissatisfaction, we see at present no firm 
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evidence of advanced planning or of immediate determination to act against the 
regime on the part of any group having real assets.” The second report on 21 
August discussed additional information, but reached the same conclusion: “there 
is no hard evidence of imminent action.”57 
 
4. Push for a coup and its collapse (21 - 31August 1963) 
 
From the pagoda raids to the green-light cable (21 - 24 August)  
The GVN raided four pagodas in Saigon in the early hours of 21 August, followed 
by similar actions in other major cities. On the same day, the President proclaimed 
martial law, giving the army “full authority in all matters.” 58  Soon, 
combat-dressed troops dominated key points in Saigon, while armed jeeps began 
to patrol the main streets.59  
     In response, the INR published a Research Memorandum, “Diem versus the 
Buddhists: The Issue Joined” (21 August). After outlining the crisis since May, the 
report argued that “The sudden injection of the army into the Buddhist crisis has 
introduced an entirely new factor.” Pointing out that the predominantly Buddhist 
armed forces had been critical of Diem’s repressive measures and that there had 
been a flurry of reported coup plots, the INR stressed that “the degree to which 
Diem can count on the army to suppress further Buddhist moves is most 
uncertain.”60 
     Soon general officers actually distanced themselves from the actions on 21 
August, and began to criticise Nhu for misleading them into these oppressive 
policies (even though, according to Gen. Don, it was general officers who 
recommended Diem the use of marshal law, if not pagoda raids61). On 22 August, 
Halberstam (New York Times) reported that “Highly reliable sources here said 
today that the decision to attack Buddhist pagodas and declare martial law in South 
Vietnam was planned and executed by Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President’s brother, 
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without the knowledge of the army.” 62 Defense Secretary Thuan also told Rufus 
Phillips (USOM) that “Under no circumstance should the United States acquiesce 
in what Nhus have done.”63  
     The Office of Current Intelligence analysed those conflicting accounts in the 
“Review of Recent Developments in South Vietnam” (26 August). After 
summarising reports on key issues, the document concludes that Nhu was 
controlling the situation in Saigon “possibly without President Diem’s assent.” The 
OCI also pointed out, however, the possibility of “some diffusion of power among 
Nhu, Diem and the military at the moment,” warning that “The armed forces are 
not unified and if a military coup is attempted, there is a danger that serious clashes 
may break out among competing elements.”64 
     Two days earlier, on 24 August, Forrestal, Hilsman and Harriman had 
already reached a similar conclusion that, as Forrestal told the President, “Nhu is 
the mastermind behind the whole operation against the Buddhists and is calling the 
shots. This is now agreed by virtually everyone here.” Forrestal also added: 
“Agreement is also developing that the United States cannot tolerate a result of the 
present difficulties in Saigon which leave Brother Nhu in a dominating 
position…Averell and Roger now agree that we must move before the situation in 
Saigon freezes.”65  
     Not sharing the CIA’s concern about the disunity in the armed forces and its 
negative implications for a coup attempt, those senior State officers sent a cable to 
Henry Cabot Lodge (the new Ambassador who had arrived in Saigon on 22 
August) on the same day (24 August), authorising the Ambassador to inform Gen. 
Don that the U.S. government would support a regime change. On 26 August, State 
also sent its message to the South Vietnamese through Voice of America: 
“Washington officials say the raids were made by police under the control of 
President Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. They say America may cut its aid to 
Vietnam if President Diem does not get rid of the police official responsible.”66 
 
Collapse of coup plots (25 - 31 August) 
In Saigon, Lodge pursued his new assignment without asking further guidance 
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from Washington, regarding himself as a chief tactician on the U.S. side.67 Lucien 
Conein (a CIA officer in Saigon who served as the main channel with the coup 
plotters) met Gen. Khiem from 26 to 29 August to promise that the U.S. 
government would fully support his group during the interim period after a 
breakdown of the central government, and that it would help the families of the 
generals engaged in a coup in the event of its failure. “As assurance of US 
intentions,” Conein gave the general a list of the complete inventory of ordnance in 
stock at the Long Thanh training camps. To back up those efforts, Rufus Phillips 
(USOM) also met Gen. Kim on 29 August and told him that Conein’s promise was 
“bona fide and had the Ambassador’s complete blessing.”68  
     Meanwhile in Washington, the NSC meetings from 26 to 28 August revealed 
that the JCS did not agree with the direction in which Hilsman, Forrestal and 
Harriman had been pushing U.S. policy, and that Nolting strongly opposed any 
action against the Presidential Palace. (The CIA gave a briefing but did not join the 
main debate, as DCI McCone was away and its second-tier representatives, 
William Colby and Richard Helms, stayed silent.) Harriman and Ball defended 
their decision to send the cable, insisting that action against the Ngos was 
necessary.69  
     Yet even to the eyes of those State officers, the prospects of a coup became 
increasingly uncertain. Initially, reports from Saigon suggested that the generals’ 
action against the Palace was imminent. The CIA station claimed on 28 August that 
the situation in Saigon had “reached point of no return,” and that the overwhelming 
majority of general officers (except for Dinh and Cao) “are united, have conducted 
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prior planning, realize that they must proceed quickly, and understand that they 
have no alternative but to go forward.” 70  On 27 August, however, Lodge 
acknowledged that “as of now, there are no signs…that these or any other generals 
are really prepared to act against the government.”71 It was around this time that 
the State Department began to notice some gaps in the reports from Saigon. 
Hilsman told Lodge on 27 August that “Examination of reports to date gives 
considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions,” which included the 
comparative strength of forces in Saigon area, Nhu’s own capability for a 
counter-coup, and the chance for a successful coup in the case in which initial 
operations were indecisive.72 In response, Lodge admitted the next day that “In 
appraising current prospects, it must be born in mind that our knowledge of 
composition of coup group and their plans is derived from single source.”73 Then 
on 29 August, the CIA station produced a report on the probable loyalties not only 
of several high-ranking generals in the army but also of the key units in and around 
Saigon, including the Presidential Guard, Airborne Brigade, Navy, Air Force and 
Special Force, and suggested a significant uncertainty as to their loyalties in the 
event of a coup attempt.74 
     Despite the lack of solid intelligence from Saigon, policymakers reached the 
consensus at the 29 August NSC meeting not to reverse the instructions to the 
Ambassador. By the time they arrived at another NSC meeting on 30 August, 
however, it had become clear that the general officers had abandoned their plot. 
Gen. Khiem told Harkins that the generals decided not to go ahead because “they 
did not have enough forces under their control compared to those under the 
President.” Khiem also suggested that they could not fully trust the U.S. support 
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promised by Conein, as he was a low-ranking officer in the CIA. The alleged 
friendship between Nhu and CAS chief John Richardson also caused the suspicion 
that Nhu and his wife were on the CIA payroll.75 During the same meeting on 30 
August, Gen. Clifton Carter (the Deputy Director of the CIA) also reported that 
Nhu was apparently trying to ease the tension with the Buddhist community, 
pointing out the creation of a new inter-sect committee, Madame Nhu’s silence, the 
easing of the curfew, and the release of the students.76  
     At this point, the unreliability of information coming through the Saigon 
Embassy became hard to ignore. Expressing its “uneasiness at the absence of bone 
and muscle as seen from here,” the State Department told Lodge on 30 August:  
 
Generals so far appear [to] have no plan and little momentum…Central 
question therefore comes to be how much reality there is in attitude 
expressed by generals with whom contacts have been made and their 
capabilities and determinations with respect to what has been said thus 
far. The distinction between what is desirable and what is possible is 
one which we may have to face in the next few days.77  
 
At the beginning of the NSC meeting on 31 August, Dean Rusk (the Secretary of 
State) asked “why a coup had been considered by the US in the first place.” He 
argued, and McNamara agreed, that “it was unrealistic to begin by assuming that 
Nhu would have to be removed.”78  
 
5. Dispute (September 1963) 
 
At the NSC meeting on 6 September, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
policymakers agreed that they needed an up-to-date assessment of the impact of 
the political crisis on the war effort in the countryside in order to make an 
informed decision. As a result, Krulak and Mendenhall were dispatched to South 
Vietnam for a four-day fact-finding mission. Upon their return, they presented 
conflicting reports at the NSC meeting on 10 September. This left the dispute on 
the general approach to the crisis unresolved. During the NSC meetings from 10 to 
12 September, State officials – Hilsman and Meklin – insisted that tough pressure 
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at the risk of a coup d’état was necessary, while McNamara, Taylor and Gilpatrick 
all questioned the need for and long-term benefits of such policy.79 McCone also 
expressed his doubt about alternative leadership, arguing that, although he had 
heard some names, he knew of “no paper which listed a group which could form a 
government strong enough to rule if Diem and Nhu were removed.”80  
     While the disagreement over policy direction remained unsettled, the main 
focus of the Vietnam policy circle shifted to Nhu’s response to U.S. pressures. Nhu 
was reportedly conducting “virulent public and private anti-American 
campaigns”81 and allegedly ordered a student demonstration against the Embassy 
in which his agents would assassinate Lodge and other Embassy officials and set 
fire to the building. “For Diem and Nhu even to be thinking of my assassination is 
so unbelievably idiotic that a reasonable person would reject it out of hand,” Lodge 
cabled Rusk and Harriman on 10 September, “But Nhu is apparently pleased with 
his raids on the Buddhist pagodas last summer and is said to be annoyed with me 
for having advised him to leave the country for a while. Also he is reported to be 
smoking opium. For all these reasons my associates here, whose experience 
antedates mine, consider assassination to be real possibility.”82 It was also around 
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this time that the intelligence community began to analyse the possibility of Nhu’s 
contact with the North Vietnamese government through Polish ICC Commissioner 
Mieczyslaw Maneli (the so-called Maneli affair).83 On 14 September, the CIA 
judged that “Although we do not feel that there is great danger of an imminent 
GVN arrangement of some form with the North…they might at some juncture seek 
to work out a modus vivendi with the North, out of belief that a deal with kindred 
peoples was better than submitting to foreign (US) pressures.”84 Another memo on 
the same issue on 19 September written by Chester Cooper (CIA) also suggested 
that several motives – notably a desire to increase their manoeuvrability in face of 
U.S. pressure - “could induce (or may have already induced) the Ngo’s to explore 
the possibilities of rapprochement with Hanoi.”85 
     For senior officers in the CIA, however, of greater concern in September 
appeared to be the media criticism of the Agency’s Saigon Station (CAS), which 
started around 9 September. A San Francisco Chronicle editorial reported on that 
day that the CIA was “paying the salaries of the police army in Vietnam, called the 
Special Forces, that raids Buddhist pagodas and knocks students off their bicycles,” 
and called for the abolition of “this organization of international 
wrong-wirepullers”86 In an interview on the same day, David Brinkley and Chet 
Huntley told President Kennedy that “In the last 48 hours there have been a great 
many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA was up to” and asked the 
President whether the CIA was making its own policy without coordinating it with 
other departments.87 Although the President denied that allegation, the criticism 
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continued throughout September. In his article in the Evening Star (“CIA’s 
Blunders in Viet Nam”) on 23 September, Max Freedman claimed that, although 
unspecified State officers who criticised the CIA had no desire to stir up a row 
within the administration, “With the evidence in their hands of the incredible and 
garish blunders committed in a sickening sequence by the CIA, these men in the 
State Department would be false to their trust if they remained silent while omens 
of disaster steadily accumulated.”88 This was followed by Richard Starnes’ article 
in the Washington Daily News (“‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobey Orders in Viet Nam”) on 
2 October, in which he argued that the story of the CIA’s role in the RVN was “a 
dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and 
unrestrained thirst for power,” adding that the Agency “flatly refused to carry out 
instruction from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.”89 
     Many suspected that those criticisms were fuelled by Lodge (who possibly 
saw the CIA’s tie with Nhu’s Special Forces as a main contributing factor to the 
collapse of a coup plot in late August) and/or other officers in the State Department 
(such as Harriman) who continued to advocate a regime change. According to 
Harold Ford, James Reston of the New York Times told McCone that anti-CAS 
stories had been planted “probably a good deal of it from Harriman.” 90 
Embarrassed by comments allegedly originated in his department, George Ball (the 
Undersecretary of State) telephoned McCone on 24 September and promised that 
he and his colleagues would try to “straighten this one out.”91 Even Hilsman, who 
had long been avoiding the press “like a plague,” volunteered to become McCone’s 
“unofficial public relations officer” who would defend the CAS though press 
interviews and Congressional briefings.92  
     Eventually, though, the CIA decided to recall Richardson on 5 October. The 
decision can partly be explained by the fact that his identity was compromised in 
the aforementioned article by Richard Starnes on 2 October. However, as McCone 
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stated at the executive session of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee on 10 
October, Richardson was recalled primarily to give the U.S. government “more 
freedom for carrying forward on our current policy.”93  
 
6. Pressure plan, coup plot and last minute dispute (October 1963) 
 
The current policy in question was agreed upon on 5 October. Based on the 
McNamara-Taylor post-trip report on 2 October, the decision was made to impose 
sanctions against the GVN, including the withdrawal of aid to Nhu’s Special 
Forces and the suspension of the Commodity Import Program, which had been 
serving as economic aid to the GVN. It was also agreed that Ambassador Lodge 
had to continue his current posture of “cool correctness” in his relation with the 
Presidential Palace, keeping his distance in order to make President Diem come to 
the Ambassador.94  
     On the same day, a report on a new plot by general officers led by Gen. Minh 
reached Washington. 95  In response, the State Department, with Kennedy’s 
approval, told Lodge on 6 October that policymakers in Washington “do not wish 
to stimulate coup” but “also do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart 
a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new 
regime.” The cable added that, while the U.S. government “should avoid being 
drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans or any other act which might 
tend to identify US too closely with change in government,” it would “welcome 
information which would help us assess character of any alternative leadership.96 
On 10 October, Lucien Conein assured Gen. Minh that the United States would not 
oppose a coup, and that it would offer necessary support to a new regime. After 
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those exchanges, there appeared to be no major report to Washington on coup plots 
until 23 October.   
     Meanwhile in mid-October, it became reasonably obvious that the GVN was 
not responding to aid suspensions as the U.S. government wished. In his memo 
“Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Possible Reactions to Aid Withholding” (18 October), James 
Montgomery (State Department) suggested that Nhu had been prompting 
discussions on how to survive without U.S. aid. Montgomery predicted that Nhu 
would scrap socioeconomic projects sponsored by the United States (such as 
village health programmes and hamlet schools) that were not essential to the 
government’s control over the population. Nhu would also disband the Self 
Defense Corps and the Civil Guards, and turn over their weapons to his Republican 
Youth so that the latter could assume a larger role in the rural areas. Montgomery 
concluded that Nhu would “possibly consider present aid pressures as a welcome 
excuse to bring about certain changes in the rural scene [which could] get the 
Americans out of the countryside.”97 A study by the CIA’s Office of Current 
Intelligence (“Events and Developments in South Vietnam, 5–18 October”) on 19 
October reached a similar conclusion that “Diem and Nhu are not appreciably 
moved by US actions to date and are preparing to dig in for a protracted war of 
attrition with the US.” The report added that the Palace would seek to dissipate 
pressures for reform “by exploiting any differences which may emerge among US 
policy-makers.”98  
     Joseph Neubert (State Department) feared that such differences were already 
emerging in Washington. On 18 October, he warned Hilsman that “we are heading 
into a period of considerable difficulty in maintaining cohesion and momentum in 
our policy toward the GVN,” and predicted that the first serious problem would 
arise with the CIA. He noted that at the meeting of the Special Group 
(Counterinsurgency) on 16 October McCone argued – “at some length and 
reportedly with considerable vigor” and, in Neubert’s view, in an attempt to assert 
for the record one of his “familiar” instinctive feelings – that the United States was 
going to face an “explosion” in the RVN. The DCI warned that the cumulative 
effect of aid suspension would bring the war efforts to a head much sooner than the 
original estimate of two to four months and that the Viet Cong would exploit the 
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chaos that could ensue. In Neubert’s prediction, McCone would soon argue that the 
consequences of the present course were going to be “unhelpful in the extreme” 
and that Washington, therefore, had to edge quite rapidly back toward the policy 
before August 1963. “Unless we can effectively refute the argument that our 
present course is trending toward ‘an explosion,’” Neubert argued, “we are going 
to have to assert with some considerable confidence that such an explosion is to 
our benefit.”99 
     In late October, McCone actually called for reconciliation with Diem and 
Nhu, but in a different policy context. On 24 October, Gen. Don told Conein that 
his group would launch a coup d’état no later than 2 November.100 During the rest 
of the month, Robert Kennedy (the Attorney General), the Pentagon and the CIA 
all expressed their doubts on the generals’ ability to govern the country. At the NSC 
meetings on 25 October, McCone argued that even if the generals successfully 
overthrow the Ngos, they would face a period of political confusion because the 
generals involved in the coup plotting were incapable of providing immediate, 
dynamic leadership. “We forecast that the political confusion would then end up, 
quite possibly, in another coup at some undetermined future time…it was possible 
that the war might be lost during the interregnum and period of political 
confusion.” Based on this prediction, McCone insisted that the U.S. government 
had to return to work with Diem and Nhu, and that Lodge should not “sit stony 
faced waiting for Diem to talk to him but rather he should talk to Diem and get the 
issues out on the table.”101 At the meeting on 29 October, Robert Kennedy, Gen. 
Maxwell Taylor and McCone argued, as the DCI summarised, that “the failure of a 
coup would be a disaster” and that “a successful coup would have a harmful effect 
on the war effort.”102  
     In response, the State Department produced a lengthy memo toward the end 
of October, emphasising the negative aspects of the GVN. According to its author 
(possibly William Sullivan), the document was written specifically to “brainwash” 
McNamara.103 As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was also in late October 
that the INR released its Research Memorandum RFE-99, showing that, contrary to 
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the JCS’s claim, the counterinsurgency was not going successfully under the Diem 
regime.  
 
7. Coup and after (November 1963) 
 
Before those last-minute disputes produced any decisive action by Washington, the 
generals launched a coup at around 1.45 p.m. Saigon time on 1 November. On the 
next day, Diem and Nhu, who had escaped to a residence in the suburb of Cholon, 
were taken captive and assassinated on the way to the generals’ headquarters.104   
     The U.S. government had not been given enough time to prepare for the 
event. “Instead of getting four hours or two days notice,” Harkins complained, “we 
got approximately four minutes.” Yet, once begun, the developments were reported 
in minute detail to Washington. By 6 November, it became clear that the generals 
had successfully ousted the old regime and installed a new government under the 
leadership of Gen. Minh and Tho. Predictably, advocates of the coup during the 
crisis emphasised positive features of the new regime. In his cable to President 
Kennedy on 6 November, Lodge insisted, the “prospects of victory are much 
improved, provided the generals stay united. [Robert] Thompson of the British 
advisory mission thinks that, in such an event, the war could be considerably 
shortened as compared with the period estimated during the Diem regime.”105 
Referring to an interview with Minh on 12 November, Forrestal also told 
McGeorge Bundy that Minh “appears more politically sophisticated than some of 
us thought.”106  
     For Washington, the biggest problem immediately after the coup was the 
death of Diem and Nhu, which apparently came as a surprise to Kennedy.107 
Madame Nhu, who was in Europe at the time, issued a statement holding the U.S. 
government responsible for the deaths of her husband and brother-in-law, which 
she described as “cruel treachery” and “dirty crime.” To contain the damage, the 
State Department instructed Lodge not to give “any suggestion that this is just the 
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sort of thing you have to expect in a coup.”108   
     Meanwhile, senior CIA officers were aware of the possibility that the media 
criticism against its Saigon Station in September to October was having negative 
effects on the morale of its employees. In an Agency Newsletter of 6 November 
1963 Lyman Kirkpatrick (the Executive Director of the CIA) addressed this issue 
and assured his staff that they could be “proud of what the Agency has done in 
South Vietnam,” calling the CAS’ performance as “first-rate.”109 A month later, 
McCone tried to persuade President Johnson to recall Ambassador Lodge in order 
to protect the new chief of the Saigon station, Peer de Silva. At meetings with the 
President in late November, McCone noted that Johnson had “no tolerance 
whatsoever with bickering and quarreling [sic] of the type that has gone on in 
South Vietnam,”110 and speculated that the President was “obviously opposed to 
Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate).”111 When McCone met 
Johnson on 6 December and recommended de Silva as the next chief of the station, 
he argued that de Silva’s appointment was a good move only if Johnson was to 
remove Lodge. The President turned out to be reluctant, however, arguing that such 
decision “would have political repercussions and would be tantamount to a vote of 
no confidence in the military junta.” McCone insisted that Lodge would try to 
destroy de Silva if he opposed the new chief’s assignment or simply did not like 
him, adding that “Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and 
he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower 
administration…he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an 
individual or block an action.” The President promised that he would exercise the 
full power of his office to keep Lodge in line, but decided not to recall him. “Lodge 
would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for 
the Presidency,” Johnson predicted.112  
     By the time Lodge left the RVN in mid-1964 to join the Presidential 
campaign – as a supporter rather than a candidate – the negative consequences of 
the regime change had become undeniable. As the CIA predicted, Minh’s 
government was overthrown by another coup in late January 1964. The repeated 
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changes of regime disrupted the chain of command and further weakened the war 
effort in the countryside. Furthermore, the new regime under General Khanh soon 
faced mass protests as well as threats from within the military circle, leading to 
another political crisis in September 1964. It was not until mid-1965 that the GVN 





































Chapter 5  
Rejecting Alternatives, November 1963 - March 1964 
 
For both Vietnam intelligence and Vietnam policy, the months following the 
regime change in November 1963 can be seen as another period of missed 
opportunities for radical reforms. In late to early 1964, there were attempts to 
address some weaknesses in reporting, but those efforts fell short of a radical 
review of intelligence-related problems. Despite those lukewarm efforts, 
intelligence products from November 1963 to February 1964 not only clarified the 
rapid deterioration of the situation in the countryside but also some of the most 
basic problems for the GVN. Those reports pointed to the need for either a 
diplomatic settlement or a radically new approach to the counterinsurgency. 
However, the U.S. government had, by the end of March 1963, largely rejected 
both of those options, and had started to consider the possibility of taking action 
against North Vietnam with the aim of stopping Hanoi’s support for the NLF. It 
was against this backdrop that senior policymakers began to see infiltration as the 
primary problem for the GVN and the NSC officially accepted the domino theory 
as a basis of its Vietnam policy in March 1964, a decision which was endorsed at 
least implicitly by the CIA. Together those developments set the framework for the 
Vietnam policy during the rest of 1964.   
 
1. Limits of intelligence reform 
 
By the end of 1963, the need for intelligence reform had been widely 
acknowledged. As discussed in the previous chapters, the detrimental effects of 
intelligence deficiencies upon policymaking became obvious during the dispute at 
NSC meetings in September 1963. “As you are well aware,” Forrestal later told 
McGeorge Bundy, “the great difficulties we had to live through last August and 
September resulted largely from a nearly complete breakdown of the Government’s 
ability to get accurate assessments of the situation in the Vietnamese 
country-side.” 1 In October, William Sullivan’s report discussed some of the 
intelligence-related problems within the U.S. mission, 2  whereas the INR’s 
Research Memorandum RFE-90 underscored problems in the MACV statistics.3 
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Soon afterward, the regime change in Saigon revealed the inaccuracy of the 
intelligence supplied by the Diem regime, leading the Pentagon to accept that its 
estimates, based extensively on the GVN’s statistics, had been too optimistic.4 In 
December, those developments prompted Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 
and DCI John McCone to act “vigorously in our respective spheres” to address the 
“grave reporting weakness.”5  
     For McNamara, one of the most pressing problems was poor intelligence 
coordination between the civilian and military parts of the U.S. mission.6 Based on 
Sullivan’s aforementioned report and his own observations in Saigon in December 
1963, the Secretary judged that the primary source of the problem was Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge. McNamara told the President that the ambassador had 
“virtually no official contact” with, and refused to show important cables to, Gen. 
Paul Harkins (the MACV commander). “My impression,” McNamara added, “is 
that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. 
This has of course been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by 
John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has 
just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.”7 A possible 
solution, in McNamara’s view, was the newly assigned deputy chief of the mission, 
David Nes, a soft-spoken 46-year-old diplomat who received widespread support 
across Washington when nominated for the post in December.8 This “highly 
competent team player,” McNamara hoped, could constitute “what would in effect 
be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.”9 This 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
(22 Oct 1963), JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 4, “Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on 
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4 Memo, McNamara to the President, “Vietnam Situation” (21 Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, 
CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #130. 
5 Memo, McNamara to the President, “Vietnam Situation” (21 Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, 
CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #130. 
6 It is worth mentioning that within the MACV the effort to improve information sharing 
among military, paramilitary and non-military elements began in late 1963, following the 
two-day seminar in September sponsored by the MACV J-2. Cable, Saigon to State, 
“Monthly Wrap-up Report” (7 Nov 1963), JFKL, NSF, Country, Box 202, “Vietnam, 
General, 11/6/63–11/15/63, State Cables,” #21. 
7 Memo, McNamara to the President, “Vietnam Situation” (21 Dec. 1963), LBJL, NSF, 
CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #130. For Lodge’s lack of coordination skill, see also: Cable, CAS to 
CIA (16 Nov 1963), JFKL, President’s Office Files, Country Files, Box 128A, “Vietnam, 
Security, 1963,” #34; Memo, Forrestal to M Bundy, “Appendix to Memorandum on South 
Vietnam: Ambassador Lodge” (26 May 1964), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, 
“Southeast Asia, 1961–1966, Vietnam, General, 3/64–5/64.” 
8 Memo, Rusk to the President (9 Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #131; 
Memo, “Biographic Data, Mr. David G. Nes” (n.d.), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, 
#131a; Mamo, M. Bundy to the President, “Your meeting with David Nes at 12:15 p.m.” 
(10 Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #135; Memo, Taylor to the President (10 
Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #136. 
9 Memo, McNamara to the President, “Vietnam Situation” (21 Dec 1963), LBJL, NSF, 
CFV, Box 1, Folder 7, #130. 
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was possibly the origin of the “Nes committee,” a regular meeting at the deputy 
level chaired by Nes and Gen. William C. Westmoreland (the deputy commander 
of the MACV).10  While the committee provided a valuable civilian-military 
channel, however, it was not until Lodge and Harkins were replaced by Gen. 
Taylor and Gen. Westmoreland respectively in mid-1964 that the relationship 
between the embassy and the MACV markedly improved. 11  Meanwhile in 
Washington, senior policymakers also tried to ameliorate the “deep-seated lack of 
confidence” between senior officers at the Pentagon and the Far Eastern office in 
the State Department through the transfer of William Bundy (the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) to State’s top Far East post 
(the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) in February, replacing 
Roger Hilsman. 12  By mid-1964, therefore, the tension between the State 
Department and the Pentagon had been reduced by moving Taylor and Bundy from 
the Pentagon to key posts in the State Department, expanding the Defense 
Department’s influence on Vietnam policy.  
     McCone’s primary concern was the distortion of intelligence by the GVN 
and the U.S. mission. He made at least two separate attempts to mitigate this 
problem. The first was the dispatch of sixteen CIA officers (“old Vietnamese 
hands”) to South Vietnam in January 1964 to conduct a survey across the country 
and to “spot check” the accuracy of data supplied by the GVN and the U.S. 
mission.13 This effort resulted in a series of reports in February, but had little 
long-term effect on the quality of intelligence.14 Secondly, according to Forrestal, 
the DCI also “made great effort…to get his people out of all except a few 
operations in South Vietnam” and to “put them back into the intelligence business.” 
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This separation of intelligence and covert operations was expected to reduce what 
Forrestal described as “the old problem of having people who are responsible for 
operations also responsible for evaluating the results.”15 Yet, despite support from 
Peer de Silva (the new chief of the CIA’s Saigon Station), this proposal had small 
chance of actually being followed through when many in the Station continued to 
see their covert projects as an important part of the counterinsurgency. Following 
the “sobering revelations of GVN weaknesses” after the November coup, as 
Thomas Ahern (a CAS officer) later recalled, the Station’s “post-Diem agenda 
reflected the desperate need to do something, anything, to stem the Communist tide 
more than it did any rigorous analysis of the reasons for VC successes.”16 McCone 
himself had come to support an increase in the CAS’s covert projects by June 
1964.17  
     During February and March 1964, there were also efforts among 
mid-ranking officers, including Chester Cooper (CIA), Col. Gillis (DIA) and Louis 
Sarris (INR), to improve technical aspects of intelligence assessments. “We are 
currently undertaking comprehensive examination of reporting requirements of all 
Washington intelligence and policy elements concerned with developments in 
Vietnam,” the State Department told the Saigon Embassy on 20 February.18 In 
March, those discussions resulted in a series of recommendations to the U.S. 
mission (including the introduction of a joint weekly report from Saigon and the 
creation of provincial intelligence units) and formed a foundation of the Weekly 
Report in Washington.19 During the rest of the year, discussions on technical issues 
continued,20 but many weaknesses remained largely unchanged. Basic intelligence 
capabilities were still inadequate to cover diverse subjects pertinent to Vietnam 
policy, especially those concerning the NLF. Intelligence traffic continued to be 
dominated by fragmented reports of the latest developments, while the 
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19 Memo, Whiting to Mendenhall, “Intelligence Reporting from South Vietnam,” (5 Feb 
1964); Memo, Cooper to Sullivan, “Washington Requirements for Reporting on the War in 
South Vietnam” (24 Feb 1964); Memo, W. Bundy to Cooper (25 Feb 1964); Memo, Cooper 
to Sullivan, “Washington Requirements for Reporting on the War in South Vietnam (as 
revised, 25 Feb 64),” (26 Feb 1964); Memo, Cooper to Sullivan, “Recommendations on 
Intelligence Reporting” (27 March 1964), all five documents acquired though FOIA 
requests. Cable, State to Saigon (joint State-Defense-AID-CIA message)(30 March 1964), 
LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 3 [1 of 2], Folder 4, #135.  
20 Memo, Wilson, “Criteria for Determining Completion of New Life Hamlets” (18 May 
1964), LBJL, Westmoreland Papers, Box 2, Folder 4, #87, 88 and 89. 
 92 
understanding of the socio-political background of the conflict remained weak in 
many organisations. On top of this, the lack of strategic consensus, together with 
the absence of an effective interdepartmental mechanism for intelligence 
coordination, continued to limit the government’s ability to interpret and analyse 
different aspects of the conflict in a reasonably comprehensive manner.21  
     These tentative efforts in early 1964, in short, failed to address many of the 
key problems which would have required thorough, interdepartmental inquiries. 
Yet McNamara, McCone and other senior policymakers possibly felt that such a 
move was politically impossible,22 for it could highlight the mistakes of some 
organisations (including the JCS) in the previous two years and reignite 
bureaucratic bickering and quarrelling, for which President Johnson had “no 
tolerance whatsoever.”23 This political problem, which the intelligence dispute in 
1963 had intensified, might also be a part of explanation why the U.S. government 
never conducted a major, interdepartmental review of its Vietnam intelligence 
during the following decade despite McNamara’s declining confidence in the 
intelligence products supplied by his own department and the disputes between the 
JCS and the CIA over the Order of Battle statistics in the late 1960s.24 
 
2. Negative trend and its causes (November 1963 - February 1964) 
 
Washington’s view on the new regime in Saigon appeared to remain relatively 
positive throughout November 1963. Just after the death of Diem, President 
Kennedy emphasised that the United States had to help the new leaders to rebuild 
the country,25 and his successor, President Johnson, was equally anxious not to 
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send any sign of a “vote of no confidence in the military junta.”26 While these 
signals by the White House might well have discouraged negative comments by 
the coup’s opponents, advocates of the regime change stressed the good prospects 
for Gen. Minh’s government. At the NSC meeting on 24 November, according to 
McCone, Lodge told Johnson that “everybody was very happy after the coup” 
(showing pictures of the crowds in Saigon to back up this claim) and “left the 
President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.”27 In this context, 
the CIA remained a major exception. Since mid-November, its Saigon Station, then 
under the leadership of acting chief David Smith, dispatched a series of critical 
assessments, identifying emerging problems in the new regime.28 This, together 
perhaps with his anger at Lodge’s behaviour during the 1963 crisis, led McCone to 
challenge the Ambassador at the aforementioned NSC meeting on 24 November. 
Telling the President that the CIA’s estimate of the situation was “somewhat more 
serious,” McCone said that the Agency could not give a “particularly optimistic 
appraisal of the future.”29   
     During the following months, doubts about the GVN spread into other 
departments. While reports on progress did continue, negative information 
dominated the cables from Saigon, the in-depth analyses by the intelligence 
community and the briefings to McNamara and McCone during their joint visit to 
Saigon in December 1963.  
     As to the war efforts in the countryside, the evidence had become clear 
enough by early 1964 to conclude that the situation in the southern part of the 
country – the provinces around Saigon and in the Delta – had been deteriorating 
since mid-1963 “to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue 
dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting,” although the condition in the 
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northern and central regions remained less critical.30 The number of completed 
Strategic Hamlets turned out to be far smaller than the previous regime had 
claimed.31 After the November coup, furthermore, the NLF’s offensives across the 
country had caused a “substantial toll of friendly personnel and weapons.”32 As for 
the GVN, purely military operations by the ARVN continued, but Diem’s 
pacification programs had “virtually ground to a halt.”33 Many projects of the 
previous regime, including the Strategic Hamlet programme, were suspended or 
abandoned because of their weaknesses, their close association with the Ngo 
family,34 and/or the disruption caused by the replacement of district and provincial 
chiefs appointed by the Ngos. A “vacuum created by the abrupt disappearance of 
the highly authoritarian and personalized Ngo family rule” proved “enormous.” In 
particular, the fall of Nhu’s grass-roots political organisations (including the 
Republican Youth Movement, the Can Lao party and the secret police) diminished 
the government’s contact with, and control over, the local population. Deprived of 
those mass platforms, the GVN’s ability to rally popular support through its local 
administrators was limited, as the opulent lifestyle of the GVN officers in the 
provinces had “created a wide gulf between the government and the people.”35 
Furthermore, there were some indications of the “apathy among the population at 
large and waning enthusiasm among the military,” especially in the paramilitary 
forces. The rural community was reportedly “without enthusiasm either for the 
GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter” because it feared the NLF or it 
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was susceptible to NLF propaganda regarding peace and neutralism. The 
paramilitary forces were “unpaid and essentially unmotivated, and had little 
confidence in the ability of the ARVN to reinforce or support.”36   
    Political weaknesses of the junta-led government in Saigon became 
increasingly obvious as well. The rivalry among the leading generals was one of 
the key issues discussed in intelligence products since November. The CAS, for 
example, reported on 16 November that Gen. Dinh (the Second Vice Chairman of 
the Military Executive Committee), Gen. Oai (the Minister of Information) and 
Gen. Xuan (the Director of the National Police) were emerging as “three possible 
sources of irritation” in the GVN.37 Yet, it was the second coup by Gen. Khanh on 
29 January that exposed the full extent of the power struggle within the GVN and 
allowed the U.S. government to identify some causes of political instability 
(notably dissatisfaction with Minh’s leadership within the army, the ambitious 
character of key generals, and the tensions between the allegedly pro-French and 
neutralist generals who occupied key posts in Minh’s government and the 
anti-French officers close to Khanh).38 The prospects of the new regime remained 
uncertain. On the one hand, the fact that Khanh had assembled a relatively 
inclusive government (which not only retained Gen. Minh as the titular head of 
state but also embraced representatives of all three major geographic regions and 
some non-communist political factions) was largely welcomed by the State 
Department and the CIA.39 On the other hand, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao (a participant 
in the November coup who was also a VC agent) and the CIA’s “old Vietnam 
hands” (who were in South Vietnam when the January coup took place) stressed at 
least three major problems for the new regime: the “volatile, exceedingly ambitious 
and dictatorial” character of Gen. Khanh, which could heighten the fear of 
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dictatorship among civilians as well as in the military; the negative popular 
response to Khanh’s action against Minh, who was known to be “much better liked 
than Khanh”; and the possibility that Khanh’s move had lowered the hurdles 
against future coups d’état.40 It is not surprising, therefore, that, even though the 
Khanh’s regime remained relatively stable from mid-February to early May, 
McNamara’s post-trip report in March 1963 recognised its “uncertain viability,” 
pointing out a “constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would 
drop morale and organization nearly to zero”41 
     Meanwhile, the CIA’s Special Report “Trend of Communist Insurgency in 
South Vietnam” (17 January 1964) provided a fine analysis of the strength of the 
NLF.42 The report admitted that, despite some progress during 1963,43 information 
on the NLF’s political activities remained “meager,”44 and it could not give details 
on some aspects of the NLF, such as their presence in the GVN.45 Nevertheless, 
the report could show that during 1963 the NLF’s capabilities had increased 
sharply and its operations had become more elaborate. After outlining a “marked 
                                                                        
40 Thao suggested that coups might become “a national pastime, with every disgruntled 
element plotting forceful change,” while the CIA team also argued, “Perhaps most 
disturbing implication of the Khanh’s coup is the eye opener it must have provided to unit 
commanders as to the relative ease with which the regime could be overthrown” Memo, 
Jorden to Harriman, “Situation in Viet Nam: Report of a Conversation with Col. Pham 
Ngoc Thao” (3 Feb 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 2 [1 of 2], Folder 3, #105; Memo, CIA, 
“Initial Report of CAS Group Findings in South Vietnam” (10 Feb 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, 
Box 2 [1 of 2], Folder 3, #109; Memo, CIA, “Further Comments by CAS on the Situation 
in Vietnam” (10 Feb 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 2 [1 of 2], Folder 3, #111ab 
41 Post-Trip Report, McNamara to the President, “South Vietnam” (16 March 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 3, “McNaughton, VII, National Archive (1),” #8. McCone registered a 
dissent footnote, arguing that the risk of another coup was not “as serious as he believes 
this paragraph implies.” 
42 CIA/OCI, Special Report, “Trend of Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam” (17 Jan 
1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 48, “Southeast Asia, Special Intelligence Material, Vol. I, 
12/63–7/64,” #21. 
43 Memo, CIA to McCone, “Viet Cong Quasi-Governmental Activities” (29 Nov 1963), 
JFKL, Newman Papers, Box 17, “Dec. 1963: 1–5”; DIA, “Improved VC Combat 
Effectiveness and Insurgency Posture” (24 Dec 1963), NA, RG 218, Records of Gen. 
Maxwell Taylor, Box 12, “091 Vietnam (Nov 63–Feb 64) (1 of 2).” 
44 The report, nevertheless, speculated that the NLF was carrying out political campaigns 
using various organizations such as the “Liberation Youth” movement, peasant associations, 
women’s leagues, and guerrilla veterans’ groups.  
45 This is not to say that the Agency was not aware of the problems. Kirkpatrick, for 
instance, pointed out in February, “It is evident that a major factor in VC victories is their 
superior intelligence based on nation-wide penetrations and intimidation at all levels. This 
is also a factor in their military victories where internal agents turn guns on defenders.” 
Memo, CIA to M. Bundy “Appraisal of the Conduct of the War in Vietnam” (10 Feb 1964), 
LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 2 [1 of 2], Folder 3, #110. Nonetheless, the Agency was probably 
unaware at the time that the new Deputy Director of National Police, Tran Ba Thanh, who 
the CIA later suspected to be a VC agent, “released some key Viet Cong prisoners, 
destroyed Viet Cong dossiers in police archives, and placed at least one known Viet Cong 
agent in a key position within the police structure,” jeopardising the GVN’s grasp of the 
VC apparatus in the capital area, which was fairly robust during the closing days of the 
Diem regime. SNIE 53-2-64, “The Situation in South Vietnam” (1 Oct 1964), the CIA, 
FOIA Electronic Reading Room <www.foia.coa.gov> accessed 4 February 2007. 
 97 
growth in the organizational strength and firepower,” the report stressed that, in 
response to the difficulties caused by the surge of U.S. military assistance in 1962, 
insurgents had developed new policies and programs geared to a “long and arduous 
struggle.” Their military campaigns were now directed almost exclusively against 
“soft targets such as strategic hamlets and small outposts manned by paramilitary 
forces.” On the political and psychological fronts, they sought to gain the support 
of the masses through their own civic action programmes and a range of 
propaganda activities (such as meetings, demonstrations and “whispering 
campaigns”). The report also suggested that the NLF was carrying out “on a 
massive scale” a proselytizing programme against the officers working in the 
ARVN and paramilitary units (and their dependents), using a combination of 
persuasion and selective use of violence. Overall, the report highlighted the 
insurgents’ “resourcefulness, adaptability, and determination which has 
characterized their nearly continuous involvement in guerrilla fighting since 1945.” 
In so doing, it sent a clear warning that the prospects for the conflict were for a 
“prolonged contest of attrition, endurance, will, and morale.”46  
     Given all those reports, it was almost inevitable that policymakers 
recognised the situation as critical. In late December, McNamara told the President 
that the situation was “very disturbing,” adding that “Current trends, unless 
reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely 
to a Communist-controlled state.”47 In February McCone told Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk that “the situation was most serious…There was no evidence of 
Country Team operation and increased evidence of Viet Cong activities and 
victories.”48  
     At around the same time, the call for a diplomatic solution became rounder 
and more widespread. In late 1963, the French government stepped up its effort to 
pressure the White House to accept an international conference on the RVN,49 
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whereas the New York Times intensified its campaign for a negotiated settlement, 
criticising the “let’s get back to the war” spirit in Washington.50 Arguably the most 
clear-sighted – and rather prophetic – at this point was Senator Mike Mansfield, a 
close observer of the Vietnam conflict since the 1950s. In his memo to the 
President on 1 February, the Senator argued:  
 
This process of coup upon coup may be expected to be increasingly 
divorced from any real concern with the needs of the Vietnamese 
people. If the people do not go over actively to the Viet Cong, they will 
at best care very little about resisting them, let alone crusading against 
them. Indeed, the bulk of the Vietnamese people, as well as the lower 
ranks of the armed forces, may already be in this frame of mind. If 
there are in fact the grim prospects, our present policies will be drained 
of any constructive significance for the political future of Viet Nam. 
We will find ourselves engaged merely in an indecisive, bloody and 
costly military involvement and the involvement will probably have to 
increase just to keep the situation as it is…A deeper military plunge is 
not a real alternative. Apart from the absence of sufficient national 
interest to justify it to our own people, there is no reason to assume that 
it will settle the question. More likely than not, it will simply enlarge 
the morass in which we are now already on the verge of indefinite 
entrapment. Indeed, the morass could conceivably be enlarged all the 
way into North Viet Nam, into Laos, into Cambodia and into China 
without changing the basic pattern of the difficulty for us.”51  
 
Analysts in the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE) also implied the need for 
Washington to consider the possibility of a diplomatic solution. A 45-page memo 
on 19 January written by Willard Matthias (a ONE analysts), which was later 
leaked to the U.S. press in the middle of the presidential campaign in August 1964, 
expressed his “serious doubt that victory can be won.” While accepting that “at 
least a prolonged stalemate can be attained,” the memo suggested that certain 
developments “could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon 
neutralization.”52 Matthias’ colleague at the ONE, Chester Cooper, also sent a 
memo to Walt Rostow (the chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning 
Council) on 7 February, warning:  
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I feel that attention should be given to planning against what I would 
describe as ‘the worst case’…our planning vis-à-vis Southeast Asia 
concentrates on how we accomplish our objectives there…But, 
suppose, despite our best laid plans and our heroic effort, things go 
sour – and there are plenty of things beyond our control that could go 
sour. Who is planning what we can salvage if we are forced to 
negotiate out of South Vietnam?53  
 
3. Rejecting a diplomatic settlement and a new strategy (March 1964) 
 
Despite all this, the U.S. government rejected the possibility of a diplomatic 
solution and the need for a radical overhaul of the counterinsurgency strategy. 
Instead, policymaking in March 1964, which was centred upon the 
McNamara-McCone trip to Saigon, largely focused on relatively minor technical 
issues, apparently on the assumption that small changes could reverse the tide of 
the conflict. During his meeting with McNamara’s team, for instance, Lodge 
insisted:  
 
[T]he present rather apathetic state of opinion in the country can 
change overnight…I have seen so many political campaigns where 
everything looks awful. Then you try this and you try that and a couple 
of things begin to go; all of a sudden, people’s way of looking at things 
change and I believe that that could happen here.54  
 
At the same time, the Pentagon continued to believe that “the military tools and 
concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate,” 55  and 
concentrated on areas in which improvement appeared to be possible (such as the 
reorganisation of paramilitary forces, the introduction of additional military 
equipment, and the creation of offensive guerrilla units). Listing those proposals, 
McNamara reported to the President on 16 March that “If the Khanh Government 
can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out rapidly, it is my 
judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the 
next four to six months.” 56  This focus on relatively minor technical issues 
obscured more basic problems identified in intelligence products in early 1964, 
such as the peasant apathy toward the government, the low morale among 
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paramilitary forces, and the skill and determination of the NLF. 
     The growing attention to enemy infiltration also took attention away from 
those fundamental problems within the RVN. Until early 1964, the North 
Vietnamese support for the NLF was not regarded as a primary problem for the 
GVN. In January 1964 the CIA’s Special Report mentioned earlier pointed out that 
“relying only in part on infiltration from the North, the Viet Cong levy 
replacements from local guerrilla units,” even though the report also noted that 
trained officers and heavy weapons from North Vietnam had played a crucial role 
in the development of VC capabilities.57 More important was McNamara’s report 
to the President in December 1963, which concluded that “In general, the 
infiltration problem, while serious and annoying, is a lower priority” compared to 
weaknesses in the GVN/US operations.58 Around February and March 1964, 
however, senior policymakers began to emphasise infiltration as a primary problem 
for the GVN. Lyman Kirkpatrick (CIA), for example, argued on 10 February that 
“with the Laos and Cambodia borders open, its entire pacification effort is like 
trying to mop the floor before turning off the faucet.”59 A month later, during a 
meeting with McNamara’s team, Lodge insisted that “North Viet-Nam, with Red 
China goading it on, is stepping up the flow of men and materials into South 
Viet-Nam.” This led to the argument in McNamara’s post-trip report in March 
1964 that “North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing.”60 
McCone supported this view, arguing that the GVN/U.S. program “can never be 
considered completely satisfactory” so long as it permitted an “uninterrupted and 
unmolested” supply from North Vietnam,61  
     This marked change in policymakers’ view on the importance of infiltration 
can partly be explained by a series of reports on large enemy units with better 
equipment, which was thought to be impossible without support from the DRV.62 
The growing attention to the external support for the NLF can also be attributed to 
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the fact that in late 1963 to early 1964 some policymakers, notably Lodge and Walt 
Rostow (State Department) began to consider the possibility of military action 
against North Vietnam. 63  For McNamara, though, the primary reason for 
emphasising infiltration seemed to be the need to justify the ongoing U.S. support 
for the GVN. At a meeting in Saigon in March 1964, McNamara insisted on taking 
a sample or two of Chinese-made weapons back to Washington, explaining:  
 
I want to get off the plane in Washington with members of our party 
carrying a recoilless rifle and a heavy machine gun…If this nation is 
going to be dedicated to support of South Viet-Nam, we are going to 
have to convince Americans more than we already have of Chicom 
involvement in this war, and I just want to have it there where the TV 
cameras can take pictures of it.64  
 
Presumably for the same reason, McNamara’s post-trip report listed Chinese-made 
equipment found in the RVN, such as 75 mm recoilless rifles and 90 mm rocket 
launchers.65  
     Underlying all this, as always, was the domino theory: the prediction of a 
domino-like effect in the event of the U.S. withdrawal from the RVN. At first, 
President Johnson appeared to be unsure about that possibility. In January he asked 
his senior policymakers to provide their comments on Mansfield’s memos to the 
President of 7 December and 6 January, both of which called for a negotiated 
settlement. 66  The response by Rusk, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy all 
confirmed the existing belief that a neutral South Vietnam would soon become a 
communist-dominated state, and that the consequences of a communist takeover of 
the RVN would be “extremely serious both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for 
the U.S. position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key areas of the world.”67 
McNamara’s post-visit report on 16 March repeated this consensus, arguing that 
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negotiation on the basis of neutralisation would “simply mean a Communist 
take-over in South Vietnam.”68 On the next day (17 March), the NSC officially 
accepted the domino theory as a basis of the Vietnam policy.  
 
4. The domino theory and the CIA (1964) 
 
The CIA/ONE’s endorsement of the domino theory  
There have been two conflicting interpretations of the CIA’s view on the domino 
theory, especially with regard to its memo on 9 June 1964 (“Would the Loss of 
South Vietnam and Laos Precipitate a ‘Domino Effect’ in the Far East?”) produced 
by the Agency’s Bureau of National Estimates (BNE) upon request from President 
Johnson. In his memoir In Retrospect (1995), McNamara argues that this document 
reinforced the administration’s fear that the “West’s containment policy lay at 
serious risk in Vietnam. And thus we continued our slide down the slippery 
slope.”69 This interpretation is challenged by Harold Ford (a former ONE analyst 
who played an important role in Vietnam intelligence in 1964) in his book CIA and 
Vietnam Policymakers (1998). In the section titled “The Domino Theory 
Questioned,” Ford insists that the same BNE memo in June 1964 actually 
dismissed the domino theory and that the memo’s conclusion was simply ignored 
by policymakers. The problems, according to Ford, were that the “CIA had not 
been asked for its view of the domino thesis until 10 weeks after the NSC had 
already inscribed it as formal US policy” in March 1964, and that the Agency’s 
view had “no apparent impact on existing or subsequent policy.”70  
     Ford’s argument is misleading at least on two important respects. Firstly, 
although policymakers might not ask the CIA’s view on the domino theory in early 
1964, the Agency’s documents in that period not only discussed the policy 
implications of the instability in Southeast Asia but also reinforced the domino 
metaphor by emphasising threats to the U.S. national security. SNIE 50-64 
“Short-term Prospects in Southeast Asia” (12 February 1964), for example, 
stressed that “The struggle for South Vietnam will be a test, crucial for much of 
Southeast Asia, of US ability and will to preserve and protect anti-Communist 
regime in the area – and, hence, of the feasibility of going along with the US 
response to Communist pressures rather than of opting for some other course such 
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as an attempt to negotiate liable settlements with the Communists.”71 This was 
followed three months later by the CIA memorandum “The Situation in Southeast 
Asia” (18 May 1964), which argued that “The year 1964 is likely to be critical in 
this battle for control of Southeast Asia. The regime in Vientiane is in a shambles; 
the government in Saigon…is confronting great odds…the US may, by the year 
end, be unable to rally effectively the friendly forces necessary to preserve the 
Western position in Mainland Southeast Asia.” 72  These strong and repeated 
warnings by the intelligence community in early 1964 can be seen as a part of the 
reason why the NSC faced little, if any, opposition when and after it officially 
made the domino theory a basis of its Vietnam policy on 17 March 1964.  
     It seems impossible, secondly, to describe the aforementioned BNE memo 
on 9 June 1964 as a challenge to the domino theory. On the opening page, as Ford 
points out, the memo did question the possibility of the “rapid, successive 
communization of the other states of the Far East” with the possible exception of 
Cambodia. However, as McNamara points out, the BNE then used the following 
four pages to emphasise other forms of “domino” effects as if they were almost 
unavoidable:  
 
Failure [in South Vietnam] would be damaging to US prestige, and 
would seriously debase the credibility of US will and capability to 
contain the spread of communism elsewhere in the areas…Thailand 
would almost certainly shift toward a neutralist position, hoping thus to 
forestall any vigorous Communist move against the regime…Ne Win 
[of Burma] would see the ouster of the US from Indochina as 
confirming the wisdom of the isolationist, somewhat pro-Peiping 
course he has already embarked upon…Indonesia…would be 
emboldened in its efforts to crush Malaysia…The outcome in South 
Vietnam and Laos would conspicuously support the aggressive tactical 
contentions of Peiping as contrasted with the more cautious position of 
the USSR. To some degree this will tend to encourage and strengthen 
the more activist revolutionary movements in various parts of the 
underdeveloped world. 
 
A copy of this document now in the file of John McNaughton at the Lyndon 
Johnson Presidential Library, which has hand-written emphases in its margins, 
supports McNamara’s suggestion that the Pentagon considered this memo to be a 
confirmation of its concern about domino effects.73  
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Underestimating opportunities and uncertainty 
The domino theory became far less persuasive after the start of the air strikes 
against the DRV in February 1965. In mid-1965, Indonesian President Sukarno (a 
driving force behind his country’s aggressive, pro-Chinese foreign policy) was 
overthrown by the military and replaced by Suharto, who was of pro-Western 
inclination. Thailand turned out to be one of the first countries to send its troops to 
South Vietnam in support of the GVN and the United States. Soon, Communist 
China was to descend into a socioeconomic crisis after the launch of the Cultural 
Revolution in May 1966. Already during the congressional hearing on the Vietnam 
War in February 1966 Gen. Maxwell Taylor had to defend the administration’s 
policy by focusing on what Senator Claiborne Pell called the “leapfrog domino 
theory,” the argument that while the fall of the GVN might not affect neighbouring 
countries, it would have negative repercussions in Africa or Latin America. This 
prompted Pell to point out that the Soviet capitulation in the Cuban Missile Crisis 
had shown no major adverse effect in the Communist bloc. Why, the senator asked, 
would “dominos fall this, [but] not the other way”?74 This possibility – or “the 
Domino Theory in reverse” as Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt called it at 
the SEATO conference in June 1966 – proved to be exactly what the Western bloc 
began to pursue in Southeast Asia though the spread of the market economy in 
1966.75 As the region became less vulnerable to communist influence during the 
rest of the decade, it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. public to see why 
the United States had to pay such a high price to defend the GVN. 
     This does not necessarily mean that the CIA’s warnings about domino effects 
in 1964 were unsound: geopolitics in Southeast Asia could have evolved quite 
differently had the United States abandoned the GVN in 1964 or 1965. Nonetheless, 
those developments after 1965 did point to the pitfall of the Agency’s focus on the 
threats to the U.S. national interests. Presenting wide enough issues and 
probabilities is an important aspect of intelligence estimates. As Denald Steury 
explains:  
 
Highly predictive in nature, the typical NIE [National Intelligence 
Estimate] consisted largely of informed judgements about future 
actions or situations that ultimately could not be proved, however 
well-founded they might be in experience or factual or theoretical 
knowledge...In general, therefore, NIEs would try to convey the full 
range of possibilities, even though they might come down firmly in 
favour of one particular set of conclusions.76 
                                                                        
74 Joseph Fry, Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 59. 
75 Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War (New York: HaperCollins, 2007), pp. 254-255. 
76 Donald Steury “Introduction” in Kent, Sherman Kent and the Board of National 
 105 
It is worth noting that the documents produced in 1962 and 1963 tended to pay 
more attention to those wider possibilities including those favourable to the U.S. 
national interests. Two studies commissioned by the department in mid-1962 and 
completed in early 1963 (the 124-page research paper “Regionalism and Security 
in Mainland Southeast Asia” on 28 January 1963 written by INR analyst Charles 
Spinks and the 99-page study “Divisive Forces in Southeast Asia” on February 
1963 completed by Bernard Gordon, a researcher at the Washington-based 
think-tank Institute for Defense Analyses) explored the possibility of a region-wide 
approach as an important but neglected aspect of U.S. policy towards Southeast 
Asia. 77  “Even in this fragmented area,” Gordon argued, “certain common 
movements are developing – what might properly be called ‘regionalism’ – 
and…these regional factors in Southeast Asia offer opportunities for US policy and 
action which will contribute to freeing us from the dilemma we faced in Laos and 
will assist in assuring mainland Southeast Asia against Communist aggression.”78 
The CIA memo “Communist Threats in Southeast Asia” (24 May 1962) also 
presented a relatively balanced assessment. While this document did acknowledge 
that a communist victory in Laos and South Vietnam might led to “a loss of nerve 
and will on the existing [non-communist] regimes” in Southeast Asia, “a traditional 
spirit of ‘accommodation’” and “a step-by-step subversion of the governments 
themselves,” it also added: 
 
[T]here is nothing foreordained about such a process. It is conceivable 
that, even if Laos and South Vietnam were lost to communism, the 
other states of the area would still find the strength and will to preserve 
their national independence. The manner in which communism won in 
South Vietnam and Laos could give rise to a variety of unforeseeable 
counterforces…In any case, the project of Chinese Communist power 
over Southeast Asia would not be a foregone conclusion.79  
 
What those documents in 1962 and 1963, together with the actual developments 
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during the second half of the 1960s, indicate is that the intelligence materials in 
1964 – especially the June 1964 memo discussed earlier – should have placed more 
emphasis on the opportunities for the Western bloc, the limits of communist 







































South Vietnam: Problems and Prospects, 1964 
 
During the policy debate in 1964, advocates of military action against North 
Vietnam justified their position partly on the assumption that such a bold action 
would boost the morale of the GVN, stop infiltration into the RVN and thereby turn 
the tide of the conflict.1   
     The intelligence panel in the Vietnam Working Group in the NSC questioned 
this assumption during the policy review in November 1964. It suggested that low 
morale and infiltration were merely two of the complex problems facing the GVN, 
implying that improvement in those two areas would have only a limited effect on 
the long-term prospects of the counterinsurgency: 
 
Even under the best of circumstances…reversal of present military 
trends will be extremely difficult…The basic elements of Communist 
strength in South Vietnam remain indigenous: South Vietnamese 
grievances, war weariness, defeatism, and political disarray; VC terror, 
arms capture, disciplined organization, highly developed intelligence 
systems, and ability to recruit locally; and the fact that the VC enjoys 
some status as a nationalist movement.2  
 
This can be seen as a major achievement of intelligence analysts that supports the 
“sound but ignore” interpretation of Vietnam intelligence promoted by Harold Ford, 
John McCone and Ray Cline. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that the 
intelligence on South Vietnam in 1964 was neither a clear-cut success nor an 
insignificant part of Vietnam policy. Although the intelligence community made 
progress on some issues (such as the sources of political instability, the 
administrative problems on the frontline, and the pattern of military attacks by 
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insurgents), reliable, in-depth analysis on some of the key factors (including the 
morale of friendly forces, the attitude of the rural community, and the nationalist 
driving force behind the NLF) remained almost entirely absent throughout 1964. 
Moreover, while some document – such as the SNIE 53-2-64 in October and the 
intelligence panel’s report mentioned earlier – identified a range of problems 
facing the GVN and implied the difficulty of changing the tide of the conflict, it 
remained unclear how and to what extent changes in infiltration and morale would 
affect the overall landscape of the conflict in the RVN. Those gaps in intelligence 
products can be seen at least as a permissive factor for the decision for military 
action against the DRV.  
 
1. Political instability  
 
Gen. Khanh’s regime, which came to power upon the second coup in late January 
1964, remained relatively stable during the first three months. From May onward, 
however, the regime faced growing threats from inside and outside the government, 
leading to another crisis in September. The CIA’s weekly reports and intelligence 
memoranda skilfully analysed various elements involved in this new round of 
political turmoil. 
     As in 1963, political instability emerged in May 1964 with the rising tension 
between the Buddhist and Catholic communities. By June, it had escalated to the 
point where moderate leaders on both sides found it increasingly difficult to 
control.3 Meanwhile, the relations among junta members continued to be tense and 
unpredictable. While the feud among three leading figures – Khanh (the Prime 
Minister), Minh (the Chief of State) and Khiem (the Defense Minister) – kept 
themselves and other generals on the alert for or against a coup d’état,4 the release 
                                                                        
3 The religious problem was regularly mentioned in the CIA’s weekly reports. See for 
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in July of four “Dalat generals” (Don, Kim, Dinh and Xuan, who had been arrested 
during Khanh’s coup in January and held in Dalat) also indicated a “further 
weakening of [Khanh’s] already tenuous control over the military leadership.”5 
Compounding this was the rising influence of the Dai Viet (a nationalist political 
party) and Nguyen Ton Hoan (the leader of its southern faction who also served as 
the Deputy Prime Minister for Pacification). The fact that several commanders 
around Saigon were known to be Dai Viet members, together with the rumour that 
Khiem had Dai Viet ties, fuelled the speculation that the party was becoming the 
focal point of a plot against the Premier.6 At the same time, Hoan was busy 
rallying major political parties and religious sects to establish a mass organisation 
(“United Nationalist Forces”) as a political base of the government,7 even when 
Khanh was trying to balance the power of different organisations so that no one 
group could become powerful enough to challenge his regime.8 Meanwhile, the 
civilian-military tension emerged as another source of instability. Whereas the 
civilian population (including politicians, intellectuals, mass media and students) 
criticised the centralisation of power in the hands of the military and pressured 
Khanh to broaden the base of the government,9 the military demanded tougher 
control which it claimed was necessary for effective conduct of counterinsurgency, 
arguing that “military victory must take precedence over democracy.”10 All this 
evolved against the backdrop of the lack of clear progress in the war effort, which 
intensified the public frustration with Khanh’s leadership.11  
     Then, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 2 and 4 August, Saigon descended 
into a political crisis from which it never fully recovered until February 1965. A 
chain of events was triggered on 7 August when Khanh – using the U.S. retaliatory 
attack against North Vietnam on the previous day as an excuse – declared a state of 
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emergency and gave the Military Revolutionary Council “all but absolute power.”12 
This was followed by a restructuring of the government on 16 August, which made 
Khanh the President (replacing Minh) and reduced civilian power in the 
administration.13 These moves to strengthen the power of the military and curtail 
civil liberties led Buddhists and students to stage demonstrations against what they 
regarded as Khanh’s “dictatorial” rule. 14  Further accusations and threats by 
militant monk Tri Quang forced Khanh to resign from the presidency and repeal 
the 16 August Charter.15 These concessions irritated the military and increased the 
risk of coup d’état. Reportedly losing confidence in his ability to outmanoeuvre his 
rivals and suffering from “physical ailment and emotional exhaustion,” Khanh 
retired to Dalat in late August, causing a power vacuum in Saigon.16 With pledges 
of support from key generals, however, the premier returned to the capital on 3 
September and introduced further reform designed to reduce Dai Viet influence, 
sending Hoan overseas and removing Dai Viet commanders near Saigon,17 who 
several days later (13 September) attempted a coup d’état. These “rebel generals” 
temporarily occupied Saigon and declared victory, but their attempt was soon 
subdued by young officers, including Air Force Commander Gen. Ky.18 This 
helped boost the influence of the “Young Turks” vis-à-vis the older generation of 
commanders, adding further complications to Khanh’s leadership of the military.  
     After all these events, Khanh abandoned the idea of strengthening the 
military’s control over politics and in late September set up a High National 
Council as a step towards a civilian-led government while also attempting to retain 
“honorary” influence of the military. This initiative was fully supported by 
Ambassador Taylor, and the Council’s selection of Phan Khac Suu as the new chief 
of state on 25 October offered some promise for stability.19 The long-term viability 
of the GVN remained uncertain, however. While old tension remained among 
various political and religious organizations, the government faced new threats to 
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its stability, including labour strikes, protests by ethnic minorities (“Rhade 
uprising”) and the “People’s Revolutionary Committee” orchestrated by Professor 
Le Khac Quyen and other faculty members of Hué University.20  
     The quality of the reports on the political instability in mid- to late 1964 
differed across the key subjects. On the one hand, intelligence remained relatively 
weak on the inner workings of groups outside the government and the NLF’s 
influence on those organisations (even though the CIA was at least consistent in its 
judgment that the NLF might abet the political instability but did not directly 
instigate public protests, which developed in large part on their own initiative).21 
On the other hand, the GVN was comparatively less opaque to the U.S. 
government thanks to the U.S. mission’s network of contacts with the South 
Vietnamese ruling elite. Furthermore, intelligence on the nature of the Buddhist 
movement became much clearer than it had been in 1963. The CIA’s Special 
Report on religious problems of 17 September in particular provided a relatively 
clear picture with regard to the structure of the main Buddhist organisation (the 
Unified Buddhist Association of Vietnam) and the intentions of militant leader Tri 
Quang (an “ambitious, skillful, ruthless political manipulator and born 
demagogue” according to the report). It also explored the historical background of 
Buddhist-Catholic tensions to explain why the Buddhist community was so 
susceptible to Tri Quang’s militant agitation.22 An equally important achievement 
was the analysis of diverse factors in the wider socio-political and historical 
contexts. The point was most clearly articulated in NIE 53-64 (“Chances for a 
Stable Government in South Vietnam”) of 8 September, the opening sentence of 
which reads: “the downfall of the Diem regime released powerful political forces 
previously suppressed or underground.” 23  This suggested that the political 
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instability did not have a simple solution, and that military action against North 




Meanwhile, the negative trends in the countryside remained largely unchanged. 
The atmosphere was in fact slightly more relaxed in April and early May, when the 
regime was more or less stable and the counterinsurgency showed some signs of 
recovery. This hardly boosted the confidence in Washington, however. “[T]here has 
been a slight improvement overall in the last month,” Forrestal reported after his 
trip to Saigon in May 1964, “[but] the trend has definitely not yet turned in our 
favor.”24 The Pentagon too remained cautious, even mentioning the possibility of 
another Dien Bien Phu during its conference in May.25 The following five months 
were marked by a lack of progress in the war effort and a steady increase in VC 
capabilities. Intelligence made some progress, but continued to be weak on 
human-based factors such as the morale of the ARVN and the attitude of the rural 
community.  
 
Technical problems on the front line  
Apart from purely military operations by the ARVN, the progress in pacification 
was largely confined to planning and preparation in Saigon. By the end of June, 
pacification plans had been drawn up for most provinces,26 and directives were 
issued for some specific projects, including the Mobile Action Cadre.27 After the 
arrival in July of the new ambassador, Maxwell Taylor, the Embassy renewed its 
efforts to strengthen the liaison mechanism between the U.S. mission and the GVN 
National Security Council, which worked together in the following months to 
launch a new project (Operation Hop Tac) in the provinces around Saigon28 
However, these efforts in Saigon did not result in tangible progress in the 
countryside. As the CIA observed in June 1964, “Pacification efforts still show few 
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real gains. Planning and organization of the program continues to occupy most of 
the time and talent of those charged with its implementation.”29 This continued in 
July and August30 (with the notable exception of mid-July, when “The pacification 
effort in the fourteen critical provinces moved forward slowly”31), leading to 
another warning in late September that “Although pacification planning continues 
in the GVN National Security Council, the Embassy has the feeling that the 
decisions taken are not being implemented with any great enthusiasm or to any 
significant degree.”32 
     The fact that policies and concepts agreed upon in Saigon rarely resulted in 
successful operations in the countryside drew attention to the problem of 
implementation. What became clearer to some, if not many, in mid-1964 was that, 
as Thomas Ahern later pointed out, policy proposals had a tendency to “mistake the 
desirable for the possible,”33 ignoring many weaknesses and constraints on the 
front line. In May, William Colby wrote a memo to address this problem, 
reminding readers that “the GVN at the grass roots is not working well, and it is 
here that the war is being fought. Outmoded concepts, directives and practices, 
bureaucratic constipation, insufficient on-the-spot resources and erratic 
commitment or withdrawal of forces have occurred in various proportion to make 
all too rare the cases wherein the GVN has seized the initiative.”34 Shortly 
afterward, William Sullivan (State Department) made a similar point when he 
argued, “Starting with the fact that counter insurgency is a very complex business, 
we should examine whether the various programs which the Vietnamese have laid 
out…amount to more than they are technically and administratively capable of 
handling.”35  
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     Some of the administrative and procedural problems became clearer by late 
1964. One of them was the lack of coordination between civilian and military 
authorities and the resulting absence of military support for pacification. A report 
by Maj. Gen. Charles Timmer (the Chief of MAAC from March 1962 to May 
1964) in July, for example, devoted much of its space to this problem,36 while the 
MACV also acknowledged in May that the overall pattern of military operations 
was not synchronised with the Pacification Plan, admitting that military operations 
in support of pacification amounted to only 4 percent of the South Vietnamese Air 
Force’s activities. 37  Another major problem was the ineffective system of 
financing and resource allocation, which was emphasised by Sullivan, the Embassy 
and the CIA. The Agency, for instance, warned in October, “The procedure for 
funding Hop Tac is increasingly a problem. The Hop Tac problem illustrates in 
acute form the present uncertainty as to who will fund programs.”  
     Reports also identified some sources of those administrative weaknesses, 
including an “overly ambitious effort to get the program launched” which caused 
“improper phasing” of the projects; the ill-defined jurisdiction of different 
departments/agencies in the GVN; bureaucratic turf battles within both the GVN 
and the U.S. mission38; and the political instability in Saigon, which caused 
frequent changes of district and province chiefs39 and a fragmentation of the 
command around the capital as a counter-coup measure. 40  Reports also 
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acknowledged that many of the administrative problems partly stemmed from the 
very nature of counterinsurgency, which required adaptation to diverse conditions 
across the country and what Gen. Timmer described as “a truly integrated 
military-political-economic-sociological-psychological effort, on both the US and 
host-country sides…at all levels.”41 
 
Human factors: friendly forces and the rural community  
Another problem on the front line was the limited competence of GVN officers, or 
what the CIA described as “a shortage of talent and cohesiveness at all levels.”42 
The lack of qualified leaders, in particular, was acknowledged as a major problem 
by David Palmer and John Connor. Warning that leadership was “in the shortest 
supply,” Palmer argued that “Aggressiveness and initiative are contrary to the 
Vietnamese character.”43 Similarly, Connor saw leadership as being “perilously 
thin” and “the most precious and least available commodity in South Vietnam (the 
VC are well endowed with leaders)” due to “attrition by death, wounds and disease, 
and to the ousting of many competent leaders after the anti-Diem coup.”44  
     The analysis of the morale among friendly forces appeared contradictory and 
unreliable, especially with regard to the regular forces, if not militias whose low 
morale appeared undisputable. After his trip to Saigon in April, for example, Gen. 
Earls Wheeler (Army Chief of Staff) reported that the South Vietnamese Air Force 
(VNAF) was “poorly motivated and practices the custom of going off duty at noon 
on Saturdays for the weekend.”45 This was denied in May by Gen. Moore, who 
argued that the basis of Wheeler’s comment was “taken out of context” and 
presented his own view that the VNAF’s morale was “pretty good now and 
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improving under General Ky.”46 A MACV memo written around the same time, 
however, observed that the loss and replacement of leaders after the November 
coup had caused the “demoralization” of middle-ranking officers and that 
discontentment and apathy had reached the ordinary soldiers in the first quarter of 
1964. As a consequence, the desertion rate rose “in an alarming fashion.”47 Yet, in 
July, a MACV survey of U.S. advisors’ opinions across the country led 
Ambassador Taylor to conclude that “morale in general remains good to excellent 
at the troop and leadership levels…the general attitude is one of confidence that the 
pacification program will work.”48 In August, David Palmer reached a similar 
conclusion. Dismissing comments about war-weariness as “over-played,” Palmer 
argued that battle losses had a smaller effect on morale than widely believed, 
adding that “The units I observed were either not affected by casualties or actually 
had a higher esprit after a little blood-letting.”49 The lack of reliable assessment of 
morale in the GVN had an important policy implication, since one of the key 
objectives of military action against North Vietnam was to boost morale and 
thereby to improve the GVN’s performance. This line of argument would be 
unsound if the morale in the friendly forces was not low and/or the problem in 
morale was a relatively minor part of the overall problem in the performance of the 
GVN.    
     Solid intelligence was also missing on the attitude of the peasant community. 
The Viet Cong’s ability to successfully stage ambushes suggested both peasant 
reluctance to pass information to the GVN and the importance of overcoming this 
problem. However, while a “census grievance” program began to provide a better 
picture of the problems and conditions in the rural area,50 there appeared to be no 
large-scale effort to investigate how operations by the GVN, the United States and 
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the NLF affected peasant lives and perceptions. As a result, comments on peasant 
attitudes remained largely speculative and varied significantly. At the relatively 
optimistic side of the spectrum, for instance, one of the Embassy’s provincial staff 
felt in July that “rural antipathy toward the Viet Cong has increased because of 
indiscriminate Communist terrorism and heavier tax demands” and that “they 
would prefer to side with the government if guaranteed security.”51 In contrast, 
those who were familiar with socio-cultural and historical contexts tended to be 
more cautious. Col. Connor, for example, emphasised that the people in the Delta 
were “not acquainted with government in any form, be it French, Diem, or 
post-coup” and strongly resented government efforts to tax them. The enemy 
forces “capitalize on this attitude and encourage them to resist any form of 
government control.” 52  Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos was even more 
pessimistic when he told U. Alexis Johnson (the Deputy Chief of the U.S. mission) 
in August that the people in the countryside “really see no reason to commit 
themselves to the Government’s fight,” pointing out that “these people will never 
forget the promises made by the French that they, the French, would protect these 
people.” Moreover, he added, Viet Cong propaganda was telling them that the 
Americans, like the French, wished to rule the land, and that “to be a patriotic is to 
side the Viet Cong.”53 In August 1964, this lack of solid study on peasant attitudes 
was discussed in a State memo, which noted, “We are told repeatedly that this is a 
war for the minds of the people, but it is being fought as though it were a game of 
kriegspiel, in which we perceive only our own moves but have to guess at the 
reactions they induce.”54 
 
3. Strengths of the NLF 
 
Rebuilding its pacification programmes amid the insurgency proved an extremely 
difficult task for the GVN. The CIA’s weekly reports regularly recorded how small 
achievements the GVN made in certain parts of the country were almost nullified 
by insurgents, who often concentrated their efforts on areas where the GVN was 
beginning to make some progress.55 Although some aspects of the NLF (notably 
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the armed attacks against the GVN) became reasonably clear, insurgents continued 
to conceal themselves and their activities effectively from the GVN and the United 
States. 
     By mid-1964, it had become obvious that the pattern of the enemy’s military 
operations was making it difficult for the friendly forces to respond. The MACV’s 
analysis showed that insurgents were effectively combining small-scale actions 
(“harassment and terrorism”) with large-scale (that is, company and battalion-size) 
attacks against GVN facilities, such as training camps. Although large-scale attacks 
were relatively small in number (usually fewer than ten a month), they caused 
considerable damage to the friendly forces. According to MACV statistics, during 
the period from 1 July to 16 August only 14% of the Viet Cong attacks were 
company and battalion-size, but they accounted for “75% of the total government 
killed, 84% of the wounded, 84% of these missing, and 78% of the weapons 
lost.”56 The need to respond to these large-scale attacks across the country partly 
explains why the GVN and the MACV did not abandon their structure and tactics 
designed for conventional war, and failed to provide sufficient support for 
pacification programmes.  
     The NLF’s capabilities behind those offensives remained difficult to analyse, 
however. Reports on related subjects – such as the number of insurgents, the rate of 
infiltration, command and control, and intelligence network – tended to underline 
the limitations, rather than the successes, of the intelligence community. In July 
1964, for example, the MACV revised its estimates of VC regular forces from 
23,000–27,000 to 28,000–34,000 not because of an actual increase in enemy cadres 
but because of the “acceptance of existence of units suspected for two or three 
years for which confirmatory evidence has become available only in the last few 
months.”57 The intelligence community might have been slightly more confident 
about the figures on infiltration, thanks in part to the information supplied by two 
captured VC prisoners in July, which made it possible to speculate that several 
groups of around 500 to 1000 men were being infiltrated into South Vietnam in 
1964.58  Yet intelligence on exact routes and methods of infiltration did not 
improve significantly. 59  Likewise, intelligence on the command and 
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communication system and intelligence network of the NLF was based largely on 
deduction from the Front’s successful conduct of military activities rather than on 
detailed evidence on those factors themselves.60 These weaknesses in intelligence 
on the NLF led Ambassador Taylor to note in November that “The ability of the 
Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one 
of the mysteries of this guerrilla war.”61 
     The understanding of the insurgents’ “amazing ability to maintain morale”62 
was also hampered by Washington’s identification of the enemy as communists, 
rather than nationalists. In fact, as policymakers must have known, the French 
government, Le Van Hoach (the South Vietnamese Minister of State) and the U.S. 
media all questioned this description in 1964. A report by the French Embassy in 
Saigon concluded that the NLF was “a resurgence of the national Vietnamese 
movement which began on September 2, 1945.”63 Le Van Hoach maintained that 
he “knows most of the leaders of the Viet Cong National Front for the Liberation of 
South Vietnam, and believes that many of them are non-Communist nationalists 
who could be won over to the government in a negotiated settlement of the war.”64 
U.S. media also pointed out that the NLF had been formed in the late 1950s by 
various groups opposing the Diem regime. “The [media] reporting of the war 
itself,” Walt Rostow (State Department) noted in May 1964, “tends to portray it as 
a vicious, indigenous civil war in which the United States has somehow become 
involved in ambiguous ways.” Despite all this, Washington continued to assume 
the NLF to be largely a communist movement partly because of the absence of 
robust intelligence on the motivations and backgrounds of those who had joined 
the NLF. In October a CIA officer addressed this problem, writing: “the enemy: 
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who exactly is he? Is he this monolithic bloc of Marxist communist seeping down 
from Hanoi with orders from Peiping to be executed faithfully without 
consideration of self and national interests? I submit we have made next to no 
effort to identify and systematically analyze this ‘enemy.’”65  
 
4. Intelligence estimates 
 
The intelligence community produced two (Special) National Intelligence 
Estimates on South Vietnam in 1964. The first (NIE 53-64 “Chances for a Stable 
Government in South Vietnam” on 8 September 1964) was focused on the political 
crisis. Therefore, only the second (SNIE 53-2-64 “Situation in South Vietnam” on 
1 October 1964) examined the situation in the RVN in general. This second product 
in October was intended to send the warning that “the situation in South Vietnam 
has continued to deteriorate” since early August and that “the conditions favour a 
further decay of GVN will and effectiveness.” Outlining some of the negative 
trends (including signs of defeatism in the GVN leadership, tensions in the 
U.S.-GVN relations and the growing enemy strength in the cities), the document 
concluded: “The likely pattern of this decay will be increasing defeatism, paralysis 
of leadership, friction with Americans, exploitation of possible lines of political 
accommodation with the other side, and a general petering out of the war effort.” 
However, due to its relatively narrow focus on the short-term trends and prospects, 
this SNIE was not designed to provide a thorough analysis of the causes of those 
deteriorations.66 
     During the following month, as mentioned earlier, the intelligence panel of 
the NSC Working Group did identify some of the main problems in South Vietnam 
(including the “political disarray” of the GVN, the NLF’s “highly developed 
intelligence systems,” its “ability to recruit locally,” and “the fact that the VC 
enjoys some status as a nationalist movement”), suggesting that, since the basic 
elements of the NLF’ strength remained indigenous, “even under the best of 
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circumstances…reversal of present military trends will be extremely difficult.”67 
This implied that air strikes against North Vietnam would not make a decisive 
impact on the conflict in the RVN.  
     The panel’s warning came too late, however, and appeared to be too 
confusing for senior policymakers to reconsider their basic assumptions. Even Ray 
Cline (the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence) could not understand the 
complexity of the conflict in the RVN and continued to support military action 
against the DRV. In his memo for DCI McCone on 27 November written in 
“desperation of Thanksgiving Day,” Cline argued that “Out of the fog of medieval 
scholasticism surrounding many months of discussion of Vietnam, a few simple 
propositions seem to me to emerge as true. Most of the other subtle distinctions and 
arguments I have heard do not seem to me to affect the US course of action.” He 
maintained that U.S. action against the North would damage the will and capability 
of the NLS and boost the morale of the friendly forces. Those changes, Cline 
hoped, would allow the GVN to “improve the security situation in SVN, to 
gradually contain and eventually destroy the VC as an effective insurgent force, 
and to establish a stable, friendly government.” 68 Clearly, this was a scenario that 
analysts in his own organisation implied was questionable. Yet, given the dearth of 
reliable intelligence on some of the key factors in the counterinsurgency discussed 
earlier – including the morale of the South Vietnamese forces, the reason for 
peasants’ apathy toward the central government, and the driving forces behind 
insurgency – and the absence of a robust NIE in 1964, it is hardly surprising that 
the intelligence panel’s list of indigenous problems in November had little effect on 
the view of those who had already been convinced that action against the North 
was the most effective way to turn the tide of the conflict in the RVN. 
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North Vietnam: Intentions, Capabilities and Probable Response, 1964 
 
The case for escalation was also based on the assumption that air strikes could 
force the DRV to cease its support for the NLF. At worst, it was assumed, 
Washington could start negotiating with the DRV from the position of strength (as 
against what proved to be the reality of plunging into a major war on the Asian 
Continent due partly to difficulties in bringing the North Vietnamese leaders to the 
negotiating table).1  
     Intelligence on North Vietnam in 1964 had mixed implications for this side 
of calculations in Vietnam policy. On the one hand, the intelligence community 
could show that general trends in the DRV – in terms of politics, economy, internal 
security and military capabilities – and in the DRV’s relations with China and the 
USSR made it difficult for the United States to change the policy of the North 
Vietnamese government through the use of military force. On the other hand, 
however, some aspects of the DRV, China and the USSR – their intentions in 
particular – remained highly uncertain, leaving some room for wishful thinking on 
the part of policymakers. Moreover, the intelligence estimates on the probable 
consequences of air strikes (SNIE 50-2-64 in April and SNIE 10-3-64 in 
September) not only failed to considered the worst case scenario that actually 
unfurled after February 1965 but also predicted that aerial campaign would result 
in Hanoi accepting at least a temporary suspension of its support for the NLF.    
     The way in which those intelligence estimates failed suggests that the policy 
preference in Washington, which was learning towards escalations in mid-1964, 
had a distorting effect on intelligence estimates by narrowing down the range of 
scenarios discussed by analysts. In addition, the intelligence estimates on North 
Vietnam in 1964 also underlines the fundamental technical limitations of gauging 
the intentions of a secretive regime and predicting policy outcomes in a dynamic 
international environment.  
 
1. Lack of information 
 
Available information on the DRV was limited in both quality and quantity. In 
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1964 there appeared to be few, if any, American observers inside the DRV due to 
the lack of diplomatic ties between Hanoi and Washington and the ban on U.S. 
citizens’ travel to the country.2 Although some states in the Western bloc – 
including France, Britain and Canada – had small delegations in Hanoi, reports 
coming through these channels rarely contained strategically significant 
information.3 “Since the communist takeover of North Vietnam in 1954–55,” the 
CIA pointed out in 1964, “few official non-Communist personnel or journalists 
have been in the area, and their movements within the country have been greatly 
restricted.”4  Attempts to infiltrate South Vietnamese agents into the DRV – 
initially launched by the CIA in 1961 and transferred to the Studies and 
Observation Group (SOG) of the MACV in early 1964 – became, as Richard 
Shultz puts it, “a catastrophe of substantial proportions.” Virtually all of about 500 
agents sent to the North between 1961 and 1967 are believed to be either killed, 
captured or turned into double agents soon after their arrival.5 U-2 flights over 
North Vietnam, which started in January 1961, were considerably more successful. 
Yet the aerial images they provided were largely confined to topography, 
transportation networks and large-scale military facilities.6 As a result, Washington 
had to rely extensively on Hanoi’s official publication and broadcasts, such as the 
Communist Party’s daily newspaper Nanh Dan and the elite journal Hoc Tap. 
While those open sources offered a valuable window to the country’s internal 
affairs and the perceptions of the Communist Party, they were regularly distorted 
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for propaganda purposes and covered only a limited range of subjects.7 
     This lack of reliable information was recognised by the intelligence 
community. The unusual “Note” at the beginning of SNIE “The Outlook for North 
Vietnam” (4 March 1964) warned the reader: “Firm information about North 
Vietnam is extremely sparse. Accordingly, analysis of economic and political 
situation and especially of the size, structure, and capabilities of the armed forces is 
extremely difficult, and the judgments below must be considered tentative.”8 Four 
months later, the problem was discussed in more detail in the “Comments on 
Principal Sources” section at the end (p. 65) of the National Intelligence Survey 
“North Vietnam” (July 1964). It stated that “Available information on North 
Vietnam is generally reliable in the transportation, telecommunication, and military 
geographic fields, although there are a number of deficiencies. Data on the armed 
forces and on sociological and political topics are very limited and difficult to 
evaluate qualitatively. Economic data vary in both reliability and quantity.”9 The 
central challenge for analysts, therefore, was to exploit limited data to narrow the 
range of possibilities and draw sound conclusions, while also communicating 
uncertainty to policymakers. 
 
2. Unfavourable trends 
 
The intelligence community could at least identify key developments – in regard to 
politics, economy, internal security, military capabilities and external relations – 
pertinent to the intentions and capabilities of the DRV.  
     Politics was one of the most difficult subjects for the intelligence community 
because of the lack of information on the North Vietnamese politburo and the 
difficulty of analysing the character and thinking of leading figures in the 
Communist Party.10 Historians have long been debated whether Ho Chi Minh was 
essentially communist or nationalist.11 The CIA did not agonise over this question: 
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it simply observed that “The Party is led to a large extent by highly nationalistic 
Marxist-Leninists who founded the Indochinese Communist Party in the 
1930s…The leaders of the Lao Dong Party are dedicated Communists who believe 
that Vietnamese national aspirations can be furthered most effectively by close 
alliance with other Communist states.” 12  Rather, the Agency seemed more 
interested in the diversity of opinion and the occasionally intense power struggle 
among the ruling elites. Although the unchallenged status of Ho Chi Minh, then in 
his mid-seventies, provided a façade of unity and stability, the party hierarchy was 
thought to contain multiple sources of conflict. This included “personal rivalries 
(like the 1950 dispute between Vo Nguyen Giap and Truoing Chinh)…regional 
origins (in which northerners oppose southerners), [and] policy orientation (in 
which the moderates oppose the extremists and the pro-Chinese oppose the 
pro-Soviets).”13 This raised the possibility of political instability after the death or 
retirement of Ho Chi Minh. “Ho has successfully kept these rival groups under 
control,” SNIE 14.3-64 (March 1964) pointed out, “but when he leaves the scene 
these rivalries are almost certain to create serious difficulties within the Party and 
perhaps instability within the country…the succession is unlikely to be smooth and 
might be violent.”14 Of more immediate importance, however, was the growing 
prominence of the pro-Chinese hard-liners (including Le Duan, Truong Chinh and 
Nguyen Chi Thanh) at the expense of relatively moderate pragmatists (such as 
General Giap and Pham Van Dong),15 which was discussed in the CIA’s Special 
Report “Extremist Influence in North Vietnamese Party” (8 November 1963).16  
     The North Vietnamese economy seemed easier and more straightforward to 
analyse due to its relatively quantifiable nature and the greater availability of 
information. It was clear that despite rapid growth since the late 1950s the DRV 
had “largely an agrarian economy with only a small industrial sector.” Data 
suggested that the per capita GNP in 1963 stood at about $75, which was “among 
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the lowest in the world.” It was estimated that about 76% of the labour force was 
engaged in agriculture compared to less than 10% in industry, and that 80% of the 
industrial work force was producing handicrafts.17 While the expansion of heavy 
industry was a primary objective of the Five-Year Plan (1961–1965), the sector had 
failed to establish itself as a driving force for economic development.18 “North 
Vietnam is far from being an economical producer of these industrial goods,” the 
CIA concluded in October 1964, “the economy is paying a heavy cost for the 
prestige of producing these ‘symbols’ of economic development and advanced 
technology.”19 The faltering process of industrialisation under the Five-Year Plan 
was due in part to the severe agricultural shortfalls between 1960 and 1963. “This 
will mean,” the Agency explained in mid-1963, “a continuation of the tight food 
situation – near the subsistence level – which has prevailed for several years.”20 
The poor harvest in the early 1960s and the rudimentary state of its industry made 
the North Vietnamese economy dependent upon foreign aid from other communist 
countries. Such assistance was estimated to be more than $956 million from 1955 
through 1963, of which Communist China contributed about 48% and the USSR 
about 39 %.21 
     The chronic economic hardship pointed to the possibility of internal security 
problems. Armed resistance against the communist regime or its policies was not 
uncommon in the 1950s. “One of the most spectacular outbreaks of dissidence,” 
the CIA noted, “occurred in 1956 in a largely Catholic area of Nghe An Province 
where the peasants revolted against land reform extremes.” In contrast, the food 
shortage in the early 1960s showed little sign of inviting “anything other than 
isolated acts of reprisal against government procurement policies.” By then the 
potential for dissidence among the 700,000–800,000 Catholics and the two million 
or so members of non-Vietnamese ethnic minorities had been significantly 
curtailed. At the same time the regime had intensified its efforts to “reach and 
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control virtually every North Vietnamese citizen” through a combination of 
measures, including a massive internal security apparatus, a network of informers, 
strict control over popular movement and compulsory membership in mass 
organisations. On top of this, the start of covert U.S. sabotage operations (OPLAN 
34A) in late 1963 reportedly prompted the DRV to expand its local militias and 
neighbourhood security organisations. While those steps seemed “primarily 
designed to bolster defense against external attack,” as the Agency observed, “they 
also resulted in tightened control over the local population.” This process was 
probably facilitated by U.S. air strikes against the DRV on 6 August 1964 
following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which, according to a CIA report, 
engendered an “outburst of patriotism” among the North Vietnamese population. 
By late 1964, all these developments led the Agency to conclude that “there 
appears to be little prospect of any significant internal dissidence or any successful 
program of subversion directed from abroad in the predictable future.”22 
     Nor was the North Vietnamese military – the People’s Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) – an easy target despite the huge military imbalance in favour of the 
United States. Firstly, intelligence suggested that the PAVN’s capability was based 
upon its army, which had an estimated strength of about 215,000 men (with a 
backup of a 500,000-strong militia or trained reserve) compared to 2,500 for the 
navy and 500 for the air force.23 While the navy remained “primarily a coastal 
defense capability” and the air force was still “in the initial stage of 
development,”24 the army had steadily built up its strength since the mid-1940s. 
“Equipped with modern conventional weapons,” the DIA concluded, “the army is 
the most experienced and effective fighting force native to southeast Asia.” This 
suggests that fighting the ground forces would be crucial but costly for any serious 
effort by the Pentagon to destroy the PAVN. Secondly, U.S. intelligence on the 
PAVN – except for its large-scale military installations and infrastructure25 – 
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remained weak and outdated. “Information on many aspects of the North 
Vietnamese armed forces is lacking and available information is often vague,” the 
CIA admitted in 1964, “Since the end of the war in Indochina in 1954…there has 
been a drastic decrease in intelligence collection capabilities. Conclusions, 
therefore, are based on knowledge acquired during 1946–54, modified by 
comparatively little subsequent information.” 26  Finally, there was a marked 
improvement in the PAVN’s air defence capability from mid-1964 to 1965. Until 
early 1964, the PAVN was thought to have no combat aircraft and no robust 
anti-aircraft capability, nor an effective air control and warning system.27 As the 
CIA predicted in late 196328 and confirmed shortly thereafter, North Vietnam 
made a successful effort to mitigate this weakness through support from China and 
the USSR. The agreement between Beijing and Hanoi in July 1964 appeared to 
accelerate the reinforcement of the air force in southern China, which could be 
used to provide air defence for the Hanoi-Haiphong area.29 Then, negotiations 
with the USSR in late 1964 led to the deployment of Soviet surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs) to the DRV in 1965, which, according to the DRV’s official figures, were 
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to shoot down 834 U.S. airplanes in 1965.30 
     The support from China and the USSR – in the areas of the economy, 
military and diplomacy – appeared increasingly solid and irreversible, particularly 
in the context of the rising tension between China and the USSR since the late 
1950s (the Sino-Soviet split).31 It was already clear in the early 1960s that, with 
Hanoi remaining more or less neutral and Beijing and Moscow each trying to 
present itself as the champion of “national liberation movements,” the Sino-Soviet 
tension was working for North Vietnamese interests. “The dispute between the 
USSR and Communist China has benefited North Vietnam by encouraging a 
greater display of concern for its economic well being on the part of the 
disputants,” the CIA judged in March 1961.32 Almost a year later, the same 
conclusion was repeated in a more detailed, chronological survey of the subject.33 
The situation became less predictable in mid-1963 when the DRV abandoned its 
neutral position and began to support China on most of the major issues in the 
ideological struggle between Beijing and Moscow. Even then, however, it was 
evident that the USSR was reluctant to criticise the DRV and that the DRV, for its 
part, remained shrewd enough to maintain its ties with the USSR.34 This prudence 
on the part of the DRV paid dividends in late 1964 when the new leaders in the 
Kremlin – Leonid Brezhnev (the General Secretary of the Communist Party) and 
Alexei Kosygin (the Premier of the Soviet Union) – decided to commit their 
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country firmly to the defence of the DRV. Hanoi’s positive response to the new 
Soviet policy was confirmed in November 1964 when its delegations visited 
Moscow and the event was loudly celebrated in both the Soviet and the North 
Vietnamese media. In early February 1965, Kosygin made a return visit to Hanoi, 
confirming what the CIA called a “basic Soviet decision to contest the spread of 
Chinese Communist influence in the Far East.”35  
     From these trends and developments together with the NLF’s success below 
the 17th parallel, it was possible to infer that the DRV would not easily abandon its 
hard-line policy toward the conflict and its aspiration for national reunification. 
The knowledge about the insignificance of the industrial sector in the North 
Vietnamese economy, in particular, could bring into question Walt Rostow’s 
argument – based on his “modernization theory” – that air strikes against its 
industrial facilities could force the DRV to stop its support for the NLF because 
Hanoi would be keen to defend its economic development. 36  Furthermore, 
intelligence on the strengths of the North Vietnamese military indicated that the 
JCS argument in November 1964 in favour of air strikes (as well as the Chiefs’ 
contingency plan CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64, which included a “grand attack 
northward to seize, liberate and occupy North Vietnam”37) underestimated the 





At the same time, there remained elements of uncertainty and sources of optimism 
regarding the outcomes of military action against the DRV. First of all, some of the 
developments mentioned earlier (including the improvement of the PAVN’s air 
defence and the rapprochement between the DRV and the USSR) could not be 
confirmed until late 1964. This means that policy inquiries during mid-1964 into 
the probable consequences of air strikes against North Vietnam, which shaped the 
policy debates during the rest of 1964, were based on an assessment more 
favourable than the above analysis indicates. In addition, the real implications of 
some developments remained uncertain until the war actually broke out. (For 
instance, while the increase in the number of fighter jets in southern China and the 
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DRV could be confirmed, the quality of their pilots remained difficult to 
estimate.38)  
     Secondly, intelligence materials also mentioned the weaknesses of the DRV 
and the advantages for the United States. Of particular importance here was the 
fact that, according to the CIA, the DRV’s main armaments (heavy firepower, 
transportation facilities and other standardised equipment) were almost entirely 
supplied by Communist China and the USSR, rather than manufactured within the 
DRV. (North Vietnam could produce relatively simple weapons, such as mortars, 
grenades, mines and small arms.) This could have been seen as a problem for 
Washington, as U.S. attacks against the arsenal within the DRV would be less 
damaging to the PAVN. However, the CIA judged this as a major problem for the 
DRV, arguing that “North Vietnam’s major military weaknesses derive, directly or 
indirectly, from its deficient technological and industrial base…we do not believe 
that Hanoi could sustain a large-scale military undertaking for any considerable 
length of time without substantial continuing assistance from external sources.”39   
     Thirdly, the absence of reliable informers within, and the conflicting signals 
from, Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow, kept Washington speculating on their exact 
intentions. Intelligence products on Beijing and Moscow repeatedly argued that, 
contrary to the belligerent tone of their public statements, the leaders of these two 
countries were keen to avoid a direct U.S. intervention in the Vietnam conflict. 
“Despite their propaganda commitment to militancy,” the CIA noted in 1963, “the 
Chinese have shown considerable caution where the risks of US involvement are 
high.”40 While this kind of optimistic comment on China became rare in 1964, the 
CIA continued to predict well into late 1964 that, while warning Washington 
against a further escalation, Moscow would indicate to Beijing and Hanoi that “in 
any enlarged confrontation the USSR might publicly side against them, as in the 
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4. Probable consequences of air strikes 
 
It was partly due to these uncertainties that the estimative materials in 1964 did not 
clearly challenge the case for air strikes against the DRV, even though some 
analysts had doubt about escalation when Rostow began to advocate that option.42 
In 1964, the intelligence community produced two national estimates on the 
probable consequences of military actions: SNIE 50-2-64 “Probable Consequences 
of Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos” (25 May 1964)43 which 
was “requested by the State Department…apparently on a rush basis only a few 
days before the actual publication date” 44 ; and SNIE 10-3-64 “Probable 
Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US/GVN Courses of Actions” (9 
October 1964)45 which was possibly based on a CIA memo circulated in late July 
1964.46  
     Despite some differences, each of those documents presented a similar set of 
arguments with regard to the probable consequences of gradually intensifying 
attacks by the United States and the GVN against the DRV. They predicted, firstly, 
that the initial responses of the DRV would be to attempt to dissuade the United 
States through a combination of moves (such as some concessions to U.S. demands, 
attempts to mobilize world opinion against U.S. policy, actions designed to 
underline its determination, and instructions to the Southern insurgents to refrain 
from dramatic new attacks). Secondly, if those initial attempts failed and the 
United States continued to attack the DRV, there was a substantial danger that 
Hanoi would embark on all-out attacks on the RVN in the hope of bringing down 
the Saigon regime. In this case, China would not want to become involved in the 
conflict (though it might use its air force to defend the DRV). The USSR would be 
“increasingly concerned to bring an end to the crisis…would probably make plain 
to Hanoi and Peiping that they could look for no substantial Soviet support…[and] 
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would seek to augment international pressures on the US to bring it to the 
conference table.” Thirdly, however, the most likely response of Hanoi to 
continuing air strikes by the United States was to order the NLF to stop its military 
attacks for the time being and to press for a negotiated ceasefire in the RVN in an 
attempt to avoid the destruction of its military facilities and industrial sector. (In 
the second SNIE in October, the INR disagreed with this judgement, arguing that 
the former scenario, i.e. the intensification of Viet Cong attacks, was more likely.)47 
     What those estimates failed to examine was the worst case scenario which 
actually unfolded after February 1965: that the DRV and the NLF intensified 
infiltration and attacks against the RVN; that Washington could not find a 
diplomatic route out of the crisis; and that the deteriorating situation in the RVN 
would increase the pressure on the U.S. government to introduce its ground troops 
to save the GVN. 
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Choosing Air Strikes, April 1964 - February 1965 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Vietnam policy had already been steered toward 
escalation in early 1964 when policymakers rejected a re-examination of strategy 
in the RVN, accepted the domino theory as a official policy (and thereby ruling out 
withdrawal), and began to see external support for the NLF as the main problem 
for the GVN. The last three chapters have also shown that the intelligence 
community either endorsed, or failed to present a clear challenge to, the three key 
assumptions underlying the case for air strikes: that a loss of Vietnam would led to 
a domino-like spread of the communist influence in Southeast Asia (Chapter 5); 
that a significant reduction in infiltration and improvement in morale in friendly 
forces could turn the tide of the conflict in the RVN (Chapter 6); and that air strikes 
would either lead the DRV to cease infiltration or at least allow the United States to 
start negotiations with Hanoi from a position of strength (Chapter 6).   
     It was against this backdrop that between April and October 1964 a growing 
number of policymakers came to support air strikes against the DRV despite some 
officers in the State Department and the CIA remaining sceptical of the proposal. 
The interdepartmental Working Group in November 1964 exposed, but did not 
reconcile, disagreements on most of the key issues, including the situation in South 
Vietnam, the importance of the RVN for the U.S. national security, and the 
probable results of three key policy options. The uncertainty over, and the 
opposition against, escalation remained from December 1964 to January 1965, but 
the government eventually decided to start a military campaign against North 
Vietnam in early February 1965.  
     Throughout the policy debates of 1964 to early 1965, it was the non-factual 
elements in Vietnam policy – including the domino metaphor, Rostow’s 
“modernization theory,” and the belief that bold action by the United States could 
have a positive, catalytic effect on the counterinsurgency – that pushed the United 
States towards escalation. At the same time, however, the absence of robust 
fact-based assessments of the complex reality in Vietnam and surrounding areas at 
least facilitated the relatively simplistic ideas to dominate Vietnam policy in 1964.  
 
1. Escalation: supporters and sceptics (April - October 1964) 
 
During mid-1964, the main issue for the inter-departmental policy discussions was 
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the possibility of taking action against the DRV. This was the main subject of the 
Sullivan committee (March – April),1 two war games (SIGMA I-64 in April and 
SIGMA II-64 in September)2  and two SNIE (May and October) mentioned 
earlier.3 Although President Johnson made clear that he was not going to escalate 
the U.S. commitment during the presidential campaign, support for air strikes 
spread among senior policymakers. Already in November 1963, Ambassador 
Lodge had already suggested that the threat of air strikes (rather than actual 
military action) could force the DRV to stop its support for the Viet Cong,4 and in 
January 1964 Walt Rostow began to call for “a direct political-military showdown 
with Hanoi.”5 By mid-1964, the JCS had decided to back military intervention 
despite the reservations of the Army and the Navy.6 John McCone was not as 
enthusiastic, but apparently supported some form of intervention, telling the 
President in May that “If we go into North Vietnam, we should go in hard and not 
limit our action to pin pricks.”7 The possibility of a congressional resolution in 
support of action against the DRV was also discussed from May onward,8 leading 
to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964.9 John McNaughton, William 
Bundy and John Mendenhall began to develop new, detailed scenarios for U.S. 
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intervention during the autumn of 1964.10   
     There were at least two major cross-currents to this central development. 
Firstly, Edward Lansdale (a leading expert on unconventional warfare who in 
mid-1964 was wasting his talents as Richard Reuter’s assistant in the Food for 
Peace Program) and officers in the CIA’s Directorate of Plans were trying to show 
that the best way to improve the situation was through a radically different strategy 
within South Vietnam, placing more emphasis on the political and psychological 
dimensions. Lansdale’s memo “A Catalyst Team for Vietnam” (June 1964) and his 
article in Foreign Affairs, “Do We Understand Revolution?” (October 1964), 
proposed a less conventional approach to counterinsurgency, similar to the one that 
he used in the Philippines and South Vietnam in the 1940s and the 1950s.11 
Lansdale’s proposals had limited influence in the administration, as he stayed 
outside the Vietnam policy circle and, as Forrestal observed, he was not “well 
regarded at the highest levels of the Pentagon or of the CIA.”12 Nevertheless, 
Lansdale’s view carried some weight in the CIA’s operational branch (Directorate 
of Plans). Referring to Lansdale’s works, an officer (whom William Colby called 
an “angry young man” to protect his identity) tried to show in October that the 
counterinsurgency could be improved by more imaginative, unconventional 
methods, centred upon an effort to influence the young, revolutionary elements 
among the students, the peasants and the GVN officers. “Through these young 
revolutionists,” he argued, “we must establish a parallel hierarchy, in the same 
sense as the communist leaders who seek to monopolize the revolution.”13  
                                                                        
10 See for example: Memo, McNaughton, “Plan of Action for South Vietnam (2nd draft)” (3 
Sept 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers ,Box 8, Folder 2, #2 & 2a; Memo, McNaughton, “Aims 
and Options in Southeast Asia (1st Draft)” (13 Oct 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 2, 
Folder 6, #35; Memo, Mandenhall, “Scenario for Action in Southeast Asia” (3 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 2, #4; Memo, McNaughton, “Action for South 
Vietnam (1st Draft)” (5 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 2, Folder 6, #34; Memo, W 
Bundy and McNaughton, “Courses of Action in Southeast Asia” (26 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 2, Folder 6, #33. 
11 Memo, Lansdale, “A Catalyst Team for Vietnam” (12 June 1964), JFKL, Thompson 
Papers, Box 24, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, ‘A Catalyst Team for Vietnam’ 
6/12/64”; Edward Lansdale, “Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?” Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 43 (Oct 1964). On 24 December, Lansdale also sent a memo to McGeorge Bundy as “a 
little Christmas remembrance” to express his view that the administration should set aside 
personal issues and permit the return to South Vietnam of “priceless working Americans” 
(such as Lucien Conein, Rufus Phillips and John Vann) who had “rare rapport with the 
Vietnamese but whose help has been denied by fellow Americans.” Memo, Lansdale to M. 
Bundy “Vietnam” (24 Dec 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 11, Folder 5, #201. See also: 
Memo, Forrestal to Bundy, “Senator Humphrey’s Memoranda on South Vietnam” (10 June 
1964), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, General, 
6/64–8/64.” 
12 Memo, Forrestal to Bundy, “Senator Humphrey’s Memoranda on South Vietnam” (10 
June 1964), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, 
General, 6/64–8/64.” 
13 Memo, Colby to Forrestal, “Appraisal of American Posture in Vietnam” (16 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #14 and 14a ; Memo, “Commentary on Special 
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     Secondly, some policymakers in the State Department, notably Robert 
Johnson and George Ball, suggested that the United States needed to consider a 
diplomatic settlement. Deeply sceptical about the Khanh regime and the merits of 
escalation, Johnson told Rostow in July, “We are thus left with two policy 
alternatives, both of which have proven to be the hardest to accept – a negotiated 
solution or direct, substantial U.S. involvement on the ground in Southeast Asia.”14 
Arguably the most comprehensive case against air strikes around that time can be 
found in Ball’s memo on 5 October, which predicted that bombing would not force 
the DRV to give up its support for the NLF, that action against the North would not 
improve the situation in the RVN (and, therefore, would not strengthen the 
bargaining power of the United States), and that Hanoi and Beijing might intensify 
their supports for the NLF, a move which would increase the pressure on the U.S. 
government to introduce its ground troops to save the GVN.15 
 
2. Disagreement in the William Bundy Working Group (November 1964) 
 
In November, these differences in opinions and assumptions came to the surface 
during the policy review by an interdepartmental Working Group, which was set up 
on 1 November (the day before Johnson’s landslide victory in the presidential 
election). This NSC Working Group was chaired by William Bundy (Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) and tasked to “work immediately and 
intensively on a study of future course and alternatives.” Its members (Michael 
Forrestal from the NSC, Marshall Green and Robert Johnson from the State 
Department, John McNaughton and Lloyd Mustin from the Pentagon, and Harold 
Ford from the CIA) were expected to work with other officers within their 
respective organisations, and Ford was also asked to work with George Fowler 
(DIA) and Allen Whiting (INR) on intelligence-related questions as a 
“CIA-DIA-INR intelligence panel.”16 The key issues discussed by the Working 
Group included the stakes of the GVN, the situation in South Vietnam and what 
Bundy thought were the three major policy options available:  
 
A. Continue on present lines,  
B. Present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures 
against the north, meshing at some point with negotiation, but with 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
National Intelligence Estimate 53-2-64” (19 Oct 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, 
Folder 3, #14b. 
14  Memo, Robert Johnson to Rostow, “The Situation in Vietnam and U.S. Policy 
Alternative” (27 July 1964), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, 
Vietnam, General, 6/64–8/64.” 
15 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 349-351. 
16 Memo, Jonathan Moore (3 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 2, #5b. 
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pressure actions to be continued until we achieve our central present 
objectives,  
C. Present policies plus additional forceful measures and military 
moves, followed by negotiations in which we would seek to 
maintain a believable threat of still further military pressures but 
would not actually carry out such pressures to any marked degree 
during the negotiations.17  
 
Several drafts were produced for each section during the following weeks before 
Bundy assembled the final report on 26 November. The report was then discussed 
by senior policymakers, including Ambassador Taylor, at the NSC meeting on 27 
November. The Working Group revealed disagreements on almost all major issues 
but did not change the view of those who supported escalation (Option B or C).  
     With regard to the importance of South Vietnam for the U.S. national 
security, William Bundy and the JCS disagreed on the degree of certainty regarding 
the domino effect in the event of losing the RVN. Bundy did acknowledge the 
serious risks that might arise from the loss of Vietnam. Yet he also recognised the 
uncertainty, pointing out that “there are enough ‘ifs’ and enough possibilities of 
offsetting action in the above analysis so that it cannot be concluded that the loss of 
South Vietnam would soon have the totally crippling effect in Southeast Asia and 
Asia generally.”18  Lloyd Mustin (JCS) disagreed, arguing that Bundy’s draft 
“appears to understate rather substantially the gravity to the United States of the 
possible loss of SVN to the communists” and “appears to overstate rather markedly 
the magnitude, difficulty, and potential risks in measures by the United States to 
prevent that loss.”19   
     As to the situation in South Vietnam, disagreements remained on two key 
questions. The first was the urgency of U.S. action needed to avoid a collapse of 
the war efforts. Gen. Westmoreland (the MACV commander) emphasised some 
signs and further possibilities of improvement on the military side of the 
operation20 and was generally “inclined to wait six months to have a firmer base 
for stronger actions.” 21  In contrast, Ambassador Taylor felt that the U.S. 
government could not “count on the situation holding together that long,” 
                                                                        
17 Direct quotation. Memo, W. Bundy, “Project Outline: Working Group on Courses of 
Action in Southeast Asia” (3 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 2, #5a. 
18 Memo, Mustin “Comment on Part II – US Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia” (10 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #10, 10a. 
19 Memo, Mustin to W. Bundy, “Comment on Part II – US Objectives and Stakes in South 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia” (10 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #10 
and 10a. 
20 Memo, Westmoreland to Taylor, “Assessment of the Military Situation” (24 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 10, Folder 5, #96. 
21 Memo, W. Bundy, “Memorandum of Meeting on Southeast Asia, November 27, 1964” 
(27 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers ,Box 8, Folder 4, #16. 
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suggesting that “we must do something sooner than this.”22 The second question 
was the extent to which military action against the DRV would improve the 
situation in the RVN. The intelligence panel stressed that the key problems were 
largely internal to South Vietnam, implying that the effects of escalations upon the 
war effort in the South were limited. As already discussed at the beginning of 
Chapter 6, the panel insisted that reversal of military trends would be “extremely 
difficult” because basic problems for the GVN were indigenous and difficult to 
mitigate.23 Ambassador Taylor also confessed that, while external actions would 
have some positive effects on the performance and morale of the GVN, he was 
“not sure this would be enough really to improve the situation.”24  In fact, 
according to William Bundy, some of the supporters of Options B and C also 
conceded that “there is some chance that the GVN would come apart under any 
Option.”25 In spite of all this, the possibility of improvement in the RVN remained 
a key justification for taking action against the DRV.26 
     Option A (the continuation of the existing policy line, which consisted 
primarily of efforts within South Vietnam and some covert cross-border actions 
into Laos) was rejected by advocates of escalation (Options B and C) as 
“doomed.”27 However, Robert Johnson and Rufus Phillips of the State Department, 
along with George Carver and William Colby of the CIA, tried to show its 
feasibility and advantages. In response to Robert Johnson’s request for a “free 
think” piece,28 Carver completed a 20-page memo in favour of Option A on 13 
                                                                        
22 Memo, W. Bundy, “Memorandum of Meeting on Southeast Asia, November 27, 1964” 
(27 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #16. See also: Memo, Taylor “The 
Current Situation in South Viet-Nam (probably around 24 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke 
Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #12. 
23 NSC Working Group on Vietnam, “Section I: Intelligence Assessment, the Situation in 
Vietnam” (24 Nov. 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #9. In fact, the JCS tried 
to soften those negative comments, arguing that “a very modest change in the government’s 
favor…may be enough to turn the tide and lead to a successful solution.” Memo, Mustin to 
W Bundy, “Comment on Draft for Part I of Project Outline on Courses of Action in 
Southeast Asia – “The Situation” (10 Nov 64), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 2, #16 
and 16a; Memo, ”Suggested Revisions for Section I, ‘The Situation’” (12 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 2, #25; Memo, Mustin to W Bundy, “Comment on 13 
November 1964 Draft for Section I of Project Outline on Courses of Action in Southeast 
Asia – ‘Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in Vietnam’” (18 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke 
Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #18. 
24 “Memorandum of Meeting on Southeast Asia, November 27, 1964” (27 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #16. 
25 Emphasis in the original, Memo, W. Bundy to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, Ball 
and M Bundy, “Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia” (24 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke 
Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #10. 
26 Memo, W. Bundy, “Summary: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia” (26 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #13.  
27 Memo, W. Bundy to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, Ball and M Bundy, “Issues 
Raised by Papers on Southeast Asia” (24 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 
4, #10. 
28 Memo, Robert Johnson to W. Bundy, “Case for Option A” (18 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
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November.29 This was followed by William Colby’s decision on 16 November to 
circulate the aforementioned memo on 19 October written by the “angry young 
man,” which stressed the possibility of re-launching the counterinsurgency along 
the lines suggested by Lansdale.30 Soon afterward, Robert Johnson circulated his 
own memo “Case for Option A” (18 November),31 and Lansdale’s idea was also 
promoted by Rufus Phillip, who had worked with him in the Philippines.32 Within 
the CIA, the inquiry into Option A continued, and a study by the Directorate of 
Plans on 23 November reached a conclusion similar to Carver’s, suggesting that 
support for Option A within the Agency was not confined to a few individuals.33 
Despite differences in details, those documents share the basic assumption that a 
less conventional strategy could improve the situation more effectively and with far 
less risk than escalation. Nevertheless, their influence within the Working Group 
was limited, and William Bundy’s final draft on 26 November concluded that 
“Option A appears to offer little hope of getting Hanoi out or an independent South 
Vietnam re-established.”34 
     Both Option B and Option C (two types of military actions against the DRV) 
were questioned by the intelligence panel, which judged that air strikes did not 
have a good chance of breaking the will of Hanoi.35 The main debate, though, was 
over the comparative merits of Option B and Option C. The supporters of Option C 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #19; Forwarding memo, Carver to McCone, “The 
Possibilities of an Expanded Option A in South Vietnam” (27 Nov 1964), NA, CREST 
80R01720R000500010004-8. 
29  Draft Memo, Carver, “The Feasibility and Possible Advantages of a Continued 
Concentration on Counterinsurgency (Option A)” (13 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, 
Box 8, Folder 4, #2a. See also: George Carver, “The Real Revolution in South Vietnam,” 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, no. 3 (April 1965), pp. 387-408. 
30 Memo, Colby to Forrestal, “Appraisal of American Posture in Vietnam” (16 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #14 and 14a; Memo, “Commentary on Special 
National Intelligence Estimate 53-2-64” (19 Oct 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, 
Folder 3, #14b. In late January 1965, Colby sent his own view to McGeorge Bundy. He 
stressed the primacy of the political dimension of the counterinsurgency and proposed 
organisational reform to bring all civilian elements in Saigon (AID, USIS, Peace Corps and 
the CIA) under a unified leadership. Memo, Colby, “The Political Weapon for Political 
War,” (29 Jan 1965), LBJL, NSF, Agency File, Box 9, Folder 2, #56 and 56a 
31 Memo, Robert Johnson to W. Bundy, “Case for Option A” (18 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #19.  
32 Memo, Rufus Phillips, “United State Policy Options in Vietnam: A Synopsis” (25 Nov 
1964), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, General, 
9/64–12/64.” 
33 Forwarding memo, Colby to Forrestal (27 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, 
Folder 4, #15; Memo, “Option A Plus” (25 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, 
Folder 4, #15a; Forwarding memo, Carver to McCone, “The Possibilities of an Expanded 
Option A in South Vietnam” (27 Nov 1964), NA, CREST 80R01720R000500010004-8; 
Memo, CIA “The Feasibility and Possible Advantages of a Continued Concentration on 
Counterinsurgency (Option A)” (26 Nov 1964), NA, CREST 80R01720R000500010005-7. 
34 Report, W. Bundy, “Summary: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia” (26 Nov 1964), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #13. 
35 The intelligence panel, as quoted in Ranelagh, CIA, p. 117. 
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(the civilian side of the Pentagon and some part of the State Department) assumed 
that a gradually intensifying aerial campaign would reduce the risk associated with 
military action (such as China’s intervention).36  The advocates of Option B 
(mainly the JCS), in contrast, insisted that “a sharp, forceful attack from the outset” 
was more likely to achieve the objectives “with the least probability of enemy 
miscalculation” and “at the least risk, casualties, and cost” because it would 
“eliminate DRV combat air capability and reduce US losses on subsequent 
operations.”37  
     The Working Group’s final report on 26 November, as William Bundy 
apparently intended at the beginning, generally supported Option C. The whole 
exercise, in the end, failed to unsettle the basic assumptions of the advocates of 
escalation. Nor did it change their reluctance to take seriously the basic, indigenous 
problems for the GVN. As William Bundy duly informed policymakers before the 
NSC meeting on 27 November,38 however, the discussion in the Working Group 
did revealed the lack of clear consensus and the significant level of uncertainty 
surrounding military action. 
 
3. Decision under uncertainty (December 1964 - February 1965) 
 
This general uncertainty, together with the limited understanding of the problems 
in South Vietnam, led the White House to avoid immediate action against the DRV 
and to send a poorly informed policy instruction to the U.S. mission on 3 
December. Ignoring the many problems within South Vietnam identified by the 
intelligence panel, the cable stated that the recent policy review in Washington 
“clearly established” that the unsatisfactory progress in counterinsurgency was “the 
result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stemmed: first, 
the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second, the continued 
reinforcement and direction of the VC by the North Vietnamese Government.” Of 
those two, the cable argued, political stability was of primary importance, since 
there must be an effective government to conduct successful operations against 
                                                                        
36 Memo, W. Bundy, “VII. Analysis of Option C” (13 Nov 64, revised pages 17 Nov 64), 
LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 3, #6; Memo, W. Bundy, “Summary: Courses of 
Action in Southeast Asia” (26 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #13. 
37 Memo JCS to McNamara, “Courses of Action in Southeast Asia” (23 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #6. 
38 William Bundy informed senior policymakers of some of the key points of disagreement, 
and they were discussed at the NSC meeting on 27 November. Memo, W. Bundy to Rusk, 
McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, Ball and M Bundy, “Issues Raised by Papers on Southeast 
Asia” (24 Nov 1964), LBJL, Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #10; Memo, W. Bundy, 
“Memorandum of Meeting on Southeast Asia, November 27, 1964” (27 Nov 1964), LBJL, 
Warnke Papers, Box 8, Folder 4, #16. 
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insurgents even after the end of infiltration. Therefore Washington should not 
expand its operations and commitment until it was sure that the GVN was capable 
of exploiting the favourable conditions anticipated from such action. Based on 
those arguments, the cable asked the Embassy to encourage the GVN to 
demonstrate its ability to conduct its projects by making tangible progress in 
certain areas (such as the replacement of incompetent commanders, the 
strengthening of provincial chiefs’ authority and measurable progress in the Hop 
Tac operation around Saigon).39  
     The situation in South Vietnam, however, deteriorated further during 
December and January. The NLF continued to expand its military operations, 
overrunning an ARVN battalion command post near Da Nang in December and 
mounting a large-scale attack against an ARVN post at Binh Gia over the new year. 
“[T]he Binh Gia engagement,” the JCS analysed, “departs from the usual Viet 
Cong pattern, in that this force appears in regimental strength…and has chosen to 
remain in the general area and fight over a relatively long period of time.”40  
     Meanwhile, South Vietnamese politics once again became unstable in late 
December when some of the “Young Turk” generals arrested members of the 
civilian High National Council (HNC) and replaced the HNC with an Armed 
Forces Council. This action increased the tension between the GVN and 
Ambassador Taylor, who opposed the move in a rather rude manner that infuriated 
many of the general officers.41 Gen. Khanh’s public criticism of what he called the 
U.S. government’s undue interference in South Vietnamese politics prompted the 
NLF to send a letter to Khanh, praising his “determined declaration against 
American intervention” and inviting him to “join together and coordinate our 
efforts to accomplish our supreme mission, which is, to save our homeland.”42 
This was followed by a “quiet coup” on 27 January, in which Khanh ousted Chief 
of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong.43 All this led McGeorge Bundy to tell the 
Ambassador on 2 February that “I think we should give a bit of thought to the 
contingency of a fast deterioration involving a US withdrawal and/or a GVN-DRV 
                                                                        
39 Memo, “Instructions from the President to Ambassador Taylor as approved by the 
President, Dec 3 1964” (3 Dec 1964), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 11, Folder 1, #160a. 
40 Memo, JCS, “Binh Gia Engagements, 28 December–4 January” (5 Jan 1965), LBJL, 
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42 Letter, Huynh Tan Phat (Vice-President of the Central Committee of the NLF) to Khanh 
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43 Memo, INR, “The Situation in South Vietnam: the Quiet Coup” (27 Jan 1965), JFKL, 
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negotiated settlement.”44 
     In late 1964 and early 1965, some U.S. intellectuals also warned against an 
escalation, even though the majority of the U.S. public and most on Capitol Hill 
remained either supportive or “not sure” of action against the DRV.45 A letter to 
President Johnson in late 1964 (“We, 5,000 American College and University 
Educators, Urge a Neutralized Vietnam”), for example, indicated the growing 
discontent in academia, portending the rise of anti-war activism in universities in 
mid-1965.46 In his reply to William Bundy’s letter in January, Marcus Raskin 
(Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Studies) also criticised what he saw as 
Bundy’s “either-or dead or red” view of world politics that “distorts the actual 
relationships of the various groups in [Southeast Asia].” He added that Bundy’s 
“apocalyptic view” was a hindrance to sophisticated foreign policy, which required 
diplomatic skill and prowess, and that his “misguided passion…obscures, rather 
than illuminates our interest in southeast Asia.”47 Arguably the most powerful case 
against direct intervention around that time was Senator Frank Church‘s interview 
with the leftist magazine Ramparts (January–February 1965) published in 
December, in which he pointed out: “If we move in and take over in an effort to 
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thwart the impending success of a Communist insurrection, the Asian 
peoples…will come at once to regard the war as one between a white western force 
on the one hand, and indigenous Asian forces on the other. And there is no way for 
us to win such a war on the Asian continent.”48 
     By January, however, the main focus of the Vietnam policy community had 
shifted toward a final preparation for military campaign. The State Department, 
with the CIA’s help, produced a White Paper on North Vietnam’s support for 
southern insurgents (“Aggression from the North”),49 while the Pentagon was 
making final adjustments to its operational plan. A “harassed and harried” meeting 
of senior policymakers on 21 January, according to Chester Cooper, focused 
entirely on practical details (such as evacuation of the Americans, release of data 
about infiltration and press guidance), and ended in just about 11 minutes “without 
time for thoughtful discussion.”50  
     It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and lack of serious policy debate in 
Washington that McGeorge Bundy visited South Vietnam in early February 1964. 
His meeting with the U.S. mission on 5 February led to a conclusion in favour of 
sustained aerial campaigns against the DRV. The next day (6 February), insurgents 
attacked the U.S. base at Pleiku killing eight and wounding more than a hundred 
U.S. servicemen. Bundy saw this incident as a valid justification to start a 
“sustained reprisal” against North Vietnam and recommended that policy to the 
President in his cable of 6 February. He argued that while the long-term purpose of 
air strikes was to reduce Hanoi’s will to support insurgents in the RVN, its 
immediate and main objectives were to boost the morale of the GVN and to 
damage that of the enemy forces. He stressed the possibility of a “sharp immediate 
increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups” and “a 
substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres.” (The latter 
prediction was based on “the strong opinion of CIA Saigon.”) At the same time, 
though, Bundy also warned the President that “We cannot assert that a policy of 
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of Present and Past Estimates of VC Infiltration” (3 Dec 1964), all documents in LBJL, 
NSF, CFV, Box 11, Folder 1, #114,, #116, #118, #120, #122, and #124. See also: State 
Department, White Paper, “Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam’s 
Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam” (Feb 1965).  
50 Memo, Cooper to M Bundy, “Recapitulation of Principals Meeting, Jan 21, 1965” (22 
Jan 1965), LBJL, NSF, CFV, Box 12 [2 of 2], Folder 4, #159. 
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sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It 
may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy – they may 
be somewhere between 25% and 75%.”51 The President accepted the proposal, and 
operations against the DRV started on 7 February, marking the beginning of direct 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict (“America’s war”), which was to last 
until 1972.
                                                                        
51 Memo, M Bundy to the President (7 Feb 1964), LBJL, NSF, International Meetings and 






The cost of direct military intervention turned out to be far greater than most senior 
policymakers could possibly imagine in 1965. It has been estimated that by the end 
of the war in 1975 millions of Vietnamese and more than 57,000 U.S. service 
personnel had lost their lives. Several times more were wounded, and around a 
fourth of those served in Vietnam (500,000 to 700,000 Vietnam veterans) suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder.1  
     These legacies cast a long shadow over the historical debates on the Vietnam 
War. Although many historians have examined certain aspects of the conflict 
without making a general judgement on the war itself, the historiography of the 
Vietnam War has been dominated by the disagreement between those who regard 
the war as a mistake and those who depict the same event as an “honourable war” 
fought for a “noble cause.” The historical accounts of Vietnam intelligence show a 
similar tendency of dichotomy. For decades, the “sound but ignored” defence of 
former CIA officers has coexisted with the “not only wrong but also influential” 
line of stricture implied by former senior policymakers.  
     This study suggests that each of these interpretations is a valid – if partial – 
description of Vietnam intelligence in the first half of the 1960s. On the one hand, 
there are some subjects on which the intelligence community provided relatively 
clear and sound assessment. The MACV, for example, kept a detailed record of the 
number and form of enemy attacks across the RVN. This allowed the U.S. and the 
GVN to follow the changing pattern of enemy activities on the military front, if not 
the political one. The CIA’s assessments of political manoeuvre and coup plots 
within the South Vietnamese government during the political crises in 1963 and 
1964 (though not the parallel developments in public demonstrations) appear to be 
well informed and analytically astute. The intelligence community also skilfully 
exploited limited information to extrapolate many of the key trends in North 
Vietnam (in terms of its economy, internal security, military capability and 
domestic politics), even though the analysis of Hanoi’s intentions remained highly 
speculative. In general, intelligence tended to be strong on subjects on which 
information was extensively available (notably the politics within the GVN, with 
which the U.S. mission had numerous contact points) and/or with which the U.S. 
intelligence community had already developed expertise elsewhere (conventional 
                                                                        
1 Stanley Kutler ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1996), pp. 103-105, 442.  
 147 
military statistics that were used during the Second World War and the Korean War, 
and the analysis of North Vietnamese capabilities that had similarities with the 
Soviet estimates).      
     In addition, there were four occasions between December 1961 and February 
1965 when intelligence highlighted, if not rigorously analysed, some of the key 
weaknesses of the GVN/U.S. policy, suggesting that the insurgency was far more 
difficult to contain than had been widely assumed. The first such occasion was in 
early summer 1962 when almost all major channels reported basic problems in the 
GVN/U.S. war efforts. The second occasion arose in early 1963, when the CIA’s 
Office of National Estimates and the INR tried to convince policymakers that the 
counterinsurgency was not going well especially on the socio-political front. The 
third wave of critical assessments appeared in December 1963 to February 1964 
when, after the overthrow of the Diem regime, Washington accepted the negative 
trend and many problems were once again made clear to policymakers. In 
November 1964, finally, the intelligence panel of the NSC Working Group stressed 
that “Even under the best of circumstances…reversal of present military trends will 
be extremely difficult” and that “The basic elements of Communist strength in 
South Vietnam remain indigenous.”  
     On the other hand, however, intelligence assessments remained relatively 
weak in at least three important respects. First, there were many analytical gaps and 
flaws across diverse subjects, especially on human-related aspects of the 
counterinsurgency. As to the strengths and weaknesses of the GVN, there appears 
to have been no robust reporting/analytical system on administrative problems, the 
competence and morale of soldiers, or the enemy penetration of the ARVN, even 
though some of those problems were mentioned in various documents. Most 
aspects of the NLF (including its organisational structure, political operations and 
logistic activities) also remained a major gap in analysis. So did the reason why a 
large number of South Vietnamese had joined the NLF and why the Front could 
maintain high morale among its members. This also points to the general absence 
of studies on the attitudes of the rural population (except for a few reports in 
mid-1962 that shed some light on socio-cultural sources of their apathy toward the 
government). Those weaknesses indicate that, while the Pentagon’s Order of Battle 
statistics have been the main target of criticism (especially by former CIA 
analysts2), more significant weaknesses lie in the non-military side of intelligence 
assessments, for which the civilian intelligence agencies were also responsible.   
     The second major weakness lay in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 
                                                                        
2 Adams, War of Numbers; Allen, None So Blind. 
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general, which was expected to provide the intelligence-community-wide analysis 
of the broad picture of the conflict and possible policy outcomes. With the 
exception of those on North Vietnamese capabilities, the estimative products were 
not available when they were most needed or fell short of providing a thorough and 
sound assessment. On the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, the intelligence 
community published no NIE in 1962, and two (S)NIEs on that subject that came 
out in 1963 and 1964 had certain flaws and limitations: NIE 53-63 (April 1963) 
accepted the optimistic view of the Pentagon rather than the critical judgement of 
the CIA/ONE expressed in the original drafts; and SNIE 53-2-64 (October 1964) 
was limited in scope, focusing largely on the short-term prospects of the GVN. As 
to the probable consequences of a military coup in 1963, SNIE 53-3-63 (June 
1963) confirmed the State Department’s argument for a regime change and failed to 
fully recognize the risk of removing the Ngo family in the middle of the fight 
against the insurgency. Two SNIEs on the likely results of air strikes published in 
1964 (SNIE 50-2-64 in May and SNIE 10-3-64 in October) also contained a certain 
amount of wishful thinking with regard to North Vietnamese intentions and 
probable response. 
     The third, and arguably the most significant, problem with Vietnam 
intelligence was the overall analytical biases in favour of Washington’s justification 
for its Vietnam policy (that is, the arguments that the United States was defending 
the freedom of the South Vietnamese people against “aggression from the North,”3 
and that the defence of the GVN was necessary for the United States’ own national 
security). In tune with those claims, analysts failed to emphasise the fact that the 
NLF was gaining strength from South Vietnamese nationalist sentiment as well as 
from the people’s anger at what they saw as the GVN’s mistreatment of its people. 
Furthermore, CIA documents in 1964 reinforced, rather than questioned, the 
domino theory by focusing upon threats in Southeast Asia and the possible negative 
consequences of losing the GVN rather than uncertainty and factors favourable to 
the United States.  
     Those weaknesses played an important role in the failure to contain the 
insurgency during the first half of the 1960s and the decision for direct military 
intervention in 1965. The lack of thorough and robust analysis of the conflict in 
South Vietnam (especially its qualitative, politico-psychological dimension) made 
it difficult for Washington to develop the carefully coordinated socio-political 
projects necessary to win the hearts and minds of the rural community. The same 
deficiencies lay behind the repeated attempts to reverse the tide of the conflict 
                                                                        
3 State Department, White Paper, “Aggression from the North: The Record of North 
Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam” (Feb 1965). 
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through simple policy initiatives (notably the rapid expansion of Strategic Hamlets 
and the aggressive use of air strikes in 1962, the overthrow of the Diem regime in 
1963, and the military action against North Vietnam in 1965) without taking 
seriously their limitations and negative consequences. The general biases in 
intelligence products also reinforced policymakers’ beliefs that the United States 
could and should win the conflict, keeping Washington on the course of escalation.   
 
Causes of failure  
The problems outlined above can partly be explained by methodological challenges 
of intelligence analysis. They include what specialists call “tradecraft” issues, such 
as the problem of definition (“insurgent” and “completed Strategic Hamlet” for 
example); the limit of objectively analysing intangible factors (such as the 
competence of South Vietnamese leaders); the analysis of mixed trends and 
complex causal mechanisms (the causes of failing war efforts in particular); and the 
analysis and communication of probabilities and uncertainties in national estimates 
(especially with regard to the probable consequences of a regime change and air 
strikes). The lack of information and knowledge, especially on non-military aspects 
of the counterinsurgency, intensified those basic technical problems of intelligence 
analysis. On top of these, the absence of a clear strategic framework made it 
difficult to discuss the significance of each factor in the conflict and to produce a 
robust intelligence estimate acceptable to the diverse organizations involved in 
Vietnam policy.  
     Organisational aspects – with regards to management, structure, and 
procedure – also affected the quality of intelligence and intelligence-policy 
relations. In this respect, the lack of resources especially on the civilian side of the 
intelligence community remained one of the most basic problems throughout the 
first half of the 1960s. From the start, too, the whole process of intelligence 
production was highly fragmented, another problem that helps explain a shortage 
of intelligence estimates. On top of this, the intelligence-policy relation suffered 
from two contrasting problems. In the process of intelligence production, on the 
one hand, the two spheres lacked a degree of separation necessary for reducing the 
risk of intelligence being politicized. In the use of intelligence, on the other hand, 
the coordination mechanism between the two sides remained ineffective, making it 
hard for analysts to make their products relevant to Vietnam policy, and for 
policymakers to incorporate intelligence into their decision-making. The State 
Department’s contingency planning for a regime change in June 1963 and the early 
part of the policy inquiry in 1964 into the possibility of escalation in particular took 
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place without extensive support from the intelligence community.  
     The distorting effects of personal and political interests (“politicization”) 
operated at various levels. Low-ranking officers, for example, were reluctant to 
challenge the view of their government “for carrier purposes.” Bureaucratic politics 
also had negative effects upon intelligence and intelligence-policy relations, 
particularly in 1963 when a growing tension between the State Department and the 
JCS resulted in one-sided assessments from both parties, epitomised by Krulak and 
Mendehall’s reports to the NSC in September 1963. Less parochial but equally 
detrimental was the political need of the administration to sustain the morale of the 
friendly forces and to justify the U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. 
Those pressures were particularly strong in August 1962, when Nolting advised the 
GVN to “inject a note of hope” to mitigate the war-weariness among the friendly 
forces and to counter the call for a neutralist solution; in September 1963, when 
Kennedy sent McNamara and Taylor to the RVN to “assure Congress that the war 
can be won in a finite period”4; and in March 1964, when Washington was once 
again aware of the growing pressure to consider a diplomatic solution.  
     Those political pressures also point to wider contexts of the U.S. foreign 
policy – or “national security culture” – of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. The apocalyptic “either-or dead or red view of world politics”5 in 
the middle of the Cold War and the domino theory, both of which Kennedy 
inherited from his predecessor, proved to be a hindrance to a sound analysis of the 
conflict and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia. So too was the country’s general 
lack of experience in counterinsurgency. Relatively limited resources and attention 
dedicated to intelligence, together with the administrations’ tendency to dispatch a 
fact-finding mission to Saigon chaired by policymakers rather than to ask for 
objective intelligence support from analysts, might well confirm the suggestion that 
Kennedy and Johnson had relatively little interest and confidence in intelligence in 
general.  
     Apart from the Presidents, the competence, character and personal 
background of senior officers also affected the quality and role of intelligence 
materials. This includes Gen. Harkins’ and Ambassador Nolting’s tendency to 
exaggerate positive developments in their reports to Washington, John McCone’s 
penchant for relying on his own instincts and to agree with the JCS (due possibly to 
his close contact with Gen. Krulak) and McNamara’s faith in statistics (which he 
had developed throughout his career).  
                                                                        
4 Cable, Taylor to Harkins (21 Sept 1963), NA, RG 218, Records of Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 
Box 12, “091 Vietnam (Aug 63–Oct 63).” 
5 Letter, Raskin to W. Bundy (25 Jan 1965), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 25, “Southeast 
Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, General, 1/65–2/65.”  
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     All this suggests that problems in Vietnam intelligence – which originated 
both in the realm of intelligence itself and in the wider policy context – were very 
much structural. Many of the key problems, including organisational flaws, 
political constraints and ideological biases, were quite difficult for analysts and 
policymakers to rectify. Improvement in some areas was possible, but did not 
necessarily change the overall quality of intelligence and intelligence-policy 
relations, as the reform attempts in early 1964 demonstrated.  
 
Intelligence and the historiography of the Vietnam War 
The above findings largely support the orthodox interpretation of the origins of the 
Vietnam War that misperceptions and miscalculations were central to the decision 
to escalate U.S. involvement in 1965. Certainly, it is misleading to say that the U.S. 
government “did not know” the conflict, its allies and its enemies as Gen. Taylor 
claimed: some of the key factors, such as the generally unfavourable trend in South 
Vietnam, and some of the key trends in North Vietnam, had become reasonably 
clear to policymakers by early 1965. However, it is also an exaggeration to argue 
that policymakers in the U.S. government “generally had a sound grasp of the 
situation on the ground in South Vietnam, and the thinking in Hanoi” as Logevall 
suggests.6 Washington’s understanding of the conflict in the South was full of gaps 
and distortions, and to significant extent the intentions of Hanoi, Beijin and 
Moscow remained a matter of speculation.  
     A less decisive answer can be given to the broader question about the rights 
and wrongs of the Vietnam War. The fact that the 1965 decision was based on 
misperceptions and miscalculations does not necessarily mean that the decision 
itself was a mistake. Uncertainty also arises from the “what if” questions 
concerning the possible consequences of other options Washington rejected (such 
as withdrawal, diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia and the concentration on 
counterinsurgency within South Vietnam), which cannot be answered conclusively. 
     What this study can highlight, nonetheless, is the arguments used by the 
White House to justify its decision for direct military intervention in 1965 did not 
fully acknowledge the complexity of the conflict and its international environments. 
First of all, the basic normative claim that Washington was supporting the GVN to 
defend the South Vietnamese people from an “aggression from the North” obscured 
the fact that most of the NLF members and supporters were South Vietnamese 
fighting for their own conception of justice (including national self-determination 
and a proper treatment of the people by their own government).  
                                                                        
6 Fredrik Logevall, “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34 
(2004), pp. 105-106.  
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     Secondly, as to the question of whether the war was winnable, policymakers 
kept overestimating the prospects for victory due partly to their relatively limited 
understanding of the diversity and depth of the problems facing the GVN. They 
were not fully informed of the historically rooted apathy of peasants toward the 
central government, the skill and determination of the NLF, the administrative and 
political problems of the GVN, and the structural weaknesses of the U.S. 
government itself (which includes the intelligence-related problems discussed 
earlier).  
     Thirdly, analytical biases and logical leaps also featured prominently in the 
argument that a war was necessary. The claim about the need to “pay any price and 
bear any burden” to defend the GVN was based on an almost exclusive focus on 
geopolitical threats and the metaphor of the domino, as opposed to the opportunity 
for the Western block and the limits of Communist influence in Southeast Asia. The 
U.S. government, moreover, failed to recognise that, even accepting the need to 
defend the GVN, a massive military intervention was not necessarily the best 
option to achieve that objective. As supporters of Option A tried to clarify in 
November 1964, there were advantages to concentrating on the counterinsurgency 
within South Vietnam with a primary emphasis on socio-political dimensions, 
rather than expanding the scope of military operations into North Vietnam using 
the U.S. forces (which could divert the attention from the non-military projects in 
the RVN and make the U.S. actions look more like those of France during the First 
Indochina War).  
     Those counterpoints indicate that the case for the war – in terms of its moral 
cause, prospects and necessity – was much weaker than most senior policymakers 
apparently believed. This gap between the complex and ambiguous reality of the 
Vietnam conflict and the relatively simple and one-sided view of Washington at 
least helps explain why during the second half of the 1960s, when the gap became 
more obvious, it was increasingly difficult for the U.S. government to maintain 
public support for its massive military operations in Vietnam and why in early 1965 
policymakers could not predict this political outcome. 
 
Intelligence, realism and international security 
Vietnam intelligence in the first half of the 1960s points to the basic limits of a 
shrewd, reality-based foreign policy advocated by Classical Realists during the 
1950s. It underlines various hurdles against some of the key realist prescriptions, 
such as sound and objective analysis, the art of the possible, the political prudence 
to bring non-factual elements in proper relation with the reality, and the 
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anti-totalitarian principle of not claiming the “monopolistic possession of the truth 
about men and society.”7  
     Vietnam shows that objective analysis itself had its limits in the face of a 
dynamic, unpredictable security problem. It also suggests that, in the gap of solid 
analysis of facts and probabilities, non-factual elements in decision-making (such 
as the political need to believe in victory, the distorted image of the enemy, and the 
domino metaphor) could played a dominant role in policymaking, further 
undermining policymakers’ grip of reality. The result of those problems was a 
mixture of cognitive weaknesses – such as distortion, logical leaps, wishful 
thinking, and blindness toward vital details and complexity – and a general 
confusion between reality as it is and a reality one wants or imagines.  
     Compared to a simple case of inaccuracy or miscalculation, this generic form 
of cognitive failing proved much harder to refute or rectify by counter-evidence or 
counter-argument, whether this took the form of warning by intelligence analysts, 
criticism by journalists, critical advice from Senator Mansfield or dissenting 
argument by George Ball.  
     This also helps explain why democratic scrutiny and the Just War paradigm 
could not prevent the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1965. Vietnam was a case in 
which democracy did not work as a bulwark against war, at least not until it was 
too late. In late 1964 and early 1965 the majority of the U.S. public, as did most of 
their representatives on Capital Hill, remained either supporting or “not sure” about 
military action against North Vietnam (see Chapter 8, footnote 46). This result is 
hardly surprising given that the administration itself was struggling to understand 
many aspects of the Vietnam conflict, and at a time when the U.S. public had long 
been exposed to the Cold War rhetoric of its own government. Certainly, some 
critics (including the “Church-McGovern-Pell-Gore-Nelson group” in the Senate, 
the New York Times, and 5,000 “college and university educators”) did criticise the 
government’s policy and/or call for a diplomatic settlement.8 However, as they 
remained a minority, the effect of their criticism was largely confined to an increase 
in pressure on policymakers to intensify their public relations campaigns, rather 
than to rethink their policy direction. This is, of course, not to deny the possibility 
that democracy, on balance, has positive effects on international security: it can 
increase the transparency of its government; and the anti-Vietnam demonstrations 
                                                                        
7 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 356. 
8 Memo, Jonathan Moore to William Bundy, “Congressional Attitudes on SVN” (n.d.), 
JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 25, “Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, General, 
1/65–2/65”; Letter, to the President, “We, 5,000 American College and University 
Educators, Urge A Neutralized Vietnam” (n.d.), JFKL, Thompson Papers, Box 24, 
“Southeast Asia, 1961–1964, Vietnam, General, 9/64–12/64.” 
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in the late 1960s showed that, in certain contexts, democracy can act as a force for 
peace rather than war.9 However, Vietnam also demonstrated that the people do not 
always have the information and analytical expertise necessary for making critical 
judgements about external affairs and their country’s foreign policy, both of which 
are rarely simple or transparent. Furthermore, in a democracy under external threats 
(or what George Kennan called “embattled democracy”) the pressure to mobilise 
and maintain public support though persuasion, rather than coercion, can reduce 
the level of realism in its foreign policy.10 
     Vietnam also draws attention to the possible weaknesses of the Just War 
theory, which is central to international law on the use of force. As to the 
“reasonable chance for success,” all McGeorge Bundy could say to Lyndon 
Johnson when he recommended military action against the DRV in early February 
1965 was that “the odds of success…may be somewhere between 25% and 75%.”11 
The “imminence of threat,” another criterion for a just war, proved equally elusive 
when the main threat in question was an unverifiable risk (such as the possibility of 
a domino-like effect) that was open to wild speculations and could not be disproved 
by evidence. As Howard Zinn explained in 1967: 
 
[Political scientist Robert] Scalapino puts the burden of proof on the 
advocates of withdrawal…it is a curious reversal of the rules of 
evidence in civilian jurisprudence to say that someone under attack 
must present proof to show why the attacker must stop! Surely, it is the 
other way around. Not only must the United States prove why it must 
continue its ferocious assault on Vietnam, but the scale of violence 
demands that it prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. We demand 
unanimity among twelve citizens before we will condemn a single 
person to death, but we will destroy thousands of people on a 
supposition as fragile as Eisenhower’s dominos or Scalapino’s 
checkers. There is a good reason why the “domino theory” is the last 
line of defense for the Vietnam hawks, and why they put the burden of 
disproving it on their critics…This is because the domino theory rests 
on suppositions about the future, which are impossible to prove 
conclusively one way or the other…International affairs are complex, 
and predictions are extremely unreliable. 
 
While this is not to question the benefit of the Just War theory per se, the case of 
Vietnam does underline that it is less likely to function effectively as a means to 
minimise the use of force when leaders are unable and/or unwilling to make a 
sound assessment of the complex situation and to resist the temptation to abuse 
uncertainty.  
                                                                        
9 For the role of the U.S. media during the war, see: Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
10 Kennan as quoted in Zinn, Vietnam, p. 84.  
11 Memo, M Bundy to the President (7 Feb 1964), LBJL, NSF, International Meetings and 
Travel File, Box 28, Folder 2, #2. 
 155 
     Intelligence history is a good place to examine some of these problems. In 
many countries, including the United States, the intelligence community is 
assigned the role that Morgenthau expected from academia: telling the truth to 
those in power. The failure-ridden history of this unique institution provides an 
opportunity to investigate diverse problems associated with the simple principle of 
seeing the world as it is. Along with other historical cases, including the 
intelligence failures before the outbreaks of the two world wars, Vietnam serves as 
a fine showcase of those difficulties. It shows that limitations of realism arose not 
only from the dynamic, unpredictable security situation in and around the RVN but 
also from the practically imperfect and politically charged environment of Vietnam 
policymaking in the U.S. government. The difficult relations between policymakers 
and intelligence analysts also crystallises the tension between political actions and 
truth seeking (or what Isaiah Berlin describes as “the dynamism and falsifying 
influence of passionate, simple, one-sided faith, as against the clear-sighted sense 
of the complex facts and inevitable weakness in action which flows from 
enlightened scepticism”).12 Those problems also draw attention to potential limits 
of international security, for it counts ultimately upon member states’ – and, 
increasingly, many non-state actors’ – ability to be “informed and restrained” by 












                                                                        
12 Isaiah Berlin, “Tolstoy and Enlightenment,” in Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 260. 
13 The United States, Morgenthau contends, “was founded not upon power blindly and 
unrestrainedly pursued, but upon power informed and restrained by truth.” Hans 
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